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ABSTRACT 
 
 The present dissertation includes three essays on initial public offerings (IPO). The first 
chapter investigates the impact of venture capital (VC) syndicate size and diversity on the IPO 
and post-IPO performances of investee companies. We provide evidence that firms backed by 
larger and more diverse VC syndicates experience greater underpricing and lower post-IPO 
profitability. We suggest that this might be the consequence of coordination problems and 
conflicts of interests within large and heterogeneous VC syndicates which ultimately results in 
poorer added value for the investee companies. We also provide some evidence that the negative 
impact of VC syndicate size and diversity on IPO underpricing can be mitigated by the existence 
of alternative monitoring mechanisms such as bank loans. 
 In the second essay, using text sentiment analysis, we investigate the relationship 
between tone, length and information content of prospectuses and underpricing in a sample of 
UK IPOs between 2004 and 2012. The peculiar feature of the UK IPO market is the wide use of 
fixed-priced offerings to go public, which, contrary to bookbuilding, does not allow any price 
discovery. Our results show that, for fixed-priced IPOs, the length of the admission document is 
positively correlated to the offer price and negatively correlated to underpricing and to ex-post 
volatility, whereas different tone and information content in the document seem to matter less. 
We further show that admission documents have become substantially longer for all types of 
IPOs since the recent financial crisis but that their impact on IPO pricing appears to be 
significant only during the pre-crisis period. 
 The last chapter, the third essay, investigates how the market for European IPOs has 
changed, if at all, since the recent financial crisis. For this purpose we have constructed a 
comprehensive dataset of European IPOs between 2000 and 2012. Our research focuses on 
whether and how the costs, both direct and indirect, of going public have changed in the wake of 
the recent financial crisis. Our results suggest that both underpricing and underwriting fees have 
decreased since 2007. A closer look at the underwriting markets also shows that, since the 
financial crisis, underwriters have tended to syndicate more, and that there are some newcomers 
among the top ten underwriters. Additionally, we shed some light on the determinants of going 
public during post-crisis period, and we find that traditional models are of very little use in 
explaining IPO decisions during the recent recession. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Initial public offering (IPO) is one of the key decisions in the life of a company. 
Transition from a private company to a publicly-traded one provides numerous advantages for 
corporations, and the benefits of access to public equity markets include lower cost of capital, the 
attraction of more institutional investors, liquidity of shares, initiation of analyst coverage, 
increased transparency and disclosure, among others. However, those gains come with a price. 
Company owners incur direct and indirect costs that can add up to a significant proportion of the 
proceeds. Direct costs include fees for advisory channels (underwriters, auditors and lawyers) 
and fees for filing and listing, while the indirect costs of placing an IPO are mainly to do with 
underpricing, one of the most puzzling issues in finance. By going public, owners’ shares are 
diluted and companies leave millions “on the table” as a result of underpricing, which is defined 
by the ratio of difference between first-day closing price and offer price to offer price. The extent 
of underpricing fluctuates greatly in different time horizons and market conditions. The US firms 
incur an average underpricing of 21% in the 1960s, 16% in the 1980s, 21% in the 1990s, and 
40% between 2000 and 2004 (Ljungqvist (2007)). Average underpricing for UK firms during the 
period 1959-1990 was 12% (Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994)). With varying levels of 
percentages, underpricing exists in almost all stock markets around the world.  
 The literature on underpricing is immense, and a wide range of theoretical arguments 
accompanied by empirical evidence has been suggested to explain first-day return. Ljungqvist 
(2007) neatly summarizes those explanations, categorizing them into four groups1: agency cost 
approach, institutional explanations, behavioral arguments and asymmetric information models. 
                                                 
1Reviews by Ibbotson (1975) and Ritter and Welch (2002) also classify theoretical arguments into similar groups. 
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Here, I intend only to mention the general underlying notion for each class of model and to show 
how my dissertation contributes to the IPO theories proposed by existing studies. 
i. Agency cost approach 
 When ownership and control are separated, agency conflicts between owners and 
managers arise (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Managers tend to prioritize their personal benefits 
over those of the company. Monitoring provides one mechanism to reduce the conflict between 
principals and agents. Since initial public offerings eventually contribute to the separation of 
ownership and control, principal-agent models attempt to explain underpricing via agency cost 
arguments.  
 Two major models place underpricing in the agency costs context, but present opposite 
explanations. Brennan and Franks (1997) propose that managers can deliberately reduce offer 
price and circumvent monitoring by large shareholders by disperse ownership among the 
shareholders, while Stoughton and Zechner (1998), on the other hand, argue that managers can 
allocate large shares to one investor at lower prices and benefit from monitoring. In this case, 
underpricing plays a role in minimizing agency problems. Although both models have received 
empirical support from the literature, most results are in line with the arguments of Brennan and 
Franks (1997). Smart and Zutter (2003), for example, show that IPOs with non-voting shares 
enjoy less underpricing and attract more institutional investors after the IPO date. 
ii. Institutional Models 
 Institution-based studies attempt to explain underpricing in the context of legal 
environments. One hypothesis is concerned with the relationship between litigation risk and 
underpricing. The basic intuition is that companies intentionally lower price to avoid 
shareholders’ reaction in the form of lawsuits (Ibbotson (1975)). Several papers show that this 
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hypothesis is relevant to the US firms only, and that the likelihood of lawsuits does not have a 
negative economic impact on the IPO firm in countries such as Germany and Japan (see for 
example Ljungqvist (1997)).  
 Another institutional motive is the tax advantages of underpricing. Compensation 
packages usually involve stock option grants that are subject to capital gain taxes, whereby 
managers exploit tax gains by selling shares at a discount, leading to underpricing. Taranto 
(2003) finds that underpricing provides managers with greater profits than selling equity stakes. 
However, as Ljungqvist (2007) points out, boards offer strategic stock options to avoid dilution 
by underpricing, suggesting reversed causality. 
iii. Behavioral Hypotheses 
 IPO underpricing during the bubble period (1999-2000) reached a significant level, with 
some authors claiming that such large increases in initial returns (for example, 65%) are hard to 
explain through earlier hypotheses such as agency-based models or institutional environments. 
Behavioral hypotheses posit that investor sentiment or irrational investors can play a role in 
explaining initial returns. Welch (1992) argues that communication among investors leads to 
informational spillover so that initial investors with favorable information encourage the rest to 
invest. Later stage bids are therefore often motivated by irrational incentives, which helps early 
investors to drive prices up further and enjoy the benefits of greater underpricing.  
 Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2004) propose that investors maintain their optimistic 
expectations about the future performance of the firm. As a result, trading with overoptimistic 
beliefs pushes prices upwards, and it takes longer for prices to revert to the fundamental value of 
the company. Consistent with this view, Ofek and Richardson (2003) document that underpricing 
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takes place because institutional investors exit their positions and sell shares to retailers on the 
first day of trading.  
 Loughran and Ritter (2002) point out another form of behavioral bias that is prevalent 
among issuers rather than investors. They argue that owners are not overly concerned with the 
underpricing because they expect wealth loss to be recouped by retained shares and higher prices 
in the subsequent periods after the issue date.     
iv. Information Asymmetry Hypotheses 
 Asymmetric information arguments have been inspiration for the majority of the IPO 
literature. These are based on the assumption that one of the parties, which can be the issuing 
firm, the outside investor or the underwriter, involved in the transaction is less informed then the 
others (Rock (1986), Beatty and Ritter(1986)). Winners’ curse hypothesis by Rock (1986) 
proposes that uninformed investors’ demand for attractive deal is partly captured by informed 
investors. As a result, uninformed traders obtain all shares that they bid for unattractive deals. 
Information heterogeneity among investors therefore helps those investors with favorable 
information to exploit underpricing, and leads to investors with less information suffering from 
overpricing. 
 Another form of information asymmetry can take place between the issuer and the 
underwriter. Banks with an information advantage may not exert the optimal effort to allocate 
the shares efficiently to uninformed investors. This moral hazard problem was studied as far 
back as two decades ago. In a screening model, issuers design a contract where monitoring of the 
delegate, the underwriter, is costly, and the contract induces optimal effort by allowing the 
underwriter to exploit some underpricing (Baron (1982)). Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) 
provide empirical evidence that in part suggests the opposite of this prediction, finding that 
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underpricing still takes place when underwriters go public, implying no monitoring costs. 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) extend the literature by examining the impact of bookrunners' 
equity shares on underpricing, finding that underpricing is inversely correlated with equity 
holding. 
 When the information friction is between issuers and investors such that outside investors 
are less informed than firms, issuers can signal their quality by means of greater underpricing 
(Ibbotson (1975), Allen and Faulhaber (1989)). By doing so, low-quality firms are deterred from 
mimicking because of its high cost. Such models argue that high-quality firms that provide a 
good taste for investors through greater underpricing can recoup their losses in raising of capital 
in future. This prediction is empirically supported by several studies: Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and 
Welch (1993), for instance, find that negative price reaction to secondary equity offering is lower 
for firms with higher IPO underpricing.   
 One of the key empirical implications of information asymmetry models is about the link 
between ex-ante uncertainty and underpricing (Ritter (1984)). Using issuer or issue-specific 
proxies such as age, sales, industry, or gross proceeds for ex-ante uncertainty, a number of 
studies provide empirical findings that suggest that a lower degree of uncertainty decreases the 
level of underpricing (see for example Ritter (1984), Megginson and Weiss (1991), Ljungqvist 
and Wilhelm (2003), and Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu (2003)). Apart from offer- 
related details, an important information resource for investors is provided by the investment 
banks that issuing firms choose to hire. Owners can curb the extent of underpricing by endorsing 
IPO placement with their own costly choices when marginal benefits outweigh the cost of 
selection. Consistent with this line of argument, certification of the quality of issues by 
prestigious financial intermediaries such as underwriters and auditors can play a role in reducing 
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IPO underpricing by producing soft information (Carter and Manaster (1990), Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri (1994), Michaely and Shaw (1994), Titman and Trueman (1986)).  
 In addition to auditors and underwriters, there are two other important intermediaries that 
can provide financing and hence generate information and certification about issuers. The first of 
these is banks. Banking relationships involving loans and lines of credit convey significant 
information to the markets and equity markets usually react positively to bank loan 
announcements because banks are unique in their monitoring and disciplining skills (Fama 
(1985), James (1987), Diamond (1991, 1994), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994)). As regards 
underpricing, the impact of pre-existing banking relationships is significant. Schenone (2004) 
finds that bank loans initiated before the IPO date lead to approximately 16 to 17% less 
underpricing whereas relation between underwriters and issuers remains less important. The 
second type of financing provider is the venture capital firm. As shown by Barry et al. (1990) 
and Megginson and Weiss (1991), venture capital (VC) firms provide certification and reduce 
the direct and indirect costs of IPO. They find that non-VC backed firms have higher degree of 
underpricing than VC-backed ones. Between 1990 and 2007, almost 45% of IPOs received 
venture capital financing. Thus, role of venture capitalists in the performance of companies on 
IPO date and after is expected to be significant. However, venture capital financing is mostly 
syndicated, and earlier literature has not focused on potential problems within the syndicates.  
 In the first chapter of my dissertation, I empirically investigate the relation between 
agency costs associated with large venture capital (VC) syndicates and the performance of 
investee companies around the IPO date. By addressing concerns about endogeneity problems 
for VC syndication, I provide the evidence that larger VC syndicates experience greater 
underpricing and lower post-IPO profitability. Alternative governance mechanisms and 
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monitoring by banks reduce the negative impact of VC syndicate size on performance. Results 
suggest that agency problems associated with large VC syndicates have a persistent effect on 
company performance.  
 Contribution of my first essay to the literature is thus twofold. Firstly, I provide an 
alternative agency-based explanation for the performance of VC-backed firms around the IPO 
date. The agency problems here revolve around principal-principal agency conflicts, in contrast 
to earlier studies, which are structured around the classic principal-agent framework. The earlier 
venture capital literature that I have mentioned above explores the functions of VCs in the 
information asymmetry context, reaching the conclusion that VC financing provides certification 
which mitigates underpricing. I now add another layer to VC-based explanations in the agency 
cost context, arguing that agency problems within VC firms are significant and robust 
determinants of underpricing.  
 Secondly, I combine two schools of thought: venture capital literature and banking 
literature. Although both VC firms and banks provide capital and guidance to companies prior to 
IPO, the interaction of those two types of funding and its impact on issuers’ performance has not 
yet been investigated. I fill this gap in the first chapter and show that bank financing exerts a 
moderating effect on the negative impact of large VC syndicate size on underpricing. 
 One body of information asymmetry theories of IPOs is bookbuilding theory. According 
to traditional bookbuilding theories, underpricing is required to incentivize institutional investors 
to reveal costly information during pricing process during bookbuilding (Benveniste and Spindt 
(1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990)). Thus, underpricing can be viewed as a compensation to 
investors for generating costly information thereby enabling underwriters a more accurate 
pricing of the IPO (Sherman (2000), Sherman and Titman (2002)). In addition to information 
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extracted from investors, a second source of pre-IPO information is the IPO prospectus. There 
has been a lack of research on the relationship between IPO pricing and information disclosed by 
prospectuses. Recent studies examine the link between the pricing of book-built IPOs and the 
information tone and content of IPO prospectuses. The empirical evidence so far suggests that 
prospectuses have a significant impact on underpricing, pricing accuracy and after market return 
volatility for book-built IPOs (Hanley and Hoberg (2010,2012), Loughran and McDonald 
(2013)). 
 The second chapter of the thesis contributes to this branch of information asymmetry 
theories of IPOs by focusing on the relation between pre-IPO information production and IPO 
pricing. More specifically, we examine the impact of prospectuses of UK IPOs on offer price and 
underpricing between 2004 and 2012. Using textual analysis, we look at the effects of prospectus 
length, tone and information content on underpricing, offer price and post-IPO return volatility. 
Our results show that document length is positively correlated to the offer price and negatively 
correlated to underpricing and to ex-post return volatility for a sample of fixed-priced IPOs. The 
tone and information content of prospectuses, on the other hand, seem to matter less.  
 Our key departure from previous studies in the second chapter lies in the fact that we 
make a comparison between the impact of prospectus information on IPO pricing for two 
different pricing mechanisms: bookbuilding and fixed-pricing. There has been very little research 
on fixed-priced IPOs, despite the fact that the specific feature of the UK IPO market is the large 
dominance of fixed-priced IPO mechanisms. Unlike book-built IPOs, fixed-priced IPOs are not 
underwritten, and thus price discovery does not take place once the offer price is fixed. It is 
therefore an open question how the impact of pre-market information production for fixed-priced 
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IPOs, as measured by length, tone and content of prospectuses, differs from that of book-built 
issues. By looking at the UK market, we are able to fill this gap.  
 My third essay, Chapter Three, investigates varying costs and determinants of IPO 
decision over time by incorporating the effects of the recent 2008 financial crisis into the 
account. We show that pre-crisis IPO determinants have little explanatory power during the 
period after 2007. Empirical results show that during the recent recession the standard 
determinants proposed by existing literature can only explain 5% of variation in the likelihood of 
an IPO. More importantly, industry-based market-to-book ratio appears to make opposite 
predictions in the pre-crisis and during-crisis regimes. Our second set of findings are related to 
variation in costs of going public. We document that IPO costs, as measured by underwriting 
fees and underpricing, have significantly fallen in the EU but not in the US since 2007. In 
addition, underwriters tend to syndicate more, and top-ten underwriter list has seen a number of 
new players during the recession. 
 The final chapter makes two main contributions to IPO literature. Firstly, this study is 
among the very few empirical papers focusing on the determinants of IPOs. The reason why 
there have been so few empirical studies on IPO determinants is the lack of available data for 
private companies, which makes it difficult to design a setting where both private and public 
companies are compared. Our data on a large number of private UK companies overcome this 
issue. Moreover, our analysis incorporates the impact of market downturns on IPO decisions by 
examining the effects of the recent 2008 crisis. The study's second contribution is about the 
variation in costs involved in going public. Underpricing and gross spread are the two main costs 
of IPO, and with the 2008 financial crisis, there has been major concern over investment banks' 
reputation spillover and hence their role in the recession. Examining the fees charged by banks 
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and syndicate dynamics both before and during the crisis periods in both EU and the US, we 
extend the scope of literature and findings by Chen and Ritter (2000) and Abrahamson, 
Jenkinson and Jones (2011). 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
 
Size and Diversity in VC Syndicates and Their Impact on IPO Performances 
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“Too many people on the board, misalignment of interests,…, whenever you’ve got at least four 
VCs sitting around a table, you run the risk of a decision vacuum …” 
 – Brad Feld – Managing Director of Foundry Group. 
1.1. Introduction 
 The impact of venture capital (VC) financing on IPO performances has been extensively 
researched over the years as it provides an indirect test of whether VCs do indeed create value 
for their portfolio companies. Two contrasting hypotheses have emerged and received support in 
the literature. Some papers provide support to the certification hypothesis according to which VC 
backing results in lower first day returns at the IPO date because, in essence, VCs certify the 
quality of the companies they take public (Megginson and Weiss (1991)). In contrast, several 
other papers document the opposite result that VC backing seems to be associated with larger 
underpricing (Hamao et al. (2000), Lee and Wahal (2004), Gompers and Lerner (1997)). This 
evidence is consistent with the grandstanding hypothesis (Gompers (1996)) according to which 
VCs tend to take firms public prematurely in order to increase their reputation. 
 The majority of the venture capital literature compares VC-backed IPOs with non-VC-
backed ones. However, Tian (2011) reports that approximately 88% of VC-backed firms that 
went public in the period between 1980 and 2005 were funded by a syndicate (i.e. by two or 
more VCs). Yet, despite this impressive figure, to date there are very few papers that try to assess 
whether the size and composition of the VC syndicate plays a role in determining the short and 
long run performances of their portfolio companies.  
 This paper aims to shed some light on this specific dimension of VC financing by 
investigating the impact of VC syndicate size and composition on the underpricing and long-run 
performances of a sample of VC-backed US IPOs in the period between 1990 and 2007. 
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 The reason why we conjecture that IPO firms backed by large and more diverse VC 
syndicates perform differently from those backed by small and relatively more homogeneous VC 
syndicates is that VC syndicates represent an example of multiple principals monitoring a 
common agent in a moral hazard environment, where these principals are likely to have 
conflicting interests and misaligned objectives. The finance literature, both theoretical and 
empirical, has often stressed how similar situations tend to suffer from coordination, 
communication and free riding problems which ultimately prevent an optimal solution of the 
agency problem vis a vis the agent (Khalil et al. (2007), Carletti et al. (2007)). Prior research on 
syndicated private equity investments, including on firms that are later taken public, emphasize 
that goal incongruence and different decision making horizons among the involved investors 
may lead to internal agency conflicts that weaken the potential certification benefits of VC 
backing (Bruton et al. (2010), Chahine et al. (2012)). Similarly, in the banking literature, Carletti 
et al. (2007) theoretically show that multiple-bank lending is characterized by a strong free riding 
problem among principals which, in instances where the conflict of interest is very severe, might 
ultimately result in under-monitoring of the agent and hence a poor mitigation of the moral 
hazard problem.2  
 More recently, Dass et al. (2012) provide both theoretical and empirical support to the 
existence of conflicts of interest within lending syndicates. In a similar vein, an extensive 
empirical literature documents a negative relation between the size of corporate boards and firm 
performances. Yermack (1996), Eisenberg et al. (1998), and Bennedsen et al. (2008) provide 
strong support to Jensen’s view that “When boards get beyond seven or eight people they are less 
likely to function effectively and are easier for the CEO to control” (Jensen (1993)). Along the 
                                                 
2
 Khalil et al. (2007) provides a very similar result in a more general multiple-principals context stressing the role of 
conflicting preferences among principals. 
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same lines, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) conclude that “large boards exacerbate some free 
riding problems among directors vis-à-vis the monitoring of management”.  
 We suggest that coordination and free-riding problems are likely to affect large VC 
syndicates as well, particularly when this is also associated with greater diversity of the VCs 
involved in the syndicates. Hence, VC syndicates are likely to be characterized by conflicting 
preferences and objectives (Chemmanur et al. (2011), Chahine et al. (2012)). 
 However, VC investment represents one of many governance mechanisms at play in an 
IPO firm. Very often, firms are coming to the stock market with a substantial amount of debt 
which underpins another important governance mechanism associated with fixed claims holders 
(Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Hart (1995)). These alternative governance mechanisms may 
operate in concert with VC funding, and monitoring by other lenders may, to some extent, 
compensate for agency problems embedded within a VC syndicate. 
 The contribution of this paper is thus twofold. First, we test our conjecture that large and 
more diverse VC syndicates suffer from conflicts of interest, and hence lead to poor performance 
of the companies they take public. We look at both short and long term IPO performance 
measures where the short term performance is proxied by the first day return (underpricing) and 
long term performance is measured by several indicators including industry adjusted return on 
assets (ROA) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR).  
 Secondly, we investigate whether the existence of an alternative monitoring mechanism 
such as bank financing is able to curb the inefficiencies caused by large and heterogeneous VC 
syndicates.  
 After controlling for the endogeneity of VC syndicate size, we find that our results provide 
strong support to the first hypothesis and are robust to alternative measures of diversity and size. 
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We show that IPOs underpricing increases in both the size and the diversity of the VC 
syndicates, whereas long run operating and stock performances decrease in both measures. With 
respect to the second hypothesis, we document that, in line with the existing literature, bank 
lending has a positive impact on IPO performances also for VC-backed IPOs. In addition, we do 
provide some evidence that bank financing has a moderation effect on VC size and diversity.  
 As previously discussed, very few papers to date specifically look at whether the size of 
VC syndicates does matter in explaining the performance of their portfolio companies. One 
notable exception is a recent paper by Tian (2011) which compares the performance of 
syndicate-backed and single-backed IPO companies in a sample of IPOs from 1980 to 2005. His 
results show that syndicate-backed IPOs generally outperform single VC-backed IPOs in the 
short as well as in the long run. He further documents that VC syndicates are more likely to 
successfully exit their investment through either IPOs or M&As. However, Tian (2011) does not 
differentiate VC syndicates according to their size which is the focus of our analysis. Although, 
Tian (2011) controls for the number of VCs, this variable appears to be insignificant in all model 
specifications. In his concluding remarks, Tian (2011) acknowledges that his results are to some 
extent at odds with the potential cost associated with VC syndication documented in the 
literature.  
 The novelty of our paper is to explore this specific dimension of VC financing in greater 
detail by looking not only at the size but also at the diversity within the VC syndicate. In 
addition, we investigate possible ways to mitigate the costs associated with large and diverse VC 
syndicates through alternative governance mechanisms. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature 
and develop our testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample. The methodology is 
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detailed in Section 4 while the results and robustness tests are discussed in Section 5. The last 
section concludes. 
1.2. Literature Review 
 In this section, we review the literature that is most closely related to our paper. As the 
paper links with several strands of the literature, we divide this section accordingly.  
1.2.1. VC Syndicate Size and IPO Performance 
 Large VC syndicates are likely to involve different types of investors with divergent 
objectives. We argue that several inefficiencies can arise as syndicate size grows3. Firstly, 
participating VCs might have very different objectives and this can cause misalignment of 
interests. In a model of strategic venturing, Hellmann (2002) argues for instance that private 
independent VCs look only for financial profits whereas corporate VCs pursue multiple goals 
including achieving strategic gains along with financial returns. Such misalignments of interests 
among the principals are expected to influence strategic decisions such as exit timing and share 
disposals. Consistently, Arping and Falconieri (2010) develop a model that shows how corporate 
VCs might be less effective at terminating non-performing ventures than financial VCs thereby 
causing ex-ante a sub-optimal effort provision by the entrepreneur.  
 Chahine et al. (2012) examine the relation between the degree of diversity within a VC 
syndicate and earnings management in a sample of 274 VC-backed IPOs in the UK and the US. 
They construct an index of VC syndicate diversity that encompasses several dimensions such as 
VC affiliation, age, and origin. Their findings show that VC syndicate diversity increases the 
                                                 
3
 In this paper, we take the size of the VC syndicate as given and hence we do not address the question of what 
determines the size of a VC syndicate. There is a quite extensive literature that addresses the question of why VCs 
come together to form a syndicate. Some of the explanations suggested by the theory include the benefits from risk 
diversification (Lockett and Wright (1999, 2001), the need of a second opinion particularly in cases of high 
uncertainty (Lerner (1994), Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2007), Cestone, Lerner, and White (2006)), the value 
added by bringing in VCs with complementary skills (Brander, Amit and Antweiller (2002)), and the benefits of 
building a network that can ensure more deals in the future (Lockett and Wright (2001)). 
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likelihood of earnings management and the impact is stronger for the US IPOs. They motivate 
the result as being the consequence of stronger conflicts of interest within more diverse 
syndicates which ultimately leads to poor monitoring of the investee companies. They also 
document that earning management leads to a poorer IPO performance. Du (2011) studies the 
effect of heterogeneity on the performance of VC syndicates. She argues that the costs of 
heterogeneity in terms of miscommunication, misaligned objectives and often inefficient 
decision making need to be traded off against the benefits in terms of learning opportunities in 
the long run. Consistent with her conjecture, she provides evidence that heterogeneous 
syndicates tend to have lower exit rates but longer survival rates. 
 The literature has often stressed that large financial syndicates lead to sub-optimal level of 
monitoring of the borrowing company because of free-riding problems among the syndicate 
members and this applies equally to VC syndicates and bank syndicates. In a recent paper, 
Chemmanur and Tian (2011) develop a model to explain the dynamics of VC syndicate 
formation. Their model formalizes the idea that VCs need to provide effort in order to add value 
to the entrepreneur’s project and in the context of co-financing, they may be encouraged to free-
ride on one another thereby causing an under-effort provision. In this framework, they are able to 
predict which types of venture should opt for a single VC rather than a syndicate and how, in the 
latter case, the composition of the VC syndicate evolves over time. Similarly, in the banking 
literature Carletti et al. (2007) theoretically examine the effect of free-riding problems in the 
context of multiple banking relationships. They argue that as the number of banks increases, the 
benefits from more risk diversification need to be traded off against more severe free riding 
problems resulting in sub-optimal monitoring efforts. 
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 From the above discussion, it seems plausible to assume that the size of the VC syndicates 
matters when it comes to assessing the IPO performances of their investee companies. The 
largest part of the existing literature has focused on comparing the IPO performance of VC-
backed firms with non VC-backed ones. In the short term, IPO performances is typically 
measured by the underpricing, that is the price spike of a firm’s stock at the opening of the 
trading on the secondary market4. Several pioneering studies have linked IPO underpricing to 
venture capital backing but reached different conclusions. On the one hand, using a matched 
sample of 320 VC-backed and non VC-backed IPOs between 1983 and 1987, Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) document that VC-backed IPOs exhibit lower underpricing than non-VC-backed 
IPOs. They explain this evidence by arguing that VC financing, very much in the same way as 
bank financing, provides certification to outside investors about the quality of the listing 
company, and thus mitigates the adverse selection problem. They also show that VC-backed 
IPOs typically have more experienced underwriters and lower underwriting fees.  
 Barry et al. (1990) specifically examine the relation between IPO underpricing and the 
quality of monitoring provided by venture capitalists. For a sample of 433 VC-backed US IPOs 
completed during the period 1978-1987, the authors document that VC firms hold quite large 
equity positions, on average 34 percent of shares, and nominate approximately one-third of the 
IPO’s board. They argue that VCs closely monitor their portfolio companies and hence are able 
to certify the quality of the offering. They conjecture that IPO underpricing should decrease with 
the quality of monitoring and propose six different proxies of the VCs’ quality of monitoring to 
test this conjecture, one of these being the number of venture capitalists. Their findings suggest 
                                                 
4
 The focus of this paper is not on IPO undepricing per se. Hence, we refer to Ritter and Welch (2002) and 
Ljungqvist (2007) for a survey of the literature.   
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that the number of VCs carries the expected negative sign but with a weak statistical and 
economic significance.  
 On the other hand, Gompers (1995) developed a theoretical model where new venture 
capital firms have an incentive to take their portfolio companies public earlier than what would 
be optimal in order to increase their reputation and hence their future fund flow. Subsequent 
research has tested the predictions of the “grandstanding hypothesis” formalized by Gompers 
(1995). For instance, Lee and Wahal (2004) test the grandstanding hypothesis on a sample of 
6,413 IPOs between 1980 and 2000 of which 37% consists of VC-backed IPOs. After controlling 
for the endogeneity of the VC financing decision, they find that VC-backed IPOs are underpriced 
more than non VC-backed IPOs and the difference ranges from 2% in the period 1980-1998 to 
25% during the internet bubble (1998-2000). They interpret this result by arguing that a 
successful IPO enables VC to raise more funds in the future and confirm their conjecture by 
documenting a positive relationship between IPO underpricing and future fund-raising.  
 Finally, Bradley and Jordan (2002) show that the first day return of VC-backed IPOs is not 
significantly different from that of non VC-backed IPO after controlling for industry, listing 
exchange and underwriter quality.  
 At present, few papers have investigated whether the size of the VC syndicate plays a role 
in explaining the first day return. This paper attempts to fill this gap. The closest paper to ours is 
Tian (2011) which compares the value creation of VC syndicates as opposed to that of a single 
VC. The author looks at several dimensions to assess the value creation which includes the exit 
mode, the degree of innovation, and also short and long run IPO performance. 
 In our analysis, we specifically focus on the effect of size and diversity of VC syndicates 
on IPO performances. More importantly, we are interested in investigating whether the potential 
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negative impact of large and diverse syndicates on IPO underpricing can be mitigated by the 
existence of alternative monitoring mechanisms such as bank lending.  
 Banks have traditionally been viewed as delegated monitors (Diamond (1984, 1991)) 
whose comparative advantage relative to the market is their expertise to closely monitor the 
borrower.  
 The governance role of bank loans is intuitively of great importance to IPO companies 
which suffer from severe adverse selection problems vis-à-vis the market. Not surprisingly, 
several papers in the IPO literature have investigated whether the existence of credit 
relationships prior to the IPO date improves the IPO performance, by reducing the first day 
return. The existing evidence provides strong support to this conjecture.  
 For instance, using a sample of 316 US IPO between 1980 and 1984 Slovin and Young 
(1990) find that pre-existing bank loans or credit lines significantly reduce IPO initial returns. 
Similarly, James and Wier (1990) develop a theoretical model that show how established credit 
relationship at the IPO date reduces the ex-ante uncertainty about the firm’s value and hence the 
underpricing. They test the predictions of their model on a sample of 549 US IPOs between 1980 
and 1983 and document that firms with borrowing relationship before the IPO date are 
underpriced less than companies that have no credit history.  
 Schenone (2004) investigates the role of relationship banks – i.e. banks that have an 
established lending relationship with the IPO firm - that decide to act as underwriter in the IPO 
of a borrowing company. The repeal of the Glass-Steagall act in 1998 has allowed commercial 
banks to compete with investment banks to secure underwriting mandates. An obvious concern is 
the potential conflict of interest arising when a relationship bank also acts as the underwriter of 
the firm. Using a sample of 306 US IPOs between 1998 and 2000, Schenone (2004) finds that 
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pre-existing lending relationship with a potential bookrunner at the IPO date results in 
approximately 16% less underpricing even though the relationship bank has ultimately not acted 
as a bookrunner in the IPO. She explains her results by arguing that relationship banks have a 
strong certification role because they hold a lot of information about the firm and they are, thus, 
better able to mitigate asymmetric information problems.  
 More recently, Neupane and Poshakwale (2010) investigate the relationship between new 
bank loans and IPO underpricing. They study a sample of Indian IPOs between 2001 and 2008 
and focus on companies that take new bank loans shortly before the IPO date. They find that 
even very new bank loan results in lower underpricing at the IPO date because the bank 
screening required to be granted a loan is, per se, a positive signal about the firm’s quality, 
reducing the ex ante uncertainty about the firm’s value. 
1.2.2. VC Syndicate Size and Post-IPO performance 
VC firms tend to maintain significant equity holdings in the post-IPO periods within the lock-up 
arrangements. Cumming and MacIntosh (2003) provide cross country evidence that VCs often 
partially exit their portfolio companies and retain a large part of their holdings beyond one year 
after the IPO. Their evidence is consistent with other studies. For instance, using a sample of US 
IPOs between 1983 and 1987, Megginson and Weiss (1991) find that VC ownership reduces 
from 36.6% of the firm before the IPO date to 26.3% after the offer date, suggesting that VCs 
effectively maintain the majority of their equity stake even after the IPO. These authors argue 
that this is a commitment device or “bonding mechanism”. Similarly, Barry et al. (1990) show 
that, in their sample of 433 US VC-backed IPOs between 1978 and 1987, venture capitalists sell 
on average 6.6% of their per-IPO equity stake at the offering. However, 58% of them do not sell 
any of their shares. The authors explain that “By retaining their share ownership after the 
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offering, the venture capitalists can provide assurance of continued monitoring and can credibly 
signal their belief in the firm’s prospects”. Krishnan et al. (2011) find similar results in a more 
recent sample of US IPOs between 1993 and 2004. They document that VCs maintain a 
significant equity stake until three years after the IPO. Specifically they find that the lead VC 
equity position at the IPO date averages 9.4% and declines to 8.05%, 7.70% and 6.62% in the 
first, second and third year after the IPO respectively.  
 If VC firms do keep a substantial share of their holdings in their portfolio companies after 
the listing and remain strongly involved in their governance and monitoring, then it is no surprise 
that this will affect the companies’ long-run performance.  
 Jain and Kini (1995) compare the long-run operating performance of VC-backed IPOs and 
non-VC-backed IPOs during the period 1976-1988. They construct a matched sample of 272 
VC-backed and non VC-backed and compare the post-IPO operating performance measured by 
return on assets, cash flows/total assets, sales growth and capital expenditure growth. They find 
that VC-backed IPOs significantly outperform non-VC-backed ones for each of their measures 
over three years after the IPO date. 
 Brav and Gompers (1997) investigate the long-run performance of VC-backed IPOs by 
looking at the cumulative abnormal stock returns on a sample of 934 VC-backed IPOs between 
1972 and 1992. They construct the CAR measure using four different benchmarks: the S&P 500, 
the value-weighted NASDAQ composite index, the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX index, and the 
equally-weighted NYSE/AMEX index. They find that, when using equally weighted CARs, VC-
backed IPOs do outperform non VC-backed IPOs. However, they also find that VC-backed firms 
with low book-to-market value significantly underperform non VC-backed firms when using 
Fama-French (1993) three factor model to measure long-run performance.  
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 Finally, Krishnan et al. (2011) examine the relation between VC firm reputation and post-
IPO performance of the portfolio company. For a sample of 1503 VC-backed IPOs between 
1993 and 2004, they find that more reputable lead VCs get actively involved in the management 
of the portfolio companies, and VC reputation is positively related to the firm’s long-run 
performance proxied by return on assets, market to book equity ratio, survival, and long run 
abnormal stock returns. 
 None of the papers discussed above does however distinguishes between single versus 
syndicate-backed firms. The notable exception as previously discussed is Tian (2011) and his 
findings seem to suggest that syndicate-backed IPO firms outperform single-backed ones in the 
long run. Tian (2011) however does not specifically address the question of whether the size of 
the VC syndicate and more importantly its composition might also play a role in determining the 
long run IPO performances. In his regressions, he does control for the number of VCs but the 
variable appears to be insignificant in all model specifications which, as he acknowledges in his 
concluding discussion, is at odds with the potential cost associated with VC syndication 
documented in the literature. 
1.2.3. Hypotheses 
  Following the previous discussion, we can now summarize the hypotheses we aim to test:  
 H1: The IPO underpricing depends on the size of the VC syndicate. 
 Syndicate size as the number of all financing VCs might not be an adequate measure 
because it is possible that the financing is in fact concentrated in the hands of few VCs. Similar 
situations should intuitively result in a more concentrated control over the investee company and 
hence stronger incentives for the VC to actively and effectively monitor. Hence, we expect that 
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more concentrated VC funding has a positive impact on IPO underpricing. Therefore, assuming 
we find support to our first conjecture, we then test the following ancillary hypothesis: 
  H1a: More concentrated VC funding reduces IPO underpricing. 
We measure the concentration of funding by constructing a Hirfindhal index based on the 
financial contribution of each VC in the syndicate.  
 The argument behind the first hypothesis is that IPO underpricing would be increasing in 
the size of the syndicate as a result of fiercer coordination problems and conflict of interests. To 
corroborate our conjecture we subsequently investigate the impact of greater diversity within the 
syndicate on IPO performances. More diverse syndicates would in fact exacerbate internal 
agency problems. Hence the next hypothesis: 
 H2: IPO underpricing depends on the degree of diversity of the VC syndicate. 
As we will explain later we construct two different proxies of diversity.  
 Linking to the existing results in the IPO literature, we next examine whether the existence 
of bank loans does help IPO firms backed by large VC syndicates to reduce their underpricing.  
 H3: Bank financing reduces the negative impact of VC syndicate size on IPO underpricing. 
This hypothesis aims to test whether bank financing has a moderation effect on VC syndicate 
size (and diversity). That is, ceteris paribus, IPO firms backed by larger VC syndicates benefits 
more from having bank loans than IPO firms backed by smaller VC syndicates.  
And finally, the last hypothesis we test is the following: 
 H4: The long-run performances of VC-backed IPOs depend on the size and degree of 
diversity of VC syndicates.  
  
33 
 
 Our conjecture is that the negative impact of large and diverse VC syndicates is long lasting 
and might affect the company value in the long term. Hence, we expect a negative correlation 
between long run performances and VC size and diversity.  
1.3. Data and Sample Selection 
 Data used in this study are obtained from various sources including Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) New Issues, Venture Economics, Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan 
(LPC), Compustat, and CRSP. The sample is composed of VC-backed IPOs over the period 
January 1990- December 2007. We use a cut-off year of 2007 so that our analysis is not affected 
by the 2008-2009 financial crisis. 
 IPO related measures come mainly from SDC Platinum New Issues. To be consistent with 
earlier studies, we eliminate financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), utilities (SIC 
codes between 4900 and 4999), equity carve outs, foreign issues, depository offerings, Real 
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), closed-end-fund investments, unit issues, leveraged buyouts 
(LBOs) and IPOs with offer price less than 5 dollars. We obtain supplementary company level 
characteristics such as company age at the time of IPO and underwriter bank reputation from 
Prof. Jay Ritter’s website5. 
 We get details about the VC financing from Venture Economics. Venture Economics 
provides several important details such as disclosed round amount, VC firm investment focus, 
VC firm affiliation and round number among others. The record of venture-backed IPO offerings 
come from merging SDC New Issues with SDC Venture Economics tapes6. As highlighted by 
Tian (2011), there are some discrepancies between SDC and Venture Economics. Specifically, 
during the matching process, we identify several observations that SDC New Issues database 
                                                 
5
 http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm 
6
 We perform matching by using Cusip numbers. For the observations that have missing Cusip, we carry out the 
matching with company names. 
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mistakenly code as non-VC-backed for which we can in fact find corresponding round based 
financing records in Venture Economics. These observations are included in our final sample. 
Using Compustat tapes, we then obtain accounting and balance sheet data for our sample 
observations. 
 Return data are obtained from Center for Research in Security Prices at the University of 
Chicago (CRSP). Private loan agreements are retrieved from Loan Pricing Corporation’s 
DealScan (LPC) which provides details on coupon, deal maturity, loan size, use of proceeds, 
syndicating banks, general covenants, and seniority structure. DealScan's coverage for all 
commercial U.S. loans in early 90s ranges from 50% to 75%. The coverage ratio improves after 
1995. To match our IPO sample with the bank variables, we use GVKEY number and name of 
the company provided by DealScan7. After all filtering and merging, our final sample is 
composed of 1515 VC-backed IPOs. 
1.4. Methodology 
1.4.1. VC syndicate size and IPO performance 
 In this section, we test our first hypothesis which looks at the relationship between the VC 
syndicate size and IPO underpricing. To do this, we run the following OLS regression  
  
Underpricing = α + β1VCSize + β2LeadVCRep + β3Log(Sales) +β4 Log(Age)+β4 Log(Proceeds)   
   + β5 Rank + β6 MarketReturn +   Industry Dummies +  Year Dummies                (1) 
 
 The dependent variable in equation (1) is IPO Underpricing defined as 
OP
OPP 
100
1
 
where, in line with most of the existing literature, P  is the first available closing price after floatation 
and OP  is the offering price. On the right hand side of equation (1), our variable of interest is VCSize 
                                                 
7
 We are indebted to Prof. Michael Roberts for sharing Compustat identifiers that allow me to merge Dealscan Loan 
data to accounting data from Compustat. See Chava and Roberts (2008) for a description of these identifiers. 
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which measures the number of VCs in the syndicate. We construct this variable by counting the 
number of distinct VCs that provide financing to the firm before the IPO date and taking the sum 
as our VC syndicate size proxy.  
 Gompers (1996) argues that VC reputation is key in future fundraisings. Hence to control 
for VC reputation, we take the reputation of the lead VC where the lead VC is defined, following 
Lee and Wahal (2004) and Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2007), as the venture firm that makes 
the largest investment across all financing rounds8. Our reputation proxy, LeadVCRep, is then 
defined as the lead VC’s IPO market share during the three year period prior to the first 
investment round. Similar to Krishnan et al. (2010) and Nahata (2008), for a given IPO, the IPO 
market share is constructed as the aggregate net proceeds of all IPOs backed by the same lead 
VC normalized by the aggregate net proceeds of all IPOs over the three years prior to the first 
round of financing. For example, if the portfolio company had received the first financing in 
1994, then VC reputation measure is the ratio of total net proceeds IPOs backed by the same lead 
VC between 1991 and 1993 to the total net proceeds of all IPOs completed over the same years. 
In those cases where the portfolio company has multiple lead VCs, the reputation is taken to be 
the average reputation of all lead VCs.   
 Previous theoretical and empirical results indicate that greater ex-ante uncertainty about the 
firm’s value is likely to result in higher underpricing (Rock (1986), Beatty and Ritter (1986)). To 
control for the impact of ex-ante uncertainty, we include in our regression some company 
characteristics that are typically used as uncertainty proxies, namely (the log of) sales, company 
age, and IPO proceeds (Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Loughran and Ritter (2004)). We expect 
                                                 
8
 The results are robust to alternative definitions of the lead VC such as the VC who makes the first investment.  
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Age and Sales to be negatively correlated with IPO underpricing while Proceeds is usually 
positively related to the first day return.   
   The variable Rank denotes the lead underwriter’s rank which we obtain from Loughran 
and Ritter’s (2004) classification. The underwriter’s rank ranges from 1 to 9 with higher rank 
denoting more reputable underwriters. The higher the underwriter’s reputation is the lower the 
underpricing is (Megginson and Weiss (1991), Habib and Ljungqvist (2001)). 
 Finally, we control for market and industry conditions by including industry dummies, year 
dummies and the variable MarketReturn defined as mean value-weighted CRSP index return 
over the month before the issue date (Loughran and Ritter (2004), Lowry and Schwert (2004))9.  
 To test hypothesis H1a, we then replace VCSize by a Herfindahl Index constructed as 
follows. For each company, we compute the percentage share of each VC's total investment 
relative to total funding received across all financing rounds until the IPO date. We then take the 
squared sum of those percentages to get the Herfindahl concentration index labeled as VCH-
index. 
1.4.2. VC Diversity and IPO underpricing 
 The second step is to test the impact of VC syndicate diversity on first day return. We 
construct two different proxies of diversity. The first proxy for diversity we propose is based on 
the VC firm affiliation. VCs with different affiliations, e.g. investment bank affiliated VC firms 
vs. corporate VC firms, are likely to have different objectives and different investment horizons. 
Hence our first proxy, labeled as VCDiversity1, captures this and it is given by the total number 
of different VC affiliations represented in a syndicate. To identify the type of affiliation, we use 
                                                 
9
 We control for outliers and multicollinearity among the variables. Pairwise variable analysis based on the VIF 
(variance inflation factor) reveals that there is no sign of collinearity among the variables used in equation (1) 
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the affiliation classification compiled by Venture Economics which categorizes VCs in 14 
different affiliations. The variable takes values between 1 and 14 with a mean value of 3.18.  
 The second proxy of diversity we use, labeled as VCDiversity2, is based on the number of 
different industry preferences represented in a syndicate. To construct this proxy, we rely on the 
industry classification defined by Venture Economics which recognizes 88 different industries. 
We are able to identify the industry preferences of all the VCs in our sample. This measure of 
diversity takes values between 1 and 11 in our sample with a mean value of 4.12. It should be 
noted that both diversity measures are highly correlated with the VCSize proxy – the correlation 
coefficient is 0.71 and 0.90 respectively for the two measures – thereby clearly suggesting that 
the diversity of a VC syndicate does increase with its size as it should be expected. We then run 
equation (1) replacing VCSize with the two diversity proxies. A comprehensive list of the key 
variables used in our analysis can be found in Appendix A.  
1.4.3. The moderation effect of bank financing 
  The third hypothesis we want to test focuses on the moderation effect, if any, of bank 
financing which represents a strong alternative monitoring mechanism.  
For this purpose we augment equation (1) as follows to incorporate the effect of bank loan: 
 
 Underpricing = α + β1VCSize + β2Bank Loan + β3VCSize * Bank Loan + β4LeadVCRep  
  + β5 Log(Sales) + β6 Log(Age) + β7 Log(Proceeds) + β8 Rank  
  + β9 MarketReturn +  Industry Dummies +  Year Dummies                     (2) 
 
 The variable Bank Loan is defined as the firm’s total amount (in dollar value) of bank 
loans over the firm’s total assets. It measures the direct effect of bank financing on IPO 
performances for VC-backed IPOs. However, for the purpose of our analysis, we are specifically 
interested in testing whether the existence of bank lending can help mitigate the negative impact 
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of large and diverse VC syndicates on IPO underpricing. In order to capture this effect, we 
interact Bank Loan with VCSize and, if there is indeed a moderation effect, we should find a 
negative coefficient estimate associated to the interaction term10. 
1.4.4. Controlling for Endogeneity: Instrumental Variable and 2SLS 
 One potential problem with VC syndicate size is represented by the fact that size might be 
endogenously determined. For example, small VC syndicates can experience less IPO 
underpricing and better long term performances because of the portfolio company’s specific 
features. More specifically, ex-ante deals that look to be promising might result in smaller VC 
syndicates simply because VCs are less concerned about diversifying the risk in these firms and 
also because they want to appropriate all the benefits generated by the potentially profitable 
ventures. In other words, we might be facing a problem of reversed causality which makes our 
VC syndicate size proxy endogenous in the regressions and leads to biased OLS estimators11. 
 Hence, we deal with the potential endogeneity problem of a syndicate formation by using 
the instrumental variable (IV) method in a 2SLS regression. We run the following first stage 
regression to determine the VC syndicate size: 
 VCSize = α + β1Start-up + β2Early + β3Expansion + β4Later + β5Bank Loan  
   + β6 LeadVCRep + β7Log(Age) + β8Log(Proceeds) + β10Rank + β13MarketReturn  
   +  Industry Dummies +  Year Dummies                           (3) 
 
where we instrument our endogenous variable with the development stage of the investee 
company at the first round of financing. We include four development stages; start-up/seed, 
early, expansion, and later12. Tian (2011) documents that the development stages of the investee 
company have a clear impact on the size of the VC syndicates. The rationale for this is that 
                                                 
10
 Results remain qualitatively the same if we use a dummy variable that takes value 1 is the firm has bank lending 
and 0 otherwise. 
11
 See also Tian (2011) for a discussion on the potential endogeneity of this variable. 
12
 We leave out the buyout stage which will be our benchmark stage. 
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companies at different development stage would have different financing needs which would 
ultimately affect the number of financing VCs13. 
 The second stage regression of 2SLS model is the same as equation (1) with the exception 
that the VC syndicate size has been replaced by its predicted value generated by the first stage 
regression. The same approach is used to correct for potential endogeneity problems of the VC 
diversity proxies.  
1.4.5. VC syndicate size and long-run firm performance 
 In this section, we test our last hypothesis which aims to investigate if the VC syndicate 
size also affects the long term performances of the portfolio companies that are taken public.
 To study the impact of VC syndicate size on long-run IPO performances, we look at 
operating as well as stock performances by using three alternative proxies: 
i.) Return on assets (ROA),  
ii.) Ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) 
to total assets (TA), 
iii.) Value weighted and equally weighted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). 
 To make sure that the ROA and EBITDA/TA are truly reflecting the firm’s operating 
performances and not some common industry trends, we adjust them for possible industry 
effects. In order to do this, following Krishnan et al. (2011), we identify for each IPO firm its 
industry classification based on the Fama-French 48 industry categorization. Next, we calculate 
the median ROA and EBITDA/TA for each industry group and we finally subtract these median 
values from the ROA and EBITDA/TA of each sample firm in that industry.  
 We then run the following OLS regression:  
 
 
                                                 
13
 We discuss the suitability of this instrument in the Result section. 
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ROA (or EBITDA/TA) = α + β1VCSize + β2Bank Loan+ β3LeadVCRep + β4Log(Age)  
    + β5 Log(Sales) + β6Log(Proceeds)+ β7Nasdaq + β8Internet + β9Rank  
    +  Industry Dummies +  Year Dummies             (4) 
 
We complement the analysis by also looking at the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
over the three years following the IPO. 
 For an IPO firm i, the CAR is defined as                  where                     the abnormal return of firm i in month t.         represents the expected return and it 
is replaced by value weighted (and equally weighted) monthly market return. We calculate the 
CAR for 1, 2 and 3 years after the IPO date and compare the CAR of firms backed by large VC 
syndicate with that of firms backed by small VC syndicates. 
In the next section, we report and discuss the results of our analysis. 
1.5. Results 
1.5.1. Summary Statistics 
 The distribution of VC-backed IPOs over the sample period (1990-2007) is presented in 
Panel A in Table 1.1. It appears clear that the number of issues is not evenly distributed across 
the sample period. Not surprisingly, the peak of the IPO activity takes place during the internet 
bubble years, followed by a slowdown in the subsequent years. The Dotcom period has a total of 
400 IPOs, covering approximately 26 percent of the full sample. The mean syndicate size is 5.86 
for the whole sample period and becomes higher, 6.98, during the internet bubble period. Panel 
B reports the distribution of VC-backed IPOs and average syndicate size across 12 different 
industries. The industry classification is based on Fama-French 12 industry groups. As before, 
we note that the IPO distribution is not homogeneous across industries as the largest share of 
IPOs belong to high-tech and healthcare / medical industries. This is consistent with what is 
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documented by other papers as well (e.g. Megginson and Weiss (1991)). It can also be noticed 
that the average VC syndicate size is higher in these industries.  
 Panel A in Table 1.2 shows the summary statistics of the main variables used in the 
subsequent analysis. It is worthwhile noting that nearly 90 percent of the final sample is 
represented by firms listing on the Nasdaq14. Furthermore, 22.4% of companies (340 in total) in 
our sample have some bank loans.  
 Panel B in Table 1.2 provides summary statistics for small and large syndicates and a 
difference in means test for all relevant variables. A VC syndicate is deemed to be large when 
the number of VCs is above the median value of 5. Otherwise, the syndicate is regarded as small. 
Further, we note that the average size among large syndicates is 9.93 against 2.62 in the small 
syndicates subsample and the difference is strongly significant. The table also highlights a 
significant difference in the size of underpricing which turns out to be 6% smaller in companies 
backed by small VC syndicates and the difference is statistically significant at 1%. We note that, 
as it is expected, firms backed by small VC syndicates rely slightly more on bank loans to 
complement VC financing than firms backed by large VC syndicates.   
Large VC syndicates also appear to be involved in younger and smaller companies - when 
looking at the value of sales and total assets - than small VC syndicates and the differences are 
statistically significant at 1%. This suggests that the larger underpricing associated with firms 
backed by larger VC syndicates might in fact be the consequence of these companies being on 
                                                 
14
 In a recent paper, Anderson and Dyl (2008) examine the listing decisions of company and the SEC Rule 144 
which restricts the number of unregistered shares an individual can sell. They find that the Rule seems to explain 
why many NYSE eligible companies ultimately decide to go public on the Nasdaq, and they also document that this 
is more likely when the company is VC-backed as VCs are more keen to offload quickly their unregistered shares 
compared to other initial shareholders. This might hence provide another explanation for why such a large fraction 
of our IPOs sample is indeed listed on the Nasdaq.  
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average riskier than those backed by small VC syndicates. We shall take this into account in our 
empirical analysis by including control variables that capture the firm’s riskiness.  
1.5.2. Syndicate size, diversity and IPO performance: baseline results 
 The first column in Table 1.3 reports the results of a baseline regression where the 
dependent variable is IPO underpricing and our variable of interest is VCSize. Consistent with 
the preliminary evidence based on the descriptive statistics, the coefficient estimate of VCSize is 
positive and significant at 1%, suggesting a clear positive correlation between IPO underpricing 
and size of the VC syndicate. In terms of economic significance, we observe that an increase by 
one VC in the syndicate increases IPO underpricing by 0.4%. With regard to the other 
explanatory variables, the results show that the coefficient estimates of the company age and the 
log of net proceeds have the expected sign and are statistically significant at 1 percent level. 
Finally, greater pre-market return also leads to more underpricing. 
 Column 2 and 3 in Table 1.3 report the results of the OLS model for the two diversity 
measures. Both of them are statistically significant at 1%. Finally, in Column 4 the VCSize proxy 
has been replaced by the Herfindhal index, VCH-index. As expected, higher concentration of VC 
funding reduces IPO underpricing and the effect is both economically and statically significant. 
Finally, as a further test, in Column 5 we report the results of the OLS regression where the VC 
size proxy has been replaced by a dummy variable VCLarge which takes value one if the size of 
the syndicate is larger than the median of the sample, i.e. 5, and zero otherwise. Consistent with 
the other results, the coefficient estimate of the dummy variable has the expected positive sign 
and is statistically significant at 1%. The economic significance is also substantial as it indicates 
that IPO firms backed by large VC syndicates are underpriced 4% more than IPO firms backed 
by small VC syndicates.  
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 Overall, the results presented in Table 1.3 seem to provide strong support to our conjecture 
that the negative impact of large VC syndicates on IPO underpricing is a result of coordination 
problems and conflict of interest that are exacerbated by more diversity among financing VCs. A 
caveat is in order, however, as we have not yet addressed the potential endogeneity of our 
variables of interest which we do in Section 5.4. 
1.5.3. Syndicate size, Banking relationships, and underpricing 
 We now turn to our third hypothesis, which investigates whether bank financing has a 
moderation effect on VC syndicate size and diversity. To put results into perspective, it is useful 
to note that the average syndicate size on the subsample of companies with positive bank lending 
is 4.85 which is not substantially different from the full sample average (5.85). Also, the mean 
(median) value of our Bank Loan variable on the subsample is 0.22 (0.16) which represents a non 
trivial amount of bank lending. 
 The results of the OLS regression defined in equation (2) are reported in Table 1.4. The 
first three columns look at the existence of a direct effect of bank lending on IPO underpricing. 
Coefficient estimates are negative as expected and statistically and economically significant for 
all of our variables of interests (VCSize and VCDdiversity1 and VCDdiversity2). Hence, in line 
with previous papers (James and Wier (1990), Schenone (2004)) we find that bank financing 
does benefit VC-backed IPO companies by generally reducing IPO underpricing. However, our 
main interest is to investigate whether the use of bank loan can mitigate the agency conflicts 
within large VC syndicates and hence lead to better performance as formalized in equation (2). 
The result of this regression for our variables of interest are reported in columns (4)-(6) of Table 
1.4. The coefficient estimate of the interaction term is never statistically significant though it has 
the expected negative sign when we use VC diversity proxies. We also note that the variable 
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Bank is no longer significant except in column 4 where its statistical significance is substantially 
reduced. Our variables of interest all remain statistically significant at 1%. 
 The results of Table 1.4 should be carefully interpreted as we face two potential problems. 
First of all, a look at the correlation matrix shows a high correlation (above 70%) between the 
variable bank and the interaction terms which might distort the estimate. Secondly, we have not 
yet addressed the potential endogeneity problem of the VC syndicate proxies which we do in the 
next Section.  
1.5.4. Endogenous VC syndicate size 
A potential problem with the previously presented OLS results is that our variables of 
interest, the size of the VC syndicate and the diversity proxies, may not be exogenous to the 
model as discussed in Section 4.3. We address the problem by running a two stage least squares 
(2SLS) model where the first stage is defined by equation (3). Here, we note that our first stage 
regression is Poisson rather than standard OLS15. As discussed earlier, our instrument of choice 
is the stage of the investee companies at their first round of financing which can be classified as 
Start-up, Early stage, Expansion stage or Later stage. When using an instrumental variable 
approach, the relevance and the exclusion conditions must both hold to ensure the validity of the 
approach. The relevance condition essentially requires the instrument to be correlated with the 
endogenous variable and explain it sufficiently well. The choice of the instrument is inspired by 
Tian (2011) who shows that the development stage is strongly correlated with the number of 
financing VCs. The relevance of the instrumental variables is also confirmed by the high chi-
                                                 
15
 See Greene (2008) and Wooldridge (2006) for a discussion about the comparison between standard OLS and 
Poisson regressions. In our context, a simple OLS in the first stage would generate very similar results to those of 
Poisson regression. The reason for employing a Poisson regression instead of an OLS is because the VC syndicate 
size measure is a count variable and hence the normality assumption required by the OLS model is violated. 
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squares as in our model which, according to the rule of thumb suggested by Staiger and Stock 
(1997), should be above 20 as it is in our case.  
The second condition that the instrument needs to satisfy is the exclusion restriction. This 
condition requires the instrument to be uncorrelated with the dependent variable. In our case, we 
believe there is no reason to expect that the development stage of the company at the first round 
of VC financing might have an impact on the subsequent IPO performance of the investee 
company. This is also confirmed by the fact that Tian (2011) does not use the development stage 
as a control variable in the underpricing regression.  
 The coefficient estimates of the first stage regression are reported in Table 1.5. The 
instruments are all strongly significant at one percent levels. Also, we observe that explanatory 
power of “Start up” stage is the largest in magnitude compared to other instruments16. 
  The predicted value of the VC syndicate proxy derived from the first stage is then used in 
the second stage which otherwise replicates the OLS regression. The results of the second stage 
of the 2SLS are reported in Table 1.6. VC syndicate size remains strongly statistically significant 
in all models and its economic significance appears stronger with coefficient estimates double 
than their corresponding OLS estimates. The same applies to both diversity proxies for which the 
economic significance of the coefficient estimates is substantially larger than the OLS ones. 
Hence we can conclude that after controlling for the endogeneity, we still find convincing 
support to our first two hypothesis. 
 We now turn to the third hypothesis on the moderation effect of bank lending. The second 
stage results are reported in Columns (1)-(3) of Table 1.7 and they appear to be in line with the 
OLS results. While we confirm the significance of our VC syndicate proxies, bank loan variable 
                                                 
16
 The results refer to the first stage where VCSize is the dependent variable, but they are analogous when using the 
VC diversity proxies.  
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does not show evidence of a moderation effect. However a more careful analysis highlights a 
severe multi-collinearity problem among the regressors confirmed by Variance Inflation Factors 
(VIF) values ranging between 8 and 16 for the Bank Loan variable and the interaction term. 
Hence, to overcome this problem, we complete the analysis by running a regression where we 
drop the bank variable while keeping the interaction term. Results for this last test are reported in 
Columns (4) – (6). The coefficient estimates of the VC syndicate proxies are in line with 
previous regression results but the interaction terms are now always negative and statistically 
significant. This suggests the existence of some moderation effect of bank lending where the 
economic significance is not negligible. In fact, for an IPO firm with a bank lending equal to 
22% of its total assets (the average in the subsample), the negative impact of an additional VC on 
IPO underpricing is reduced by 0.26% while the impact of a marginal increase of the VC 
syndicate diversity goes down by 0.7% (0.5%) for VCDiversity1 (VCDiversity2). We note that 
the explanatory powers of the regressions in columns (4)-(6) are in line with those of the 
regressions in columns (1)-(3) and the VIFs of the relevant regressors are also within acceptable 
values.  
1.5.5. Post- IPO Performance of syndicates 
In this final section, we discuss the result of our analysis for post-IPO performances. Recall that 
our hypothesis 4 conjectures that the inefficiencies of large VC syndicates have a long term 
impact on the investee companies and may result in poorer long term performances. The first test 
we conduct compares the long run performances of companies backed by small VC syndicates 
(less than six VCs) with those of companies backed by large syndicates. We then look at the 
differences in means. For long run performances, we use four proxies: ROA, EBIDTA/TA (both 
industry-adjusted), Value Weighted CAR and Equally Weighted CAR. The results of the 
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univariate analysis are presented in Table 1.8. The differences in means for operating 
performance measures clearly show that companies backed by small VC syndicates outperform 
in the long term companies backed by large VC syndicates. Nearly all differences are significant 
at 1% level. 
 Results in Table 1.8 do not take endogeneity into account. As argued earlier the apparent 
underperformance of companies backed by large syndicates might stem from the endogenous 
syndicate decision due to a reverse causality or omitted variable problem. To address this 
problem and provide stronger evidence of the long term impact of large VC syndicates, we run 
both OLS and 2SLS regressions where the dependent variables are (mean industry adjusted) 
ROA, EBITDA/TA over the three year period after the IPO date. Table 1.9 and 1.10 show the 
OLS and 2SLS results respectively.  
 Similar to the regression results on underpricing, we again find that the 2SLS confirms and 
reinforces the OLS results. In fact, the 2SLS estimates show a strong statistically significant 
effect of our variables of interest in both regressions as well as a large economic significance. An 
increase of the VC syndicate by one VC decreases the long run performances of the company by 
approximately 3%. Similarly, a marginal increase in the degree of diversity of the VC syndicate 
decreases the long run performances by 10% (6% for VCdiversity2). Bank lending does not seem 
to affect the long run performances of these companies, confirming that bank lending is crucial 
in situations characterized by severe adverse selection problems. The reputation of the lead VC 
has instead positive and strongly statistically significant coefficient estimate. 
1.6. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we investigate the impact of internal agency conflicts within venture capital 
syndicates on the IPO performance of portfolio companies. Our conjecture is that large and 
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heterogeneous VC syndicates do tend to suffer from conflict of interests and coordination 
problems. This undermines VCs ability to monitor effectively their investee companies, 
jeopardizing their ability to create value. As a consequence, this might lead to poorer IPO 
performances.  
 We explore the effect of size and diversity of VC syndicates on short and long run IPO 
performances and examine whether the existence of alternative governance mechanisms such as 
bank loans might attenuate the impact of agency conflicts on the performances of the investee 
companies around the IPO date. 
 Our findings provide convincing evidence that VC syndicate size has a very strong 
negative effect on IPO underpricing and long term operating performances. This result is robust 
to many different specifications of our model and to controlling for the endogeneity of our 
variable of interest. Results appear to be stronger for our two VC diversity proxies which support 
our interpretation of the results centered on the conflict of interest and coordination problems 
within large and heterogeneous VC syndicates. This is further confirmed by the fact that, given 
the size of the VC syndicate, a greater concentration of the funding in the hands of few VCs does 
benefit IPO performances, because it implies fewer controlling VCs who have stronger 
incentives to monitor the venture.  
 Finally, we do also provide some evidence that, by representing an alternative monitoring 
mechanism, the existence of bank lending is able to moderate the distortions created by large VC 
syndicate and therefore reduce their negative impact on IPO underpricing.  
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 Appendix A: Definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
Underpricing 
 
1/100 times the ratio of difference between first available closing stock price and offer 
price to offer price  
VCSize number of distinct VCs that provide capital before the IPO date 
 
Large Syndicates 
 
one if VC syndicate size is greater than 6, zero otherwise. 
Small Syndicates 
 
one if VC syndicate size is less than or equal to 6, zero otherwise 
Leverage 
 
 ratio of long term debt (Compustat data item DLTT) to total assets (data item AT) in the 
fiscal year before the IPO date 
Bank Loan ratio of total bank loan to total assets before the IPO date  
 
Age difference between year of IPO date and the year of date when the company is 
incorporated 
 
LeadVCRep the lead VC’s IPO market share during the three calendar year-period before the first 
investment round where lead VC firm is the venture firm that makes the largest 
investment across all investment rounds 
Proceeds 
 
offer size in terms of net proceeds 
Market Return 
 
mean value-weighted CRSP index return over the month before the issue date 
Sales 
 
net company sales (data item SALE) in the fiscal year before issuance 
Internet Dummy one if the IPO firm is identified as internet company in the database complied by J. 
Ritter, zero otherwise 
Rank 
 
Loughran and Ritter underwriter rank classification 
Nasdaq Dummy 
 
one if the firm is listed in Nasdaq and zero otherwise 
Start-up Dummy 
 
one if investment round takes place in the start-up stage of the company, zero otherwise 
Early Dummy 
 
one if investment round takes place in the early stage of the company, zero otherwise 
Expansion Dummy 
 
one if investment round takes place in the expansion stage of the company, zero 
otherwise 
Later Dummy 
 
one if investment round takes place in the later stage of the company, zero otherwise 
ROA 
 
ratio of income before extraordinary items (data item IB) to total assets (data item AT) 
EBITDA 
 
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (data item EBITDA) 
CAR 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns defined as                   where                     the abnormal return of firm i in month t.         is the expected return and 
replaced by value weighted (and equally weighted) monthly market return 
VCDiversity1 
 
Total number of different VC types within the syndicate (e.g. private, investment bank 
or corporate VC) 
VCDiversity2 
 
Total number of different industry preferences of syndicating VCs 
VCH-index 
 
The squared sum of the percentage share of each VC's total investment to total funding 
received over all financing rounds till IPO date. 
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Table 1.1. Sample distribution over time and industry 
 
Panel A. VC-backed IPO frequencies by year  
Year Number of  VC - 
backed IPOs 
  Mean VC  
Syndicate Size 
1990 25 5.84 
1991 75 6.33 
1992 92 6.61 
1993 107 6.32 
1994 66 4.41 
1995 122 4.93 
1996 165 4.43 
1997 106 4.60 
1998 72 4.51 
1999 209 6.34 
2000 191 7.61 
2001 31 4.94 
2002 30 4.03 
2003 18 6.56 
2004 62 7.55 
2005 44 5.70 
2006 43 6.09 
2007 57 6.79 
Total 1515  
 
Panel B. VC-backed IPO frequencies by industry 
Industry Classification Number of  VC-  
backed IPOs 
Mean VC 
Synd. Size 
VC-backed IPOs 
with bank loan 
VC-backed IPOs  
with positive leverage 
  Consumer Non-Durables 31 3.64 13 29 
  Consumer Durables 14 3.27 3 11 
  Manufacturing  45 5.57 15 37 
  Oil, Gas and Coal Extraction 16 3.11 7 15 
  Chemicals and Allied Products 7 6.8 1 7 
  Business Equipment 753 6.91 167 579 
  Telephone and Television Transmission  72 5.87 26 69 
  Wholesale, Retail and Services 114 5.42 38 89 
  Healthcare, Medical Equipment and Drugs 320 7.64 41 270 
  Others- Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans, Hotels. 143 5.97 29 120 
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Table 1.2. Summary statistics 
Panel A. Full sample summary statistics 
 
 
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of 1515 VC-backed IPOs completed during 1990-2007. Underpricing is 
defined by the ratio of difference between first available closing stock price and offer price to offer price and divided 
by 100. VCSize is the number of distinct VCs that provide capital before the IPO date. Leverage is the ratio of long 
term debt to total assets in the fiscal year before the IPO date. Bank Loan is the ratio of bank loan amount to total 
assets. In brackets we report the percentage of companies in our sample for which the variable is different from zero. 
Age is the difference between year of IPO date and the year of date when the company is incorporated. LeadVCRep 
is the lead VC’s IPO market share during the three-year period before the first investment round. Proceeds is the 
offer size in terms of net proceeds. Market Return is defined as mean value-weighted CRSP index return over the 
month before the issue date. Sales stand for company size and represent net company sales (in millions) in the fiscal 
year before issuance. Internet dummy is equal to one if the IPO firm is identified as internet company in the 
database complied by J. Ritter. Rank is from Loughran and Ritter underwriter rank classification. Nasdaq dummy 
takes value one if the firm is listed in Nasdaq and zero otherwise.  
  
Variable Minimum Mean Median Std Dev Maximum 
Underpricing -0.49 0.17 0.13 0.20 0.78 
VCSize 1.00 5.86 5.00 4.56 33.00 
Leverage (81%) 0.00 0.17 0.06 0.23 1.00 
Bank loan (22.4%) 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.13 0.98 
Total Assets 0.13 85.08 20.57 479.16 16915.00 
LeadVCRep  0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.24 
Sales 0.00 78.05 19.24 373.61 10079.00 
Age 0.00 10.35 7.00 13.73 121.00 
Proceeds 2.13 54.66 37.70 60.92 730.31 
Rank 1.00 7.91 8.21 1.35 9.00 
Nasdaq  0.00 0.87 1.00 0.34 1.00 
Internet 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.39 1.00 
Market Return -0.64 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.58 
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Panel B. Summary statistics for two subsamples 
Variable Small Syndicates Large Syndicates Differences in means 
Underpricing 0.14 0.20 -0.06*** 
VCSize 2.62 9.93 -7.31*** 
Leverage 0.21 0.10  0.11*** 
Bank loan 0.06 0.03  0.03*** 
Total Assets 120.66 40.33  80.33*** 
LeadVCRep  0.02 0.02  0.00 
Sales 116.42 29.77  86.65*** 
Age 12.58 7.53  5.05*** 
Proceeds 57.12 51.56  5.56*** 
Rank 7.73 8.12 -0.39*** 
Market Return 0.06 0.05  0.01** 
Num. of obs. 844 671  
This panel presents the descriptive statistics for the sample firms that are backed by small or large VC syndicates. If 
the VC syndicate size is less than or equal to 5, then the syndicate is coded as Small Syndicate. Otherwise, it is 
labeled as Large Syndicate. Last column reports the differences in means. Underpricing is defined by the ratio of 
difference between first available closing stock price and offer price to offer price and divided by 100. VCSize is the 
number of distinct VCs that provide capital before the IPO date. Leverage is the ratio of long term debt to total 
assets in the fiscal year before the IPO date. Bank Loan is the ratio of bank loan amount to total assets. Age is the 
difference between year of IPO date and the year of date when the company is incorporated. LeadVCRep is the lead 
VC’s IPO market share during the three-year period before the first investment round. Proceeds is the offer size in 
terms of net proceeds. Market Return is defined as mean value-weighted CRSP index return over the month before 
the issue date. Sales stand for company size and represent net company sales (in millions) in the fiscal year before 
issuance. Rank is from Loughran and Ritter underwriter rank classification. Significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively. 
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  Table 1.3. OLS regressions for the impact of VC syndicate size on underpricing  
Variable Expected Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)                 (5) 
Intercept 
 
-0.161*** 
(0.044) 
-0.178*** 
(0.045) 
-0.168*** 
(0.044) 
-0.116*** 
(0.045) 
-0.156*** 
(0.044) 
VCSize 
+ 
0.004*** 
(0.001)   
  
VCDiversity1 
+ 
 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
   
VCDiversity2 
+ 
  
0.008*** 
(0.002)  
 
VCH-index  
- 
   
-0.068*** 
(0.016) 
 
VCLarge 
+ 
    
0.041*** 
(0.009) 
LeadVCRep 
- 
0.043 
(0.164) 
0.063 
(0.164) 
0.019 
(0.164) 
0.046 
(0.164) 
0.049 
(0.164) 
Log Sales  
- 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
Log Age  
- 
-0.021*** 
(0.007) 
-0.021*** 
(0.007) 
-0.020*** 
(0.007) 
-0.020*** 
(0.007) 
-0.020*** 
(0.007) 
Log Proceeds 
+ 
0.062*** 
(0.008) 
0.061*** 
(0.008) 
0.062*** 
(0.008) 
0.063*** 
(0.008) 
0.061*** 
(0.008) 
Rank 
+ 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
Market Return 
+ 
0.192*** 
(0.032) 
0.191*** 
(0.032) 
0.190*** 
(0.032) 
0.193*** 
(0.032) 
0.192*** 
(0.032) 
Industry dummies  YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies  YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square  0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Numb. of obs.  1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 
This table presents baseline OLS results. In all columns, dependent variable is IPO Underpricing defined as the ratio 
of difference between first available closing stock price and offer price to offer price and divided by 100. VCSize is 
the number of distinct VCs that provide capital before the IPO date. VCDivesity1 is total number of different VC 
types within the syndicate (e.g. private, investment bank or corporate VC). VCDiversity2 is total number of different 
industry preferences of syndicating VCs. VCH-index is the squared sum of the percentage share of each VC's total 
investment to total funding received over all financing rounds till IPO date. VCLarge is a dummy variable that takes 
value one if the syndicate size is greater than the median. It is zero otherwise. LeadVCRep is the lead VC’s IPO 
market share during the three-year period before the first investment round. Sales stand for company size and 
represent net company sales (in millions) in the fiscal year before issuance. Age is the difference between year of 
IPO date and the year of date when the company is incorporated. Proceeds is the offer size in terms of net proceeds. 
Rank is from Loughran and Ritter underwriter rank classification. Market Return is defined as mean value-weighted 
CRSP index return over the month before the issue date. Significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are 
represented by ***, **, and * respectively.      
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Table 1.4. OLS regressions for the moderation effect of bank loan on underpricing  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept -0.169*** 
(0.044) 
-0.187*** 
(0.045) 
-0.177*** 
(0.044) 
-0.168*** 
(0.044) 
-0.189*** 
(0.045) 
-0.177*** 
(0.044) 
-0.167*** 
(0.044) 
-0.189*** 
(0.045) 
-0.177*** 
(0.044) 
VCSize 0.004*** 
(0.001)   
0.004*** 
(0.001)   
0.004*** 
(0.001)   
VCDiversity1  0.012*** 
(0.003)  
 0.012*** 
(0.003) 
  0.013*** 
(0.003)  
VCDiversity2 
  
0.009*** 
(0.002)  
 0.008*** 
(0.002)   
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Bank Loan  -0.083** 
(0.034) 
-0.086** 
(0.034) 
-0.085** 
(0.034) 
-0.096* 
(0.052) 
-0.052 
(0.067) 
-0.062 
(0.056)    
VCSize * Bank Loan 
   
0.003 
(0.008)   
-0.009* 
(0.005)   
VCDiversity1 *Bank Loan 
    
-0.013 
(0.022)   
-0.028** 
(0.011)  
VCDiversity2 * Bank Loan 
     
-0.007 
(0.014)   
-0.019** 
(0.008) 
LeadVCRep 0.038 
(0.164) 
0.056 
(0.163) 
0.013 
(0.164) 
0.038 
(0.164) 
0.056 
(0.163) 
0.013 
(0.164) 
0.040 
(0.164) 
0.058 
(0.163) 
0.016 
(0.164) 
Log Sales  0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
00.001 
(0.003) 
Log Age  -0.022*** 
(0.007) 
-0.022*** 
(0.007) 
-0.021*** 
(0.007) 
-0.022*** 
(0.007) 
-0.022*** 
(0.007) 
-0.021*** 
(0.007) 
-0.021*** 
(0.007) 
-0.022*** 
(0.007) 
-0.021*** 
(0.007) 
Log Proceeds 0.062*** 
(0.008) 
0.062*** 
(0.008) 
0.063*** 
(0.008) 
0.062*** 
(0.008) 
0.062*** 
(0.008) 
0.063*** 
(0.008) 
0.062*** 
(0.008) 
0.062*** 
(0.008) 
0.063*** 
(0.008) 
Rank 0.005 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
Market Return 0.191*** 
(0.032) 
0.190*** 
(0.032) 
0.189*** 
(0.032) 
0.191*** 
(0.032) 
0.189*** 
(0.032) 
0.189*** 
(0.032) 
0.190*** 
(0.032) 
0.189*** 
(0.032) 
0.188*** 
(0.032) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Numb. of obs. 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 
This table presents baseline OLS results. In all columns, dependent variable is IPO Underpricing defined as the first day initial return and divided by 100. Bank 
Loan is the ratio of bank loan amount to total assets. 
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  Table 1.5.  First stage Poisson regression for determinants of VC syndicate size 
Variable Estimates Standard errors 
   
Intercept 0.568*** 0.135 
   
Portfolio company related instruments   
Start-up 0.874*** 0.058 
Early 0.682*** 0.056 
Expansion 0.655*** 0.054 
Later 0.775*** 0.056 
 
Other controls  
  
Bank Loan  -0.305*** 0.095 
LeadVCRep  2.145*** 0.377 
Log Age -0.028 0.017 
Log Proceeds -0.099*** 0.021 
Rank   0.120*** 0.010 
Market Return -0.119 0.080 
Industry dummy YES 
Year dummy YES 
R-square  
Numb. of obs. 1515 
This table provides first stage coefficient estimates. The dependent variable is VC syndicate size and defined as the 
number of syndicating VC firms before the IPO date. Instruments are the following indicator variables: start-up, 
early, expansion and later . Bank Loan is the ratio of bank loan amount to total assets. LeadVCRep is the lead VC’s 
IPO market share during the three-year period before the first investment round. Age is the difference between year 
of IPO date and the year of date when the company is incorporated. Proceeds is the offer size in terms of net 
proceeds. Rank is from Loughran and Ritter underwriter rank classification. Market Return is defined as mean 
value-weighted CRSP index return over the month before the issue date. Significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively. 
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Table 1.6. 2SLS regressions for the impact of VC syndicate size and bank loan on underpricing 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept -0.181*** 
(0.048) 
-0.225*** 
(0.057) 
-0.195*** 
(0.050) 
-0.098** 
(0.049) 
-0.187*** 
(0.047) 
-0.232*** 
(0.057) 
-0.201*** 
(0.050) 
-0.108** 
(0.049) 
VCSize 0.008** 
(0.004)   
 
0.008** 
(0.004) 
 
 
 
VCDiversity1  0.027** 
(0.012) 
   
0.026** 
(0.012) 
  
VCDiversity2  
 
0.016** 
(0.007)    
0.015** 
(0.008)  
VCH-index   
  
-0.122** 
(0.052)    
-0.118** 
(0.053) 
Bank Loan  
   
-0.073** 
(0.035) 
-0.078** 
(0.034) 
-0.076** 
(0.035) 
-0.078** 
(0.034) 
LeadVCRep -0.006 
(0.174) 
0.021 
(0.169) 
-0.050 
(0.181) 
0.013 
(0.169) 
-0.009 
(0.173) 
0.016 
(0.168) 
-0.053 
(0.181) 
0.010 
(0.169) 
Log Sales  -0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
Log Age  -0.019*** 
(0.007) 
-0.018*** 
(0.007) 
-0.017** 
(0.007) 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
-0.019*** 
(0.007) 
-0.019*** 
(0.007) 
-0.017** 
(0.007) 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
Log Proceeds 0.066*** 
(0.009) 
0.065*** 
(0.009) 
0.067*** 
(0.009) 
0.067*** 
(0.009) 
0.066*** 
(0.009) 
0.066*** 
(0.009) 
0.068*** 
(0.009) 
0.068*** 
(0.009) 
Rank 0.002 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
Market Return 0.194*** 
(0.032) 
0.192*** 
(0.032) 
0.190*** 
(0.032) 
0.195*** 
(0.032) 
0.193*** 
(0.032) 
0.191*** 
(0.032) 
0.189*** 
(0.032) 
0.194*** 
(0.032) 
Industry 
dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 
Numb. of obs. 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 
This table reports second stage results where dependent variable is underpricing. VCSize, VCDiversity1, VCDivesity2 
and VCH-index are the predicted values from the first-stage regressions. Bank Loan is the ratio of bank loan amount to 
total assets. LeadVCRep is the lead VC’s IPO market share during the three-year period before the first investment 
round. Sales stand for company size and represent net company sales (in millions) in the fiscal year before issuance. 
Age is the difference between year of IPO date and the year of date when the company is incorporated. Proceeds is the 
offer size in terms of net proceeds. Rank is from Loughran and Ritter underwriter rank classification. Market Return is 
defined as mean value-weighted CRSP index return over the month before the issue date. Significance levels at 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively. 
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Table 1.7.  2SLS regressions for moderation effect of bank loan on underpricing 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -0.186*** 
(0.047) 
-0.235*** 
(0.057) 
-0.201*** 
(0.050) 
-0.189*** 
(0.047) 
-0.236*** 
(0.057) 
-0.203*** 
(0.050) 
VCSize 0.008* 
(0.004)   
0.009** 
(0.004)   
VCDiversity1  0.028** 
(0.012)  
 
0.028** 
(0.012) 
 
VCDiversity2 
  
0.015** 
(0.008)  
 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
Bank Loan  -0.125 
(0.097) 
-0.004 
(0.133) 
-0.072 
(0.107)    
VCSize * Bank Loan 0.011 
(0.020)   
-0.012* 
(0.007)   
VCDiversity1 *Bank Loan 
 
-0.029 
(0.050)   
-0.031** 
(0.013)  
VCDiversity2 * Bank Loan 
  
-0.001 
(0.033)   
-0.022** 
(0.011) 
LeadVCRep -0.009 
(0.173) 
0.015 
(0.169) 
-0.053 
(0.181) 
-0.014 
(0.173) 
0.015 
(0.168) 
-0.056 
(0.181) 
Log Sales  -0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
Log Age  -0.019*** 
(0.007) 
-0.019*** 
(0.007) 
-0.017** 
(0.007) 
-0.019*** 
(0.007) 
-0.019*** 
(0.007) 
-0.017** 
(0.007) 
Log Proceeds 0.066*** 
(0.009) 
0.066*** 
(0.009) 
0.068*** 
(0.009) 
0.066*** 
(0.009) 
0.066*** 
(0.009) 
0.068*** 
(0.009) 
Rank 0.002 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
Market Return 0.193*** 
(0.032) 
0.191*** 
(0.032) 
0.189*** 
(0.032) 
0.193*** 
(0.032) 
0.191*** 
(0.032) 
0.19*** 
(0.032) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 
Numb. of obs. 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 
This table reports second stage results where dependent variable is underpricing. VCSize, VCDiversity1 and 
VCDivesity2 are the predicted values from the first-stage regressions. Bank Loan is the ratio of bank loan amount to 
total assets. LeadVCRep is the lead VC’s IPO market share during the three-year period before the first investment 
round. Sales stand for company size and represent net company sales (in millions) in the fiscal year before issuance. 
Age is the difference between year of IPO date and the year of date when the company is incorporated. Proceeds is the 
offer size in terms of net proceeds. Rank is from Loughran and Ritter underwriter rank classification. Market Return is 
defined as mean value-weighted CRSP index return over the month before the issue date. Significance levels at 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively. 
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        Table 1.8. Univariate analysis of post-IPO performance 
 
Year Small VCs 
Syndicates 
Large VCs 
Syndicates 
Differences 
in Means 
 ROA 
0 -0.186 -0.413 0.227*** 
1 -0.033 -0.105 0.072*** 
2 -0.081 -0.196 0.115*** 
3 -0.115 0.238 0.123*** 
    
  
EBITDA/Total Assets 
0 -0.133 -0.404 0.271*** 
1 -0.026 -0.126 0.100*** 
2 -0.048 -0.160 0.112*** 
3 -0.058 -0.155 0.097*** 
    
 
  
Value Weighted CAR 
1 0.014 -0.048 0.062 
2 0.031 0.005 0.026 
3 0.150 0.184 -0.034 
    
  
Equally Weighted CAR 
1 0.002 -0.085     0.087** 
2 -0.011 -0.090 0.079 
3 0.075 0.055 0.019 
This table provides univariate results of comparing long-run IPO performance of the sample. We divide the sample 
into two groups: IPOs that are backed by small syndicates and large syndicates. If the number syndicating VC firms 
exceed the median value, 5, then the sample IPO company is labeled as large VC syndicate. Otherwise, it belongs to 
small VC syndicates. Dividing the sample using mean values rather than median gives qualitatively the same results. 
Long-run performance measures are industry adjusted ROA and EBITDA/Total Assets. We also include stock return 
performance in terms of CAR as a third measure. Significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are represented by 
***, **, and * respectively. 
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Table 1.9. OLS regressions for the relation between VC syndicate size and post-IPO 
profitability  
Variable ROA EBITDA / Total Assets 
Intercept -0.545*** 
(0.075) 
-0.515*** 
(0.075) 
-0.535*** 
(0.075) 
-0.611*** 
(0.075) 
-0.537*** 
(0.064) 
-0.505*** 
(0.064) 
-0.528*** 
(0.064) 
-0.614*** 
(0.065) 
VCSize -0.007*** 
(0.002)   
 
-0.008*** 
(0.001)   
 
VCDiversity1  -0.022*** 
(0.005) 
   
-0.023*** 
(0.004) 
  
VCDiversity2 
  
-0.014*** 
(0.003)    
-0.014*** 
(0.002)  
VCH-index  
   
0.094*** 
(0.026)    
0.111*** 
(0.022) 
Bank Loan 0.019 
(0.055) 
0.025 
(0.055) 
0.022 
(0.055) 
0.024 
(0.055) 
0.082* 
(0.047) 
0.088* 
(0.047) 
0.086* 
(0.047) 
0.087* 
(0.047) 
LeadVCRep 0.526** 
(0.263) 
0.498* 
(0.263) 
0.561** 
(0.264) 
0.497* 
(0.264) 
0.603*** 
(0.225) 
0.57** 
(0.225) 
0.632*** 
(0.226) 
0.575** 
(0.225) 
Log Age  0.064*** 
(0.010) 
0.064*** 
(0.010) 
0.063*** 
(0.010) 
0.062*** 
(0.010) 
0.053*** 
(0.009) 
0.053*** 
(0.009) 
0.051*** 
(0.009) 
0.05*** 
(0.009) 
Log Proceeds 0.035*** 
(0.013) 
0.036*** 
(0.013) 
0.034*** 
(0.013) 
0.035*** 
(0.013) 
0.043*** 
(0.011) 
0.044*** 
(0.011) 
0.042*** 
(0.011) 
0.042*** 
(0.011) 
Rank 0.026*** 
(0.006) 
0.025*** 
(0.006) 
0.027*** 
(0.006) 
0.026*** 
(0.006) 
0.027*** 
(0.005) 
0.025*** 
(0.005) 
0.027*** 
(0.005) 
0.026*** 
(0.005) 
Internet  -0.162*** 
(0.023) 
-0.161*** 
(0.023) 
-0.163*** 
(0.023) 
-0.165*** 
(0.023) 
-0.119*** 
(0.020) 
-0.118*** 
(0.020) 
-0.12*** 
(0.020) 
-0.121*** 
(0.020) 
Nasdaq 0.065*** 
(0.022) 
0.068*** 
(0.022) 
0.068*** 
(0.022) 
0.066*** 
(0.022) 
0.045** 
(0.018) 
0.047** 
(0.018) 
0.048*** 
(0.018) 
0.046** 
(0.018) 
Industry 
dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Numb.of obs. 1476 1476 1476 1476 1472 1472 1472 1472 
Dependent variables are industry adjusted return mean ROA and EBITDA/Total Assets during the three-year period 
after the IPO date. VCSize is the number of distinct VCs that provide capital before the IPO date. VCDivesity1 is 
total number of different VC types within the syndicate (e.g. private, investment bank or corporate VC). 
VCDiversity2 is total number of different industry preferences of syndicating VCs. VCH-index is the squared sum of 
the percentage share of each VC's total investment to total funding received over all financing rounds till IPO date. 
Bank Loan is the ratio of bank loan amount to total assets. LeadVCRep is the lead VC’s IPO market share during the 
three-year period before the first investment round. Age is the difference between year of IPO date and the year of 
date when the company is incorporated. Proceeds is the offer size in terms of net proceeds. Rank is from Loughran 
and Ritter underwriter rank classification. Nasdaq takes value one if the firm is listed in Nasdaq and zero otherwise. 
Internet is equal to one if the IPO firm is identified as internet company in the database complied by J. Ritter. 
Significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively. Standard errors are 
provided in parentheses. 
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Table 1.10. 2SLS regressions for the relation between VC syndicate size and post-IPO 
profitability  
Variable ROA EBITDA / Total Assets 
Intercept -0.381*** 
(0.081) 
-0.271*** 
(0.090) 
-0.320*** 
(0.085) 
-0.310*** 
(0.068) 
-0.168** 
(0.076) 
-0.232*** 
(0.072) 
VCSize -0.033*** 
(0.006)   
-0.045*** 
(0.005)   
VCDiversity1  -0.100*** 
(0.017) 
  
-0.133*** 
(0.014) 
 
VCDiversity2 
  
-0.064*** 
(0.011)   
-0.085*** 
(0.009) 
Bank Loan -0.016 
(0.055) 
0.009 
(0.055) 
-0.002 
(0.055) 
0.032 
(0.047) 
0.066 
(0.046) 
0.052 
(0.046) 
LeadVCRep 0.949*** 
(0.276) 
0.792*** 
(0.268) 
1.134*** 
(0.287) 
1.200*** 
(0.233) 
0.979*** 
(0.226) 
1.436*** 
(0.242) 
Log Age  0.058*** 
(0.010) 
0.058*** 
(0.010) 
0.049*** 
(0.011) 
0.044*** 
(0.009) 
0.045*** 
(0.009) 
0.032*** 
(0.009) 
Log Proceeds 0.040*** 
(0.013) 
0.035*** 
(0.013) 
0.040*** 
(0.013) 
0.049*** 
(0.011) 
0.042*** 
(0.011) 
0.049*** 
(0.011) 
Rank 0.020*** 
(0.006) 
0.020*** 
(0.006) 
0.020*** 
(0.006) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
Internet  -0.131*** 
(0.024) 
-0.126*** 
(0.024) 
-0.133*** 
(0.024) 
-0.075*** 
(0.020) 
-0.069*** 
(0.020) 
-0.079*** 
(0.020) 
Nasdaq 0.090*** 
(0.022) 
0.097*** 
(0.022) 
0.106*** 
(0.023) 
0.080*** 
(0.019) 
0.088*** 
(0.019) 
0.100*** 
(0.019) 
Industry 
dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.24 
Numb. of obs. 1472 1472 1472 1472 1472 1472 
Dependent variables are industry adjusted return mean ROA and EBITDA/Total Assets during the three-year period 
after the IPO date. VCSize, VCDivesity1,VCDivesity2 are predicted values from the first stage regressions. Bank 
Loan is the ratio of bank loan amount to total assets. LeadVCRep is the lead VC’s IPO market share during the 
three-year period before the first investment round. Age is the difference between year of IPO date and the year of 
date when the company is incorporated. Proceeds is the offer size in terms of net proceeds. Rank is from Loughran 
and Ritter underwriter rank classification. Nasdaq takes value one if the firm is listed in Nasdaq and zero otherwise. 
Internet is equal to one if the IPO firm is identified as internet company in the database complied by J. Ritter. 
Significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively. Standard errors are 
provided in parentheses. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
The Role of Admission Documents on the Pricing of UK IPOs 
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2.1. Introduction 
 Traditional bookbuilding theories argue that underpricing is needed to provide institutional 
investors with the right incentives to reveal valuable information during the bookbuilding 
process (Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990)). Thus, underpricing can 
be viewed as a compensation to investors for generating costly information thereby enabling 
underwriters a more accurate pricing of the IPO (Sherman (2000), Sherman and Titman (2002)). 
In addition to information revealed by investor, the main source of pre-IPO information is the 
IPO prospectus. Recent studies examine the link between the pricing of book-built IPOs and the 
information tone and content of IPO prospectuses. The empirical evidence so far suggests that 
prospectuses have a significant impact on underpricing, pricing accuracy and after market return 
volatility for book-built IPOs (Hanley and Hoberg (2010,2012), Loughran and McDonald 
(2013)).  
 In this paper, we investigate the impact of IPO prospectuses on a sample of UK IPOs 
between 2004 and 2012. The specific feature of the UK IPO market is large dominance of fixed-
priced IPOs. In contrast to book-built IPOs, fixed-priced IPOs are not underwritten and do not 
allow any price discovery once the offer price is fixed. In our sample, 320 out of 389 are fixed-
priced offerings, hence it is legitimate to ask whether pre-market information production, as 
measured by length, tone and content of prospectuses, plays a role at all in explaining the pricing 
of IPOs, and if it does , to what extent it differs from that of book-built IPOs. By looking at the 
UK market, we are thus able to shed light on the relation between pre-IPO information 
production and IPO pricing for different offering mechanisms.  
 Using text sentiment analysis, we show longer admission documents lead to higher offer 
price and smaller underpricing and lower ex-post return volatility. The same holds for the length 
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of the risk factor sections of the prospectus. We further find that the use of more uncertain 
language as measured by the proportion of negative, weak and uncertain words also surprisingly 
increase the offer price while decreasing IPO underpricing. The proportion of these types of 
words is typically larger in longer admission documents, which explains our findings. In 
addition, we decompose the information provided in the prospectus into standard and distinctive 
following Hanley and Hoberg (2010) and find that standard information reduces the offer price 
but does not seem to have an impact on either the level of underpricing or ex-post return 
volatility.  
 Our findings on fixed-priced IPOs substantially differ from the evidence documented in 
recent studies on book-built IPOs by Hanley and Hoberg (2010), and Loughran and McDonald 
(2013). Our sample of open-priced IPOs is too small to allow us to make any strong inference 
from our analysis. However, our results on the tone of the prospectus on the subsample of book-
built IPOs are partially consistent with those provided by previous studies. Specifically, we 
document that prospectuses with a more negative tone exhibit a lower offer price and a larger 
underpricing and post-IPO return volatility in line with Loughran and McDonald (2013) who 
argue that this evidence provides support to bookbuilding theories as more uncertain 
prospectuses require underwriters to rely more on the information provided by investors during 
the bookbuilding process and hence result in a higher compensation in the form of larger 
underpricing. 
 Bookbuilding theories cannot however explain our findings on fixed-priced IPOs. In the 
absence of a proper price discovery process that can help to price the issue more accurately, 
fixed-priced IPOs are typically characterized by a more conservative pricing in order to stimulate 
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investors’ demand. This ensures the success of the offering which ultimately leads to a large 
underpricing, traditionally larger than that of book-built IPOs (Jenkison and Ljungqvist (2001)). 
 We argue that our results depend on the specific feature of the fixed-price mechanism as 
well as on the characteristics of the IPO firms that use fixed-priced offerings to go public. By 
their nature, fixed-priced IPOs are generally riskier because they are smaller, both in terms of 
size of the listing and size of the company, and usually list on the second segment of the stock 
exchange (AIM in the UK). Overall, our evidence suggests that providing more information is 
always beneficial to issuing companies in fixed-priced IPOs regardless of whether this 
communicates more uncertainty about the company. 
 Finally, we also investigate whether the tone, content and length of the admission 
documents become more valuable in bad times by looking specifically at their impact after the 
recent financial crisis. Although admission documents for both IPO mechanisms have become 
significantly longer after 2007, they seem however to play no role in explaining the pricing of 
IPOs.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the recent literature on 
sentiment and content of information provided by financial documents. Section 3 describes the 
institutional background of UK IPOs. The sample and methodology are given in Section 4. In 
Section 5, we present and discuss the results of our analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2.2. Literature Review 
 A growing body of the finance literature have recently focused on investigating the pricing 
effect of tone and sentiment of annual reports, newspaper articles, and company filings. Using 
the media news provided by Wall Street Journal, Tetlock (2007) documents that content of news 
and market prices are related. More specifically, he finds that the number of negative words in 
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major newspaper columns has a significant negative impact on next day market return. Tetlock, 
Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008) document that the proportion of negative words in firm 
related news can predict low earnings and markets react negatively to the negative tones 
embedded in media news. Quantifying document complexity and readability by using Fog index, 
which combines frequency of words per sentence and syllables per word, Li (2008) shows that 
the readability of annual reports is associated with earnings performance. He shows that firms 
with lower earnings typically publish annual reports that are long and hard to read. On the other 
hand, firms with annual reports that are relatively easy to read have more persistent positive 
earnings. Loughran and McDonald (2014) show that electronic file size of annual reports of US 
companies can be used as a simple readability measure. They find that firms with larger 10-K 
files exhibit greater return and analyst forecast volatility after the disclosure date. 
 Recently, Garcia (2013) extends this literature by examining time variation in sentiment. 
Using the proportion of positive and negative words in articles published in the New York 
Times, he shows that the predictive power of sentiment of media news is stronger during 
recessions, defined by NBER, in the past century from 1905 to 2005. He finds that media 
sentiment can explain the change in Dow Jones Industrial Average returns more in recession 
periods than expansions. 
 In the IPO context, however, our understanding about the relation between sentiment and 
information content of IPO prospectuses and the pricing or performance of IPOs is still quite 
limited. Pre-IPO information production is costly for firms because it requires due diligence and 
brings litigation risk. It is costly for investors to collect information too (Sherman and Titman 
(2002)). Nevertheless, prospectus is the main and usually the single source of information 
provided to outside investors. More importantly, IPO valuation heavily depends upon the details 
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presented in prospectus. Thus, information within prospectuses is expected to play a central role 
in the process of investor valuation for IPO firms that suffer from the lack of soft information.  
 There are only three fairly recent studies about the impact of prospectus information on the 
pricing of IPOs by Loughran and McDonald (LM, henceforth) (2013) and Hanley and Hoberg 
(HH, henceforth) (2010, 2012).  
 LM (2013) examines the relation between the tone of S-1 forms, initial prospectuses filed 
to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and first day return of US IPOs along with 
price revisions and trading volatility. They find that underpricing increases as prospectuses 
contain more uncertain language. They argue that this finding is in line with key theories of IPO 
underpricing proposed by Ritter (1984) and Rock (1986). More specifically, greater ex-ante 
uncertainty implies more first-day returns. Uncertainty theory thus predicts that information 
asymmetry proxies such as firm age or IPO size can explain reduced underpricing. The results 
provided by LM (2013) indicates that uncertain language used in IPO prospectus can function as 
another uncertainty proxy.  
 They interpret their results as providing support to bookbuilding theories (Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989) and Spatt and Srivastava (1991)) because prospectuses indicating greater 
uncertainty will lead the underwriter to rely more on institutional investors to reveal useful 
information to set the appropriate price. This will however imply a higher compensation to 
investors in the form of larger underpricing as predicted by bookbuilding theories. Consistent 
with this, LM (2013) finds that uncertain text is positively correlated with absolute price 
revision.  
 In contrast to LM (2013), HH (2010) focuses on the association between information 
content of IPO prospectus and IPO pricing for a sample of book-built US IPOs completed 
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between 1996 and 2005. They start by classifying prospectus information into standard and 
distinctive. This classification is done by calculating the correlation between word distribution of 
sample IPO firm's prospectus and word distribution of recent IPOs as well as past IPOs in the 
same industry. Standard information is basically the degree of such correlation. Uncorrelated 
part, then, gives the distinctive information content. HH (2010) documents that IPOs with more 
distinctive information content enjoy less underpricing and less gross spread. For tone of the 
prospectus, they find that tone is marginally correlated with IPO pricing. More specifically, they 
show that only the risk factors sections from the prospectuses seem to increase pricing accuracy 
when the tone is positive. Because of reputational and litigious concerns of issuers, a positive 
tone in risk factors is viewed credible by investors. Thus, it leads to an increase in pricing 
accuracy.  
 HH (2012) extends the literature by examining the relation between litigation risk of 
material omission and underpricing. They conjecture that first day underpricing and degree of 
disclosure are substitutes that can mitigate liability risk. Consistent with this, they document that 
issuers use strong strategic disclosure and underpricing to hedge against lawsuits. 
2.3. Institutional Background to UK IPOs 
 Unlike the US stock market, the EU markets have been less standardized and stringent on 
disclosure requirements of IPO prospectuses until late 1990s. In order to increase market 
efficiency and protect investors through increased disclosure standards, the European Parliament 
and the council of the European Union approved the Prospectus Directive on 4th November 2003, 
which came into effect on 31st December 2003. Based on this Directive, issuers must publish the 
prospectus when securities are admitted to stock markets or placed for offering. The Directive 
additionally standardized the content of IPO prospectuses by requiring them to provide some key 
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information about directors, financial data, use of proceeds, risk factors, and so on. The EU 
member states had to implement the Prospectus Directive by 1 July 2005. Thus, for the UK stock 
market, we contend that prospectuses of IPOs after 2004 do convey key details that investors can 
utilize for valuing the deals. A caveat applies to the AIM market which at present is exempt from 
the Prospectus Directive and, more generally, the regulatory requirements on prospectus 
disclosure are less stringent than those of the Main Market, although over time they have become 
more standardized and informative. Fixed-priced IPOs do mainly list on AIM. 
 Also the preparation and timeline of initial offerings in the UK differ substantially from 
those of US IPOs even with regard to the publication of the prospectus. While US IPO 
prospectuses are publicly filed as S-1 forms several months before the offering date, UK IPO 
prospectuses are made available to potential investors for significantly shorter time periods. We 
describe the timeline of the “live” IPO process in Figure 1. Once the IPO is announced, a 
preliminary prospectus also called pathfinder is released to the investors approached by the 
underwriters/advisors. At this point investors first go through an “investor education” period 
which entails that the analysts and equity sale teams of the bookrunners give briefing about the 
upcoming offering and its main features. The investor education period usually lasts around two 
weeks and helps the management and analysts set the price range. Then, the road show and the 
bookbuilding take place and a final offer price is determined. This second part of the process 
usually lasts a couple of weeks. Once the stock starts trading a final prospectus is officially 
published and becomes public.  
 For fixed-priced IPOs, this whole process is usually much shorter. Specifically the 
roadshow and bookbuilding take place within a few days given that they are only needed to 
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collect the orders from the investors and not also to help setting the offer price which is already 
announced in the preliminary prospectus.  
 In conclusion, the IPO process in the UK is structured in such a way that prospectuses are 
available to interested investors for a much shorter period of time compared to the US IPOs, 
typically publicly available for approximately 10 weeks before the issue date. 
 This raises the question of whether the prospectuses of UK IPO do play the same role on 
pricing as it is documented for the US IPOs given the discussed differences in terms of timetable 
and offering mechanism. 
2.4. Data and Methodology  
 We obtain the sample of UK initial public offerings completed during 2004-2012 from 
Dealogic which has a better coverage for European IPOs than SDC Platinum. In addition, it 
provides a wider range of relevant information such as gross fee, tranche incentive fee, and fee 
notes that other databases have incomplete access to. To be consistent with existing literature, we 
apply the standard filters by excluding IPOs from the following industries: Financials, Insurance, 
Real Estate/Property, and Closed End Funds. We also drop IPOs with a market value lower than 
5 million Euros.  
 To obtain prospectuses, we carry out searches through Thomson ONE, Factset, and 
Dealogic. Aim Rule 26 which came into force in February 2007 ensures that issuing companies 
maintain a webpage where admission documents are stored. Thus, for AIM firms that are not 
delisted and whose IPO takes place after 2007, we obtain the prospectuses from the company 
websites. For firms whose IPOs are completed before 2007, we make use of the databases 
mentioned above. We have to exclude further 55 IPOs for which the prospectus is either not 
available in any of the database or not machine readable at all. Our final sample consists of 389 
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UK IPOs where 320 IPOs are fixed-priced and the remaining 69 are book-built (or open-priced) 
IPOs. To be able to perform word content analysis, we first manually parse each prospectus into 
three text files. The first text file contains the whole document. The second and third text files 
instead isolate respectively the risk factors and use of proceeds sections of the prospectus17. 
Since most admission documents are stored as scanned files by data providers, we remove 
redundant characters from the corresponding text file.  
 In this paper, we merge the approaches used by LM and HH and focus our analysis on the 
impact of both the tone and the type of information content of IPO prospectuses. Tone, as 
defined by LM, essentially refers to use of certain type of words and their predictive power of 
IPO underpricing, offer price and post-IPO return volatility. HH classifies instead the 
information content into either standard or distinctive, whereby distinctive means that the 
prospectus provides relevant firm specific information. We provide the exact details about how 
the tone and information content of prospectuses are worked out in the following sections. 
2.4.1. Tone and length of document 
  Tetlock (2007) finds that the number of negative words in major newspaper articles can 
forecast next day market return. To calculate the frequency of negative and positive words, he 
utilizes the General Inquirer's Harvard IV-4 psychosocial dictionary. This lexicon currently 
involves almost 2000 negative words and 1300 positive words. Using the same source as their 
word dictionary, Tetlock et al. (2008) document that the proportion of negative words in media 
news is negatively correlated to the company’s earnings.  
 LM (2011) argue that standard word lists used by earlier studies are not suitable for 
financial texts as they are likely to make the categorization of words misleading. For example, 
                                                 
17
 Unlike US S-1 forms, UK prospectuses do not usually include management discussion sections or a detailed 
summary of the issue at the beginning of the admission document. 
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words such as “tax” and “liability” are coded as negative in the General Inquirer's word list 
although they are regarded neutral in a financial context. By compiling a new word list, they 
show that words embedded in 10-K filings are linked to returns, fraud, material weakness, and 
earnings surprises. We follow LM (2011) and distinguish six different categories of words: 
positive, negative, uncertainty, litigious, strong, and weak. These lists have been used by several 
recent studies about sentiment in news (Gurun and Butler (2012)), annual reports (Jegadeesh and 
Wu (2011)) and conference calls (Mayew and Venkatachalam (2012)). To generate tone related 
proxies, we use word lists of LM (2011) and simply look at the fractions of six tone categories in 
admission documents of our sample firms.  Below, we list the most frequently used words in 
each of the six categories: 
Positive Negative Uncertain Litigation Weak Strong 
1 Good Failure probable consent almost Undoubtedly 
2 Success Claims intangible regulatory uncertain Never 
3 Greater Adversely conditional laws depends Lowest 
4 opportunities termination possible legal appears Clearly 
5 Gain Adverse believe regulations depend Strongly 
6 Gains impairment risks contracts depending Always 
7 Able Disclosed approximately contract might Highest 
8 Outstanding Losses could law possible Best 
9 Effective Against risk shall could Must 
10 Benefit Loss may admission may Will 
 
 A complex set of information can lead to investor underreaction and poor valuation 
(Hirshleifer (2001), Brav and Heaton (2002)). Using the word count of annual reports as a 
complexity measure, You and Zhang (2009) find that longer 10-K documents lead to a stronger 
investor under-reaction. Recently, LM (2013) shows that the electronic document size of 10-K 
files can significantly predict subsequent return volatility and analyst forecast dispersion. More 
specifically, larger files exhibit a higher volatility of post-announcement returns and of analyst 
forecast. In line with this finding, Arnold, Fishe, and North (2010) find that information 
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ambiguity in the risk factor section of IPO prospectuses, proxied by the proportion of words used 
in the risk factor section relative to those used in the entire document, is positively correlated 
with underpricing and post-IPO return volatility for a sample of US IPOs completed during 
1998-2005. 
 To test the pricing effect of information complexity or ambiguity provided by UK IPO 
prospectuses, we make use of total number of words in i.) the whole document, and ii.) risk 
factor sections. Our length variable is then calculated as the natural logarithm of total words. 
2.4.2. Distinctive versus Standard Content 
 Following a similar approach to HH (2010), we represent each text file as a normalized 
vector that shows the fraction of certain words appearing throughout the document. In order to 
create a lexicon, we first retrieve the set of all words that appear in all documents. Then, we 
reduce this set to a list of words by requiring each word to appear in at least 5 percent of the 
whole document. More specifically, we delete those words from main lexicon if they repeat less 
than 50 times. After eliminating articles, conjunctions, prepositions and pronouns, we reduce the 
word list to 9083. We next map similar words that share the same word root into one word. For 
example, the words "acquire", "acquiring", and "acquired" need to be mapped to the single word 
"acquire". To be able to find the root of each word in our list, we employ a web crawling 
algorithm and pull word roots from Webster's online dictionary18. Once words with the same 
roots are merged, our final base dictionary is reduced to 5036 words. We use this vector of words 
as our text spanning set. Then, for each word in this master list, we look at the number of 
occurrence in the text file of the company admission document and generate a representation 
based on these numbers.  
                                                 
18
 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
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 As a simplified demonstration, suppose the whole admission document of a generic 
company i is the following statement: “The key advantage of the company’s product over other 
companies’ products is”. This segment involves only four spanning words, “key, advantage, 
company, product”. The corresponding vector representation based on word frequency is 
repi=(1,1,2,2) because the words “key” and “advantage” appear only once while the words 
“product” and “company” appear twice. Given the total number of occurrences, which is six in 
this example, the vector representation finally normalizes into repi =(0.17, 0.17, 0.33, 0.33). We 
carry out this exercise for the whole document and the risk factor section.  
 The next step is to classify the information content of the admission documents into 
standard and distinctive components. HH (2010) argues that costly premarket information 
production can induce firms to disclose a minimum amount of standard information that is 
sufficient to meet with regulatory requirements. In this case, the content of an IPO prospectus 
would be expected to be very much similar to the prospectuses published by other companies 
who have gone public around the same period of time and/or belong to the same industry. We 
quantify the extent to which the information content of firm i’s prospectus overlaps with that of 
other recent IPOs by calculating the following measure:  
                     
Where N is the number of most recent IPOs which we set equal to 1519. 
 In a similar way, we quantify the extent to which the information content of firm i’s 
prospectus overlaps with that of other IPOs within the same industry or closely related industries by 
calculating the following measure:  
                                                 
19
 We do try different threshold and results are unaffected. 
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Where M denotes the number of IPOs within the same industry which are identified using the 
industry classification provided by Thomson One. To eliminate a possible overlap with recent IPOs, 
we exclude the 15 most recent IPO in the same industry and we also require that each IPO in our 
sample has at least five past IPOs in the same industry. Finally, as for the previous measure we set 
the maximum to 15, so M         . 
 A linear combination of the components calculated above provides our final measure of 
standard information in a given IPO prospectus. More specifically, standard information content is 
determined by following OLS estimation without constant term 
                                      .    (1)  
We run the model above for each sample firm that has 5036 observations in the vector 
representation. Standard content is the sum of the coefficient estimates as                           .             can be interpreted as the fraction of standard words used in the admission document. 
The residual term in model (1) stands for the variation in word distribution that cannot be 
explained by standard words used in recent and similar industry IPOs. Therefore, distinctive 
content of the admission documents can be quantified by the absolute sum of residual term. 
2.4.3. OLS Models 
 Our first aim is to analyze the link between admission document and IPO underpricing. 
After constructing document tone, content and length variables, we start our analysis by 
investigating their impact on IPO underpricing by running the following fixed effect models  
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 Underpricing = α + β1 Tone / Sentiment / Length Variables + β2 VC backed +   
 + β3 Log (Proceeds) + β4 AIM + β5 Internet + β6 Underwriter Share + β7 log(1+ Age)  
 +  β8  Pre-IPO Market Average  +  Industry Dummies +  Year Dummies       (2) 
 
 The dependent variable in equation (2) is IPO Underpricing defined as the percentage 
change from offer price to first day closing price. Our main coefficient of interest is β1  for which we 
use three different independent variables. First, we look at the relation between text tone - as 
defined by fraction of positive, negative, weak, strong and litigious words - and underpricing. 
Second, we investigate the link between text information content, standard versus distinctive, 
and underpricing. Third, we examine the impact of document length on underpricing.  
 Our independent variables are as follows. VC backed is dummy variable that takes value 1 
if the sample firm has VC financing before the IPO. The relation between IPO underpricing and 
the venture capital backing has been investigated by several pioneering studies. Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) shows that VC-backed IPOs experience lower underpricing than non-VC-backed 
IPOs. They contend that VC backing certifies the quality of the offer and hence leads to lower 
underpricing. Gompers and Lerner (1997) further examine the certification of VC argument and 
find that underpricing of VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs depends on methodology as 
well as the sample periods. 
 Proceeds is the offer size in terms of net proceeds. Prior studies find that older and bigger 
companies are less risky and hence underpriced less. Thus, we expect to find a negative 
coefficient on proceeds. To be consistent with earlier studies, we take the natural logarithm of 
this variable (see also Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Cliff and Denis (2004)). 
 Smart and Zutter (2003) and Bradley and Jordan (2002) argue that IPOs on the Nasdaq 
exchange are smaller and riskier than those on the NYSE. So, the listing location is considered to 
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be another proxy of ex-ante uncertainty that has impact on IPO underpricing. A similar argument 
can be applied to firms that decide to list on the AIM as opposite to the main exchange. Hence, 
to control for the listing decision, we include the dummy variable AIM which takes value one if 
the firm is listed in AIM and zero otherwise. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) and Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) find that internet firms are associated with significantly higher initial returns 
because they are considered riskier companies. In line with the existing literature, we also 
include the dummy variable Internet which is equal to one if the IPO firm is identified as an 
internet company in the Dealogic database. 
 Most studies on IPO underpricing do control for the underwriter reputation which is often 
shown to reduce the underpricing because it mitigates the information asymmetry vis-à-vis 
investors. Following HH (2010), we measure the underwriter’s reputation by the Underwriter 
share defined as the log of past year’s market share in dollars amount. 
 Several studies find that the firm age at the time of the IPO has a significant impact on 
underpricing (Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) , Ljungqvist and William (2002), Ellul and Pagano 
(2006)). We define Age as the natural logarithm of one plus the difference between the IPO date 
and the date of incorporation. We retrieve incorporation dates for our companies from Orbis 
database, compiled by Bureau van Dijk. Whenever the information is missing in Orbis, we 
obtain the incorporation dates directly from the prospectuses.  
 Market conditions and waves in IPO placements can predict the first day returns to some 
extent. For example, Bradley and Jordan (2002) report that more than 35 percent of IPO 
underpricing can be explained by incorporating the hot issue markets. Since our sample covers 
the recent recession period caused by 2008 financial crisis, we control for market and industry 
conditions by including industry dummies, year dummies and Pre-IPO Market Average defined 
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as the mean AIM index return over the 30 day trading period before the issue date (see Loughran 
and Ritter (2004), Lowry and Schwert (2004)).  
 Our second aim is to investigate the impact of tone, content and length of admission 
documents on the offer price and post-IPO return volatility. To do this, we replace dependent 
variable in Equation 2 by offer price and post-IPO return volatility and keep the same 
explanatory variables. 
 
2.5. Empirical Results 
2.5.1. IPO frequencies and Summary Statistics 
 Table 2.1 presents the distribution of IPOs across time and industry. As it Is expected, the 
number of IPOs declines sharply during the crisis period. The total number of IPOs between 
2008 and 2012 is 83 representing approximately 21 per cent of the total sample. The fraction of 
fixed-priced IPOs, 82%, indicates that the UK IPO market remains to be dominated by fixed-
pricing mechanism. 
 Panel B in Table 2.1 shows the IPO frequency based on the macro industry classification 
provided by Thomson One. Almost 23 percent of the sample IPOs is composed of IPOs from the 
High Technology industries. Similar to year distributions, industry distribution shows that fixed-
priced IPOs dominates book-built IPOs in all industries. 
 Summary statistics are reported in Table 2.2. We note that the mean (median) underpricing 
for fixed-priced and open-priced IPOs are 10% (8%) and 6% (6%) respectively. The last column 
shows that difference of means between the two groups is statistically significant at 1 per cent 
level. This preliminary evidence is in line with the IPO literature which stresses that fixed-priced 
offerings do typically exhibit higher underpricing given the lack of information discovery which 
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is instead possible in bookbuilding. Post-IPO return volatility seems to be very similar across the 
two mechanisms, whereas there is a remarkable difference in trading volumes. This is not 
surprising for several reasons. Firstly, fixed-priced IPOs are generally smaller than open-priced 
ones as the deal amount value in Panel B of Table 2.2 suggests. Secondly, the majority of them, 
95 percent in our sample as per Panel B of Table 2.2, are listed on AIM. 
 Panel B reports mean and median values for control variables used in the subsequent 
analysis. Open-priced IPOs are significantly older and larger than fixed-priced offers. Mean 
proceeds is 231 million Euros for book-built IPOs. The sample of fixed-priced IPOs is mostly 
composed of AIM listed companies and as a robustness test, we later check whether our results 
are different if we restrict our attention only to AIM IPOs. 
 Unlike the US IPO market, UK IPO market has relatively less number of offerings that 
have VC backing. The percentage of VC backed IPOs in the sample is 19 for book-built IPOs 
and 8 for fixed-priced issues. Finally, the proportion Internet IPOs and pre-IPO mean market 
return do not change significantly from one group to another. 
 Panel C in Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics for our word semantic analysis. It is 
apparent that open-priced IPOs have longer prospectuses than fixed-priced IPOs. The number of 
total words in the whole document and in the risk factors section of open-priced IPOs is twice as 
big as that of fixed-priced offers. For tone variables, book-built issues are significantly more 
negative and uncertain than the other group. However, the difference between the proportion of 
uncertain words changes for the risk factor section. Admission documents of fixed-priced IPOs 
have significantly stronger tone than those of open-priced ones. With regard to the information 
content variables, we note that open-priced IPOs provide less standard content than fixed-priced 
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issues. The difference is significant at 1 per cent level for both whole document and risk factor 
sections. 
 Table 2.3 presents the correlations among the dependent variables and our variables of 
interest. We note that the length of the admission document is negatively correlated with IPO 
underpricing in both fixed and open-priced IPOs and the same holds for the standard content. 
The correlation between underpricing and the tone variables instead is very much different 
across tone classifications and types of offering mechanism. 
2.5.2. First Day Underpricing  
 We present the baseline OLS results for the relation between the length and tone of the 
admission document and IPO underpricing in Panel A in Table 2.4. For fixed-priced IPOs, we 
find that negative, uncertain, litigious and weak words are negatively correlated with 
underpricing. The impact is both statistically and economically significant. For example, one 
standard deviation increase in negative tone increases underpricing by 1.02%, calculated as the 
product of standard deviation of negative tone, 0.18, and its coefficient estimate, 0.057. Our 
results are in contrast with those documented by LM (2013) who instead finds a positive relation 
between IPO underpricing and negative or uncertain words.  
 When we repeat the analysis for open-priced IPOs, we find that the relation between 
negative tone and underpricing is positive in line with LM (2013), suggesting that more negative 
words result in larger underpricing. The coefficient on negative tone is 0.165 and significant at 
10 per cent level. The remaining tone variables are not significant although the signs of 
coefficients seem to be consistent with those documented by LM. However, we are cautious to 
attempt any further interpretation of this set of results given the very limited size of the open-
priced IPOs subsample. 
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 Based on the results of Panel A in Table 2.4, we can argue that the role of admission 
documents on IPO pricing varies with the type of offering mechanisms and in the following 
sections we will try and shed more light on this question.  
 Panel B in Table 2.4 extends the analysis to investigate the relationship between length of 
the prospectus and first day return. It is clear that longer admission documents and more 
specifically longer risk factor sections do significantly reduce IPO underpricing for the fixed-
priced offerings. The effect is statistically significant at 1 per cent level and we further note a 
higher R square for regression in Panel B, which confirms that the length of the admission 
document has a strong explanatory power of IPO underpricing. 
 On the other hand, the document length appears to play no role in open-priced IPOs, 
though the same caveat as before applies here that our findings might be biased by the very 
limited sample size. 
 Finally, in Panel C of Table 2.4 we look at the impact of the prospectus content, standard 
vs. informative, on first day returns. We distinguish between the content of the whole document 
and that of the risk factor section only. Results show that more informative content both at the 
level of the whole document and risk factors section increases underpricing in fixed-price IPOs. 
One standard deviation increase in informative content increases the underpricing by 2.62%. 
Standard content seems not to have an effect as coefficient estimates are not significant although 
they are also positive. Similar to the results on tone analysis, our findings on content analysis are 
in contrast with HH (2013), suggesting again that the role of the admission document on IPO 
pricing depends on the specific offering mechanism. 
 Finally, the results on open-priced IPOs also differ from those in HH (2013). Specifically, 
we surprisingly find that more standard content of the whole admission documents can 
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significantly reduce the level of underpricing for book-built IPOs while more informative content 
of the risk factor section has a significant and positive impact on underpricing.  
 In the next section, we look at implications of tone, content of prospectuses and the 
document length for offer price, which might help us interpreting the results above. 
2.5.3. Implications for Offer Price 
 Panel A in Table 2.5 reports coefficient estimates of all tone variables. It is immediate to 
note that they all have positive statistically significant impact on the offer price of fixed-price 
IPOs, with the exception for litigation and strong words which are not significant.  
 For open-priced IPOs, we document that there is negative relation between offer price and 
negative tone of the document. The coefficient on negative tone is -3.327 and significant at 10 
per cent level. However, we similarly find that positive words do have the same effect that 
negative words which seems to be less intuitive. The limited sample size makes any further 
interpretation of the results quite daring. 
 Panel B in Table 2.5 looks at prospectus length and its impact on the offer price. For fixed-
priced IPOs, we document a positive correlation between the length of the whole prospectus as 
well as of the risk factor section and the offer price - opposite sign compared to the results on 
underpricing - which is statistically and economically significant. Unlike the findings with 10-K 
files or US IPO prospectuses provided by LM (2013) and Arnold et al. (2010), the amount of 
information in UK fixed-priced IPO prospectuses play an essential role in achieving better pre 
and post-IPO valuation. Document length appears to have no impact on the offer price of book- 
built IPOs.  
 Finally, in Panel C in Table 2.5 we investigate the role of the different information types 
on the offer price and document that, while this seems to play no role in book-built IPOs, for 
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fixed-priced IPOs more standard content clearly reduces the offer price as we would intuitively 
expect. The relation is negative and significant at 10 per cent level for the whole document and at 
5 per cent for risk factor section. We fail to find any association between content and offer price 
for book-built IPOs though. 
2.5.4. Post-IPO Return Volatility  
  Information asymmetry or uncertainty theories predict that more uncertainty increases the 
ambiguity about IPO valuation and hence leads to more underpricing (Rock (1986), Beatty and 
Ritter (1986)). Moreover, more pre-IPO uncertainty is likely to result in more post-IPO return 
volatility. Consistent with this, LM (2013) find that uncertain language in S-1 forms are 
positively associated with underpricing and return volatility after the issue date. For fixed-priced 
IPOs, we find however the opposite result that a more uncertain tone decreases underpricing. To 
test whether the tone of document can also contribute to explain the subsequent return volatility, 
we run Equation 2 by replacing dependent variable with standard deviation of 60-day return 
during the period from day +5 to day +64 after the issue date. Our results are reported in Table 
2.6. 
 Results in Panel A in Table 2.6 show that there is no empirical evidence of a relation 
between post-IPO return volatility and the tone of the IPO prospectuses. All tone variables 
appear to be insignificant for fixed-price IPOs. This could suggest that our results do not support 
uncertainty hypotheses for fixed-price IPOs. We note however that the variable log net proceed 
which is also considered a proxy for ex-ante uncertainty carries the expected negative sign, that 
is larger issues have significantly less ex-post return volatility. In the next section, we try and 
provide a possible interpretation for our results for fixed-price offerings. 
  
83 
 
 For open-priced subsample, consistent with LM (2013), we find that the coefficient on 
negative tone is positive and significant at ten percent level while the remaining tone variables 
are all insignificant. 
 Similar to results on underpricing and offer price, the length of the whole admission 
document as well as the risk factor section does explain post-IPO return volatility. We find that 
both coefficient estimates are negative and statistically significant at 1 per cent level. The 
economic significance is smaller compared to the results on the offer price and underpricing, 
however taken together our findings provide a strong evidence that the document length, rather 
that the tone as suggested by LM (2003), plays a major role in determining the pricing and short 
term performances of fixed-priced IPOs. 
 Finally, for completeness we also report in Panel C the regression results for the document 
content which show that a more distinctive information content has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on the ex-post return volatility whereas standard content does not have any 
impact. We find a similar result for open-priced IPOs. The coefficients estimates are 0.055 and 
0.077 for fixed and open-priced subsamples respectively. Both estimates are significant at 10 per 
cent level. This provides another piece of empirical evidence against the uncertainty hypothesis 
because distinctive information would normally be expected to reduce post-IPO return volatility.  
2.5.5. Time variation in the impact of admission tone  
In the analysis so far, we control for market-wide fluctuations by year dummy variables. Garcia 
(2013) finds that the sentiment of information, provided by newspaper articles, has a stronger 
impact in bad times (e.g. recessions) rather than in good times. This could similarly apply to the 
information conveyed by IPO prospectuses. As our sample comprises the recent financial crisis 
of 2008 and thus raises the question of whether the period after 2008 bias in some way our 
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results. To be able to test whether this is the case we re-run our tests in the two regimes: before 
the recent crisis and during the recent recession. We set the beginning of the crisis in 2008. 
 We begin our analysis by first looking at the summary statistics of the sample over the two 
time horizons. Table 2.7 shows that admission documents have become substantially longer 
during the recession period. For fixed-priced IPOs, the mean number of words increases from 
43k to 67k. Admission documents also have more negative and uncertain tone during the crisis 
period than they do in pre-crisis period. The differences in means are significant at 5 per cent 
level for both tone measures. Consistent with this pattern, we find that prospectuses use less 
strong language in the recent crisis. The changes in descriptive statistics for open-priced IPOs are 
similar to those observed for fixed-priced IPOs. One important figure is about the information 
content variable. On average, both types of firms tend to provide more distinctive information 
during the crisis period but the difference is significant (at 5 per cent level) only for open-priced 
IPOs. 
 To perform the regression analysis about the impact of document tone and length in the 
two sample periods, we use only fixed-priced IPOs due to the very small number of open-priced 
IPOs during the crisis period which would make very difficult to obtain meaningful results. The 
regression results are in Table 2.8. We report only the results on underpricing. We observe that 
despite the evident increase of the information provided by the admission documents during the 
crisis period, none of our variables appear to be significant in the post-crisis subsample. In 
contrast, regression results on the first subsample before 2008 confirm those obtained for the 
whole sample. In un-tabulated results, similar to results in Panel C in Table 2.4, we find that 
distinctive information content variable is positive and significant, at 1 per cent level, but 
standard content proxy is not significant for pre-crisis subsample. 
  
85 
 
 We also observe that none of the regressors that do have some explanatory power in the 
period before the crisis do so after 2008. Interestingly enough the Internet dummy appears to be 
negatively correlated with IPO underpricing and the coefficient estimates are all strongly 
statistically significant20. 
 In conclusion, our findings are clearly driven by the period before the crisis as the tone, 
length and content of the admission documents do not seem to play any role on the pricing of 
fixed-price IPO after 2008. We also examine the relation between tone and offer price over two 
periods but find no significant effect during the recession period. 
2.5.6. Interpretation of the results 
 Our overall evidence clearly suggest that, for fixed-price offerings, providing more 
information is clearly beneficially to the issuing company as it results in a higher offer price, 
smaller underpricing and lower ex-post volatility. And this is a fortiori true for the length of the 
risk factor section. Our findings on fixed-priced IPOs are in sharp contrast with previous findings 
on book-built IPOs by LM (2013) and Arnold et al. (2011). Similarly, our results show that use 
of a more uncertain language as measured by the proportion of negative, weak and uncertain 
words increases the offer price while decreasing IPO underpricing, substantially differing from 
the evidence documented in recent studies on book-built IPOs by HH (2010), and LM (2011). 
 Overall, our findings show admission documents play a different role on the pricing of 
IPOs depending on the offering mechanisms used to go public. Additionally, a closer inspection 
of the correlation matrix of Panel A in Table 2.3 reveals that the length of the admission 
document is negatively correlated with the proportion of positive and strong words whereas it is 
highly positively correlated with the proportion of negative and uncertain words. In other words, 
                                                 
20
 We note that fraction of internet IPOs increases only 1% from 6% in pre-crisis period to 7% in during-crisis 
period.  
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admission documents are longer when there is overall more uncertainty about the firm. This 
would then explain our, at first counterintuitive, results for the tone variables and provides 
further support to our interpretation that more information is always better for fixed-priced IPOs. 
The reason for this might be that by their nature, fixed-priced IPOs are generally riskier because 
they are smaller, both in term of size of the listing and size of the company. Furthermore such 
IPOs usually get listed on the second segment of the stock exchange (AIM in the UK), and this is 
known from the beginning. However, providing more information can improve the pricing of 
these IPOs as it clarifies the situation of the company to prospective investors.  
 On the other hand, our findings on open-priced IPOs, weak because of the relative small 
sample size, seem to be generally in line with the evidence documented by LM (2011). This 
provides further support to our view that the different results we obtain for fixed-priced IPOs are 
the consequence of the specificity of fixed-price mechanism as well as the characteristics of 
companies that go public with a fixed-priced offering. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we perform text analysis for the admission documents of a sample of UK 
IPOs between 2004 and 2012 to examine the pricing effects of tone, length and information 
content of prospectuses. UK IPOs are peculiar for the large proportion of companies that decide 
to go public using a fixed-priced offering. Contrary to most common bookbuilding mechanism 
used by the US IPOs, fixed-pricing does not allow any price discovery from institutional 
investors. 
 Unlike recent findings for book-built US IPOs, the length of the prospectus explains a 
significant fraction of variation in first day underpricing. Specifically, longer admission 
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documents result in higher offer price and a lower underpricing and lower post-IPO return 
volatility. However, more standard prospectuses do have the opposite impact of reducing the 
offer price although we find no significant impact on the level of underpricing.  
 On the other hand, a higher level of uncertain document tone surprisingly increases the 
offer price and reduces the level of underpricing. This seems to be the consequence of 
uncertainty words being positively correlated with the document length. 
 Overall our findings clearly suggest that for fixed-price IPOs more information is always 
better regardless of whether the additional information reveals more uncertainty about the issuing 
firm. 
 A further contribution of the paper is to investigate whether the role of admission 
document on the pricing of IPOs have changed after the recent financial crisis. We observe that, 
after 2007, admission documents have become generally much longer and more negative and 
uncertain in their tone as compared to prospectuses before the crisis. Nonetheless, our regression 
analysis reveals that they do not seem to have any explanatory power on the pricing of IPOs in 
the crisis period.  
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Appendix B: Definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
Underpricing 
 
the percentage change from offer price to first day closing price 
Post-IPO Return Volatility standard deviation of 60-day return during the period from day +5 to day +64 after 
the issue date  
Offer Price 
 
natural logarithm of net proceeds. 
VC Backed 
 
one if the company gets VC financing before the IPO date and zero otherwise 
Log Net Proceeds natural logarithm of net proceeds. 
 
AIM Dummy one if the firm is listed in AIM and zero otherwise  
 
Internet Dummy one if the company is internet stock, zero otherwise.  
 
Log Underwriter  Share underwriter market share as the percent of proceeds underwritten by each 
underwriter to the total amount underwritten by all underwriters in a given year. 
Log Firm Age 
 
natural logarithm of one plus the difference between the IPO date and the date of 
incorporation 
Market Return 
 
mean AIM index return over the 30 day trading period before the issue date 
% Positive words 
 
fraction of positive words in the whole prospectus or risk factor section 
% Negative words 
 
fraction of negative words in the whole prospectus or risk factor section 
% Uncertain words 
 
fraction of uncertain words in the whole prospectus or risk factor section 
% Litigation words 
 
fraction of litigious words in the whole prospectus or risk factor section 
% Weak words 
 
fraction of weak words in the whole prospectus or risk factor section 
% Strong words 
 
fraction of strong words in the whole prospectus or risk factor section 
Document  Length  natural logarithm of total number words in the whole document or risk factor 
section 
Standard Content 
 
the sum of coefficients,                           , in the OLS regression:  
                                     where rep stands for word frequency vector. 
Distinctive Content 
 
absolute sum of residual term in the regression above. 
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Figure 2.1. IPO process in the UK 
 
This figure outlines overall IPO process in the UK. It is based on the information given by LSE's (London Stock 
Exchange) guide to AIM. 
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Table 2.1. Frequency distribution IPOs over time and industry 
Panel A. IPO frequencies by year 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
All IPOS 21 116 96 73 14 2 33 17 17 389 
FP IPO 21 94 84 59 12 2 24 12 12 320 
Percentage 1.00 0.81 0.88 0.81 0.86 1.00 0.73 0.71 0.71 0.82 
This panel shows number of IPOs per each year during the sample period (2000-2012). FP IPOs stands for fixed-
priced IPOs. 
 
Panel B. IPO frequencies by industry 
Industry All IPOs FP IPOs Percentage 
Consumer Products and Services 34 29 0.85 
Consumer Staples 5 5 1.00 
Energy and Power 67 50 0.75 
Healthcare 35 25 0.71 
High Technology 87 75 0.86 
Industrials 42 34 0.81 
Materials 74 66 0.89 
Media and Entertainment 22 18 0.82 
Retail 10 6 0.60 
Telecommunications 13 12 0.92 
Total 389 320 0.82 
This panel presents the IPO frequency based on the macro industry classification 
provided by Thomson One. FP IPOs stands for fixed-priced IPOs. 
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     Table 2.2. Summary statistics 
Open-Priced IPOs Fixed-Priced IPOs Differences 
in means Variable Mean Std Median Mean Std Median 
 
Panel A: IPO Pricing and Performance variables 
Underpricing 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.08 -0.04*** 
Post-IPO Return Volatility 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.00 
Offer Price 1.96 1.46 1.73 1.03 0.72 0.96  0.93*** 
Trading Volume 7.82 2.83 8.25 5.70 2.23 5.77  2.12*** 
Panel B: Control variables 
VC Backed 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.08 0.27 0.00  0.11*** 
Deal amount (million €) 231.47 332.40 106.78 32.42 43.23 16.10  199.05*** 
AIM 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.95 0.22 1.00 -0.47*** 
Internet Dummy 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.07 0.25 0.00  0.02    
Underwriter  Share 7.16 2.41 7.84 4.74 2.16 4.77  2.42*** 
Company Age 6.04 13.09 2.00 4.12 7.53 1.00  1.92* 
Market return 0.02 0.18 0.06 0.01 0.22 0.06  0.01 
    
Panel C: Admission Document Components 
Whole document (All)     
Total words 89688.43 44712.58 85946.00 49178.02 26357.08 42704.50 40510.41*** 
% Positive words 0.59 0.12 0.56 0.58 0.14 0.58  0.01 
% Negative words 1.10 0.16 1.07 1.04 0.18 1.03  0.06** 
% Uncertain words 1.16 0.19 1.14 1.12 0.19 1.09  0.04* 
% Litigation words 1.08 0.22 1.04 1.16 0.25 1.14 -0.08* 
% Weak words 0.59 0.14 0.58 0.56 0.12 0.55  0.03** 
% Strong words 0.48 0.09 0.47 0.51 0.11 0.50 -0.03* 
Standard Content 0.94 0.09 0.93 0.99 0.10 1.00 -0.05*** 
Distinctive Content 0.54 0.05 0.54 0.55 0.05 0.55 -0.01 
   
 
Risk Factors(RF)     
Total words 7019.64 4264.22 6130.00 3887.05 2913.42 3114.00 3132.59*** 
% Positive words 0.87 0.30 0.81 0.92 0.33 0.88 -0.05 
% Negative words 3.05 0.73 3.16 2.67 0.66 2.68  0.38*** 
% Uncertain words 3.23 0.57 3.16 3.56 0.60 3.51 -0.33*** 
% Litigation words 1.35 0.52 1.28 1.27 0.52 1.23  0.08 
% Weak words 2.11 0.46 2.13 2.16 0.38 2.17 -0.05 
% Strong words 0.70 0.27 0.66 0.85 0.27 0.84 -0.15*** 
Standard Content 0.94 0.16 0.96 1.00 0.12 1.00 -0.06*** 
Distinctive Content 0.79 0.13 0.78 0.83 0.14 0.81 -0.01** 
The sample includes 320 fixed-priced and 69 book-built IPOs completed during 2004-2012. Underpricing is percentage change 
from offer price to first day closing price.  Post-IPO return volatility is standard deviation of 60-day return during the period from 
day +5 to day +64 after the issue date. Trading volume is the log of total shares traded. Definitions of controls are given in 
Appendix. Tone variables (positive, negative, uncertain, litigation, weak and strong) are constructed by word lists provided by LM 
(2011). Standard content is the sum of coefficients,                           , in the OLS regression:                                      where rep stands for word frequency vector. Distinctive content is the absolute sum of residual term in the regression 
above.  
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Table 2.3. Correlations 
Panel A. Correlations for fixed-priced IPOs 
Underpricing 1.00  
Post-IPO Ret.  Volatility 0.60 1.00  
Offer Price -0.07 -0.25 1.00  
Doc. Length -0.21 -0.13 0.04 1.00  
% Positive words 0.00 -0.16 0.02 -0.11 1.00  
% Negative words -0.10 -0.02 0.03 0.34 0.08 1.00  
% Uncertain words  -0.07 0.03 0.03 0.16 -0.07 0.37 1.00  
% Litigation words -0.09 -0.06 0.00 -0.33 0.06 0.12 -0.03 1.00  
% Weak words -0.08 -0.01 0.02 -0.12 0.12 0.32 0.68 0.36 1.00  
% Strong words -0.04 -0.06 0.04 -0.27 0.21 0.00 0.10 0.26 0.27 1.00  
Standard Content 0.07 -0.02 0.01 -0.52 -0.07 -0.22 -0.09 0.45 0.19 0.16 1.00  
Distinctive Content 0.11 0.18 0.01 0.01 -0.08 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.14 -0.08 1.00 
The sample includes 320 fixed-priced IPOs completed during 2004-2012. Underpricing is percentage change from offer price to first day closing price. Post-IPO return 
volatility is standard deviation of 60-day return during the period from day +5 to day +64 after the issue date. Doc. Length is log of total number words in the whole 
document. Tone variables (positive, negative, uncertain, litigation, weak and strong) are constructed by word lists provided by LM (2011). Standard content is the sum 
of coefficients,                           , in the OLS regression:                                      where rep stands for word frequency vector. Distinctive 
content is the absolute sum of residual term in the regression above. 
 
Panel B. Correlations for open-priced IPOs 
Underpricing 1.00  
Post-IPO Ret.  Volatility 0.17 1.00  
Offer Price 0.04 -0.06 1.00  
Doc. Length -0.16 -0.10 0.41 1.00  
% Positive words 0.18 -0.06 -0.07 -0.28 1.00  
% Negative words 0.16 -0.13 -0.03 0.10 0.14 1.00  
% Uncertain words  0.06 0.08 0.01 0.08 -0.09 0.34 1.00  
% Litigation words 0.03 0.16 -0.15 -0.55 0.08 0.27 0.20 1.00  
% Weak words 0.17 -0.09 -0.07 -0.18 0.10 0.43 0.80 0.30 1.00  
% Strong words 0.03 -0.18 -0.09 -0.08 0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.24 1.00  
Standard Content -0.06 0.19 -0.27 -0.56 -0.14 -0.09 0.11 0.43 0.19 -0.07 1.00  
Distinctive Content 0.11 0.10 0.06 -0.04 0.11 0.07 -0.21 0.00 -0.19 -0.10 -0.22 1.00 
The sample includes 69 book-built IPOs completed during 2004-2012. Underpricing is percentage change from offer price to first day closing price. Post-IPO return 
volatility is standard deviation of 60-day return during the period from day +5 to day +64 after the issue date. Doc. Length is log of total number words in the whole 
document. Tone variables (positive, negative, uncertain, litigation, weak and strong) are constructed by word lists provided by LM (2011). Standard content is the sum 
of coefficients,                           , in the OLS regression:                                      where rep stands for word frequency vector. Distinctive 
content is the absolute sum of residual term in the regression above. 
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Table 2.4. Effects of admission documents on underpricing 
Panel A. OLS results for the relation between underpricing and tone of admission document 
 
Tone  
Variable 
 
Tone 
VC 
backed 
Log Net 
Proceeds 
AIM  
Dummy 
Internet 
Dummy 
Log Und. 
Share 
Log Firm 
Age 
Market 
Return 
Intrcpt. Year & 
Industry 
 
R-sqr 
 
Fixed-priced IPOs  
% Positive 0.002 
(0.04) 
0.065 
(2.13) 
-0.012 
(-1.99) 
-0.013 
(-0.57) 
0.006 
(0.29) 
-0.006 
(-2.28) 
-0.003 
(-0.54) 
0.089 
(3.00) 
0.133 
(2.12) 
YES 0.13 
% Negative -0.057 
(-1.84) 
0.068 
(2.30) 
-0.012 
(-2.01) 
-0.014 
(-0.66) 
0.011 
(0.56) 
-0.006 
(-2.19) 
-0.003 
(-0.63) 
0.089 
(3.00) 
0.194 
(3.24) 
YES 0.14 
% Uncertain -0.058 
(-1.85) 
0.065 
(2.21) 
-0.011 
(-1.93) 
-0.013 
(-0.54) 
0.012 
(0.64) 
-0.006 
(-2.32) 
-0.004 
(-0.70) 
0.087 
(2.87) 
0.198 
(3.27) 
YES 0.14 
% Litigation -0.043 
(-2.97) 
0.062 
(2.11) 
-0.012 
(-2.01) 
-0.013 
(-0.59) 
0.009 
(0.48) 
-0.006 
(-2.43) 
-0.003 
(-0.60) 
0.086 
(2.84) 
0.192 
(3.80) 
YES 0.14 
% Weak -0.077 
(-1.71) 
0.063 
(2.16) 
-0.012 
(-1.98) 
-0.011 
(-0.51) 
0.013 
(0.62) 
-0.006 
(-2.32) 
-0.004 
(-0.73) 
0.086 
(2.80) 
0.176 
(3.16) 
YES 0.14 
% Strong -0.056 (-0.68) 
0.067 
(2.21) 
-0.011 
(-1.72) 
-0.009 
(-0.42) 
0.004 
(0.21) 
-0.006 
(-2.31) 
-0.004 
(-0.72) 
0.089 
(3.04) 
0.157 
(2.52) YES 0.14 
 
Open-priced IPOs 
% Positive 0.182 (1.58) 
-0.020 
(-0.43) 
-0.002 
(-0.12) 
-0.048 
(-1.16) 
0.086 
(1.92) 
-0.019 
(-2.36) 
0.003 
(0.22) 
0.048 
(0.59) 
0.225 
(2.26) YES 0.34 
% Negative 0.165 (1.76) 
-0.004 
(-0.10) 
-0.007 
(-0.45) 
-0.052 
(-1.25) 
0.052 
(1.06) 
-0.020 
(-2.56) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
0.054 
(0.65) 
0.147 
(1.30) YES 0.35 
% Uncertain 0.182 (1.41) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
-0.014 
(-0.80) 
-0.049 
(-1.33) 
0.071 
(1.53) 
-0.016 
(-2.03) 
0.009 
(0.57) 
0.074 
(0.78) 
0.111 
(0.73) YES 0.36 
% Litigation -0.043 (-0.53) 
0.009 
(0.25) 
-0.003 
(-0.23) 
-0.030 
(-0.60) 
0.102 
(2.02) 
-0.018 
(-2.37) 
0.005 
(0.33) 
0.058 
(0.68) 
0.354 
(3.80) YES 0.31 
% Weak 0.233 (1.59) 
-0.005 
(-0.13) 
-0.007 
(-0.49) 
-0.047 
(-1.35) 
0.049 
(0.93) 
-0.017 
(-2.31) 
0.008 
(0.49) 
0.093 
(0.96) 
0.156 
(1.26) YES 0.36 
% Strong -0.034 (-0.23) 
0.008 
(0.23) 
-0.005 
(-0.35) 
-0.039 
(-1.04) 
0.102 
(2.09) 
-0.017 
(-2.19) 
0.004 
(0.27) 
0.059 
(0.68) 
0.335 
(3.35) YES 0.31 
The dependent variable is Underpricing defined as the percentage change from offer price to first day closing price. Tone variables (positive, negative, 
uncertain, litigation, weak and strong) are constructed by word lists provided by LM (2011). Definitions of controls are given in Appendix. 
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Table 2.4  Continued 
Panel B. OLS results for the relation between underpricing and length of admission document 
Section Document 
Length 
VC 
backed 
Log Net 
proceeds 
AIM  
Dummy 
Internet 
Dummy 
Log Und. 
Share 
Log Firm 
Age 
Market 
Return 
Intrcpt. Year & 
Industry 
 
R-sqr 
 
Fixed-priced IPOs 
All -0.076 
(-3.65) 
0.077 
(2.77) 
-0.004 
(-0.76) 
-0.044 
(-1.97) 
0.012 
(0.62) 
-0.003 
(-1.04) 
-0.001 
(-0.36) 
0.096 
(3.11) 
0.970 
(4.12) YES 0.18 
RF -0.057 
(-6.76) 
0.068 
(2.50) 
-0.001 
(-0.20) 
-0.029 
(-1.46) 
0.024 
(1.34) 
-0.004 
(-1.70) 
-0.004 
(-0.78) 
0.097 
(3.40) 
0.612 
(7.41) YES 0.22 
 
Open-priced IPOs 
All -0.017 
(-0.42) 
0.005 
(0.16) 
-0.002 
(-0.13) 
-0.038 
(-0.98) 
0.076 
(1.44) 
-0.015 
(-1.76) 
0.004 
(0.77) 
0.048 
(0.60) 
0.785 
(2.46) YES 0.28 
RF 
-0.043 
(-1.51) 
0.004 
(0.13) 
0.006 
(0.46) 
-0.032 
(-0.94) 
0.072 
(1.59) 
-0.011 
(-1.27) 
0.006 
(0.41) 
0.024 
(0.30) 
0.622 
(2.58) YES 0.36 
 The dependent variable is Underpricing defined as the percentage change from offer price to first day closing price. Document  Length is log of total 
number words in the whole document. See Appendix for variable definitions of controls.  
 
Panel C. OLS results for the relation between underpricing and information content of admission document 
Section Standard 
Content 
Distinctive 
Content 
VC 
backed 
Log Net 
proceeds 
AIM  
Dummy 
Internet 
Dummy 
Log Und. 
Share 
Log Firm 
Age 
Market 
Return 
Intrcpt. Year & 
Industry 
 
R-sqr 
 
Fixed-priced IPOs 
All 0.095 
(1.63) 
0.262 
(2.79) 
0.071 
(2.50) 
-0.010 
(-1.59) 
-0.015 
(-0.61) 
0.003 
(0.17) 
-0.006 
(-1.93) 
-0.004 
(-0.73) 
0.093 
(3.37) 
-0.113 
(-1.02) YES 0.16 
RF 0.028 
(0.62) 
0.266 
(5.07) 
0.068 
(2.57) 
-0.007 
(-1.09) 
-0.013 
(-0.57) 
0.010 
(0.60) 
-0.004 
(-1.62) 
-0.006 
(-1.31) 
0.100 
(3.51) 
-0.104 
(-1.35) YES 0.22 
 
Open-priced IPOs 
All -0.396 
(-2.42) 
-0.095 
(-0.30) 
0.005 
(0.12) 
-0.012 
(-0.74) 
-0.048 
(-1.11) 
0.116 
(2.38) 
-0.025 
(-3.22) 
0.012 
(0.70) 
0.063 
(0.76) 
0.785 
(2.46) YES 0.37 
RF 
-0.123 
(-1.35) 
0.327 
(1.97) 
0.025 
(0.72) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
-0.023 
(-0.76) 
0.078 
(2.27) 
-0.016 
(-2.06) 
0.004 
(0.30) 
0.005 
(0.07) 
0.093 
(0.56) YES 0.45 
The dependent variable is Underpricing defined as the percentage change from offer price to first day closing price. Standard content is the sum of coefficients,                           , in the OLS regression:                                      where rep stands for word frequency vector. Distinctive content is the 
absolute sum of residual term in the regression above. See Appendix for variable definitions of controls. 
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Table 2.5. Relation between offer price and admission documents 
Panel A. OLS results for the relation between offer price and tone of admission document 
 
 
Tone  
Variable 
VC 
backed 
Log Net 
Proceeds 
AIM 
Dummy 
Internet 
Dummy 
Log Und. 
Share 
Log Firm 
Age 
Market 
Return 
Intrcpt. Year & 
Industry 
 
R-sqr 
 
Fixed-priced IPOs 
% Positive 0.893 
(2.18) 
-0.259 
(-2.01) 
0.238 
(5.05) 
-0.038 
(-0.28) 
-0.005 
(-0.06) 
0.051 
(2.60) 
0.025 
(0.59) 
0.033 
(0.17) 
-0.296 
(-0.85) 
YES 0.29 
% Negative 0.414 
(1.66) 
-0.175 
(-1.66) 
0.246 
(5.37) 
-0.051 
(-0.39) 
-0.091 
(-1.22) 
0.050 
(2.39) 
0.030 
(0.68) 
0.040 
(0.21) 
-0.251 
(-0.66) 
YES 0.27 
% Uncertain 0.500 
(2.14) 
-0.154 
(-1.42) 
0.242 
(5.44) 
-0.068 
(-0.52) 
-0.106 
(-1.54) 
0.052 
(2.52) 
0.034 
(0.80) 
0.059 
(0.30) 
-0.358 
(-0.98) 
YES 0.28 
% Litigation 0.091 
(0.55) 
-0.146 
(-1.34) 
0.247 
(5.53) 
-0.061 
(-0.46) 
-0.059 
(-0.79) 
0.051 
(2.48) 
0.027 
(0.63) 
0.044 
(0.23) 
0.060 
(0.16) 
YES 0.26 
% Weak 0.858 
(2.15) 
-0.131 
(-1.19) 
0.244 
(5.59) 
-0.087 
(-0.65) 
-0.13 
(-1.52) 
0.051 
(2.43) 
0.037 
(0.95) 
0.078 
(0.40) 
-0.279 
(-0.82) 
YES 0.28 
% Strong 0.509 (1.18) 
-0.172 
(-1.52) 
0.240 
(5.55) 
-0.094 
(-0.71) 
-0.038 
(-0.55) 
0.052 
(2.52) 
0.035 
(0.87) 
0.036 
(0.18) 
-0.030 
(-0.09) YES 0.27 
 
Open-priced IPOs 
% Positive -3.006 (-1.85) 
0.260 
(0.69) 
0.342 
(1.90) 
0.250 
(0.44) 
-0.80 
(-1.17) 
0.088 
(0.99) 
-0.125 
(-1.02) 
1.467 
(1.81) 
0.905 
(0.69) YES 0.40 
% Negative -3.327 (-1.80) 
0.033 
(0.09) 
0.430 
(2.22) 
0.354 
(0.61) 
-0.078 
(-0.08) 
0.111 
(1.35) 
-0.067 
(-0.52) 
1.389 
(1.54) 
2.815 
(1.35) YES 0.45 
% Uncertain -1.075 (-0.61) 
-0.167 
(-0.49) 
0.443 
(2.02) 
0.154 
(0.26) 
-0.791 
(-1.03) 
0.044 
(0.53) 
-0.17 
(-1.22) 
1.198 
(1.46) 
0.613 
(0.26) YES 0.38 
% Litigation -2.276 (-1.16) 
-0.182 
(-0.49) 
0.471 
(2.26) 
0.631 
(0.84) 
-0.927 
(-1.26) 
0.007 
(0.07) 
-0.082 
(-0.62) 
1.103 
(1.28) 
1.445 
(0.77) YES 0.42 
% Weak -0.820 (-0.44) 
-0.162 
(-0.47) 
0.398 
(2.05) 
0.119 
(0.21) 
-0.749 
(-0.82) 
0.051 
(0.61) 
-0.154 
(-1.19) 
1.173 
(1.46) 
-0.042 
(-0.02) YES 0.38 
% Strong -1.277 (-0.45) 
-0.215 
(-0.62) 
0.378 
(1.91) 
0.108 
(0.19) 
-0.744 
(-0.86) 
0.058 
(0.68) 
-0.145 
(-1.13) 
1.259 
(1.52) 
0.098 
(0.05) YES 0.38 
The dependent variable is Offer Price. Tone variables (positive, negative, uncertain, litigation, weak and strong) are constructed by word lists provided by LM 
(2011). Definitions of controls are given in Appendix. 
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Table 2.5  Continued  
Panel B.  OLS results for the relation between offer price and length of admission document 
Section Document 
Length 
VC 
backed 
Log Net 
Proceeds 
AIM  
Dummy 
Internet 
Dummy 
Log Und. 
Share 
Log Firm 
Age 
Market 
Return 
Intrcpt. Year & 
Industry 
 
R-sqr 
 
Fixed-priced IPOs 
All 0.256 
(2.07) 
-0.190 
(-1.74) 
0.223 
(4.32) 
0.045 
(0.32) 
-0.069 
(-1.03) 
0.041 
(2.04) 
0.022 
(0.53) 
0.016 
(0.08) 
-2.615 
(-1.96) YES 0.28 
RF 0.260 
(2.61) 
-0.165 
(-1.52) 
0.200 
(4.12) 
0.013 
(0.10) 
-0.133 
(-1.71) 
0.043 
(2.32) 
0.031 
(0.76) 
0.005 
(0.02) 
-1.988 
(-2.34) YES 0.30 
 
Open-priced IPOs 
All 0.835 
(0.99) 
-0.149 
(-0.44) 
0.296 
(1.73) 
0.311 
(0.50) 
-0.972 
(-1.30) 
0.004 
(0.03) 
-0.142 
(-1.19) 
1.653 
(1.84) 
-9.894 
(-1.09) YES 0.41 
RF 
-0.122 
(-1.13) 
-0.225 
(-0.66) 
0.444 
(2.36) 
0.138 
(0.24) 
-0.980 
(-1.37) 
0.088 
(1.09) 
-0.136 
(-1.08) 
1.272 
(1.65) 
-0.386 
(-0.24) YES 0.39 
The dependent variable is Offer Price. Document  Length is log of total number words in the whole document. See Appendix for variable definitions of 
controls. 
 
Panel C. OLS results for the relation between offer price and information content of admission document 
Section Standard 
Content 
Distinctive 
Content 
VC 
backed 
Log Net 
Proceeds 
AIM  
Dummy 
Internet 
Dummy 
Log Und. 
Share 
Log Firm 
Age 
Market 
Return 
Intrcpt. Year & 
Industry 
 
R-sqr 
 
Fixed-priced IPOs 
All -0.891 
(-1.75) 
1.022 
(1.61) 
-0.212 
(-1.72) 
0.234 
(4.82) 
-0.014 
(-0.09) 
-0.034 
(-0.47) 
0.048 
(2.37) 
0.022 
(0.49) 
-0.018 
(-0.09) 
0.664 
(1.07) YES 0.28 
RF -0.577 
(-1.99) 
-0.008 
(-0.03) 
-0.164 
(-1.50) 
0.231 
(4.83) 
-0.051 
(-0.38) 
-0.067 
(-0.89) 
0.053 
(2.55) 
0.021 
(0.48) 
0.019 
(0.10) 
0.833 
(1.56) YES 0.27 
 
Open-priced IPOs 
All 0.291 
(0.15) 
0.717 
(0.27) 
-0.197 
(-0.55) 
0.391 
(1.94) 
0.089 
(0.15) 
-0.962 
(-1.34) 
0.060 
(0.59) 
-0.148 
(-1.12) 
1.277 
(1.53) 
-1.300 
(-0.41) YES 0.38 
RF 1.335 
(1.36) 
1.012 
(0.81) 
-0.310 
(-1.01) 
0.403 
(2.14) 
0.024 
(0.04) 
-0.966 
(-1.27) 
0.091 
(1.06) 
-0.157 
(-1.13) 
1.093 
(1.47) 
-2.45 
(-1.14) YES 0.39 
The dependent variable is Offer Price. Standard content is the sum of coefficients,                           , in the OLS regression:                                      where rep stands for word frequency vector. Distinctive content is the absolute sum of residual term in the regression above. See Appendix for 
variable definitions of controls. 
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 Table 2.6.  Post-IPO return volatility and admission documents 
 Panel A. OLS results for the relation between Post-IPO return volatility and tone of admission document 
 
Tone  
Variable 
VC 
backed 
Log Net 
Proceeds 
AIM  
Dummy 
Internet 
Dummy 
Log Und. 
Share 
Log Firm 
Age 
Market 
Return 
Intrcpt. Year & 
Industry 
 
R-sqr 
 
Fixed-priced IPOs (N= 264) 
% Positive -0.017 
(-1.21) 
0.010 
(1.53) 
-0.002 
(-2.49) 
-0.011 
(-2.73) 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
-0.001 
(-2.44) 
-0.001 
(-0.59) 
0.011 
(2.08) 
0.058 
(5.37) 
YES 0.16 
% Negative -0.002 
(-0.26) 
0.008 
(1.22) 
-0.002 
(-2.59) 
-0.011 
(-2.58) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
-0.001 
(-2.29) 
-0.001 
(-0.60) 
0.011 
(1.99) 
0.051 
(5.19) 
YES 0.15 
% Uncertain 0.001 
(0.08) 
0.008 
(1.23) 
-0.002 
(-2.56) 
-0.011 
(-2.49) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
-0.001 
(-2.34) 
-0.001 
(-0.57) 
0.011 
(2.20) 
0.048 
(4.36) 
YES 0.15 
% Litigation -0.006 
(-1.00) 
0.007 
(1.19) 
-0.003 
(-2.73) 
-0.011 
(-2.53) 
0.001 
(0.10) 
-0.001 
(-2.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.64) 
0.011 
(1.93) 
0.057 
(4.96) 
YES 0.15 
% Weak 0.002 
(0.18) 
0.008 
(1.23) 
-0.002 
(-2.54) 
-0.011 
(-2.46) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.001 
(-2.35) 
-0.001 
(-0.56) 
0.011 
(2.24) 
0.048 
(5.27) 
YES 0.15 
% Strong -0.008 (-0.49) 
0.008 
(1.27) 
-0.002 
(-2.36) 
-0.01 
(-2.10) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.001 
(-2.36) 
-0.001 
(-0.64) 
0.011 
(2.07) 
0.052 
(6.30) YES 0.15 
 
Open-priced IPOs 
% Positive 0.010 (0.73) 
-0.002 
(-0.33) 
-0.002 
(-0.75) 
-0.004 
(-0.70) 
0.025 
(4.06) 
-0.001 
(-1.61) 
-0.003 
(-1.16) 
0.001 
(0.08) 
0.065 
(4.18) YES 0.45 
% Negative 0.027 (1.84) 
-0.002 
(-0.39) 
-0.002 
(-0.94) 
-0.006 
(-0.86) 
0.018 
(2.39) 
-0.002 
(-1.55) 
-0.003 
(-1.45) 
-0.002 
(-0.18) 
0.038 
(1.63) YES 0.48 
% Uncertain 0.024 (1.10) 
-0.002 
(-0.28) 
-0.004 
(-1.23) 
-0.006 
(-1.32) 
0.021 
(5.46) 
-0.001 
(-0.90) 
-0.002 
(-1.04) 
0.005 
(0.43) 
0.046 
(1.91) YES 0.49 
% Litigation 0.001 (0.14) 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
-0.002 
(-0.86) 
-0.004 
(-0.62) 
0.025 
(3.90) 
-0.001 
(-1.29) 
-0.003 
(-1.12) 
0.002 
(0.18) 
0.069 
(4.07) YES 0.45 
% Weak 0.042 (1.60) 
-0.003 
(-0.56) 
-0.003 
(-1.12) 
-0.006 
(-1.30) 
0.015 
(2.77) 
-0.001 
(-0.93) 
-0.002 
(-1.17) 
0.010 
(0.73) 
0.041 
(1.87) YES 0.52 
% Strong -0.009 (-0.33) 
-0.001 
(-0.13) 
-0.002 
(-0.94) 
-0.004 
(-0.67) 
0.026 
(4.90) 
-0.001 
(-1.36) 
-0.003 
(-1.19) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
0.076 
(4.02) YES 0.45 
Dependent variable is Post-IPO return volatility calculated as the standard deviation of 60-day return during the period from day +5 to day +64 after the issue 
date. Tone variables (positive, negative, uncertain, litigation, weak and strong) are constructed by word lists provided by LM (2011). Definitions of controls are 
given in Appendix. 
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Table 2.6  Continued 
Panel B.  OLS results for the relation between Post-IPO return volatility and length of admission document 
Section Document 
Length 
VC 
backed 
Log Net 
Proceeds 
AIM  
Dummy 
Internet 
Dummy 
Log Und. 
Share 
Log Firm 
Age 
Market 
Return 
Intrcpt. Year & 
Industry 
 
R-sqr 
 
Fixed-priced IPOs 
All -0.009 
(-2.32) 
0.009 
(1.52) 
-0.001 
(-1.41) 
-0.014 
(-2.87) 
0.001 
(0.22) 
-0.001 
(-1.62) 
-0.001 
(-0.38) 
0.011 
(2.15) 
0.153 
(3.25) YES 0.17 
RF -0.005 
(-2.80) 
0.008 
(1.32) 
-0.001 
(-1.35) 
-0.012 
(-2.56) 
0.002 
(0.57) 
-0.001 
(-2.07) 
-0.001 
(-0.50) 
0.011 
(2.16) 
0.098 
(4.94) YES 0.17 
 
Open-priced IPOs 
All -0.002 
(-0.45) 
-0.001 
(-0.14) 
-0.002 
(-0.76) 
-0.004 
(-0.80) 
0.026 
(3.62) 
-0.001 
(-0.98) 
-0.003 
(-1.15) 
0.012 
(0.12) 
0.091 
(1.72) YES 0.43 
RF 
-0.003 
(-0.60) 
-0.001 
(-0.17) 
-0.002 
(-0.64) 
-0.004 
(-0.68) 
0.025 
(4.46) 
-0.001 
(-0.60) 
-0.002 
(-1.16) 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
0.096 
(1.96) YES 0.46 
Dependent variable is Post-IPO return volatility calculated as the standard deviation of 60-day return during the period from day +5 to day +64 after 
the issue date. Document  Length is log of total number words in the whole document. See Appendix for variable definitions of controls. 
 
Panel C. OLS results for the relation between Post-IPO return volatility and information content of admission document 
Section Standard 
Content 
Distinctive 
Content 
VC 
backed 
Log Net 
Proceeds 
AIM  
Dummy 
Internet 
Dummy 
Log Und. 
Share 
Log Firm 
Age 
Market 
Return 
Intrcpt. Year & 
Industry 
 
R-sqr 
 
Fixed-priced IPOs 
All -0.002 
(-0.13) 
0.055 
(2.27) 
0.007 
(1.22) 
-0.002 
(-2.25) 
-0.011 
(-2.30) 
-0.001 
(-0.07) 
-0.001 
(-2.16) 
-0.001 
(-0.64) 
0.011 
(2.18) 
0.022 
(0.95) YES 0.16 
RF -0.009 
(-0.95) 
0.025 
(1.72) 
0.007 
(1.33) 
-0.002 
(-2.29) 
-0.011 
(-2.29) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
-0.001 
(-1.71) 
-0.001 
(-0.80) 
0.011 
(2.12) 
0.039 
(2.53) YES 0.17 
 
Open-priced IPOs 
All 0.006 
(0.34) 
0.077 
(2.49) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
-0.002 
(-1.11) 
-0.005 
(-0.72) 
0.023 
(4.20) 
-0.001 
(-1.47) 
-0.003 
(-1.12) 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
0.024 
(0.67) YES 0.48 
RF 0.016 
(1.41) 
0.049 
(1.54) 
-0.002 
(-0.35) 
-0.002 
(-0.93) 
-0.005 
(-0.94) 
0.022 
(5.94) 
-0.001 
(-0.24) 
-0.004 
(-1.73) 
-0.005 
(-0.53) 
0.016 
(0.50) YES 0.55 
Dependent variable is Post-IPO return volatility calculated as the standard deviation of 60-day return during the period from day +5 to day +64 after the issue 
date. Standard content is the sum of coefficients,                           , in the OLS regression:                                      where rep stands for 
word frequency vector. Distinctive content is the absolute sum of residual term in the regression above. See Appendix for variable definitions of controls. 
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     Table 2.7. Time varying tone of admission documents over the recent 2008 crisis period 
Fixed-priced IPOs 
Pre-Crisis During Crisis Difference 
Mean Std Median Mean Std Median 
Total words  (Whole doc) 42821.37 19261.09 38297.00 67627.82 34454.13 56990.50 -24806.45*** 
Total words  (Risk factors ) 3081.26 2140.49 2583.00 6147.04 3621.68 5320.00 -3065.78*** 
Total words  (Risk factors %) 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.09 -0.02*** 
% Positive words 0.58 0.14 0.58 0.56 0.13 0.56 0.02 
% Negative words 1.01 0.17 1.00 1.14 0.18 1.11    -0.13** 
% Uncertain words  1.09 0.19 1.06 1.19 0.16 1.20   -0.10** 
% Litigation words 1.16 0.24 1.14 1.16 0.26 1.14 0.00 
% Weak words 0.55 0.12 0.54 0.57 0.12 0.57 -0.02 
% Strong words 0.51 0.11 0.51 0.48 0.11 0.47      0.03** 
Standard Content 0.99 0.10 1.00 1.00 0.09 1.00 -0.01 
Distinctive Content 0.55 0.05 0.55 0.54 0.06 0.54 0.01 
 
Open-priced IPOs 
Pre-Crisis During Crisis Difference 
Mean Std Median Mean Std Median 
Total words  (Whole doc) 83426.85 39526.99 82517.00 103065.45 52688.43 99147.00 -19638.60* 
Total words  (Risk factors ) 6067.55 3785.96 5374.00 9182.45 4798.21 8088.50 -3114.90** 
Total words  (Risk factors %) 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.08 -0.01** 
% Positive words 0.59 0.13 0.56 0.59 0.10 0.56 0.00 
% Negative words 1.09 0.16 1.07 1.11 0.17 1.09 -0.02 
% Uncertain words  1.13 0.18 1.10 1.25 0.18 1.25 -0.12** 
% Litigation words 1.09 0.21 1.07 1.05 0.24 0.97 0.04 
% Weak words 0.58 0.15 0.56 0.61 0.13 0.62 -0.03 
% Strong words 0.50 0.10 0.48 0.45 0.07 0.45 0.05** 
Standard Content 0.93 0.10 0.92 0.96 0.08 0.98 -0.03 
Distinctive Content 0.55 0.04 0.55 0.52 0.06 0.52 0.03** 
The sample consists of 320 fixed-priced and 69 book-built IPOs completed during 2004-2012. Pre-crisis period is from 2004 to 2007. 
Tone variables (positive, negative, uncertain, litigation, weak and strong) are constructed by word lists provided by LM (2011). 
Standard content is the sum of coefficients,                           , in the OLS regression:                                      
where rep stands for word frequency vector. Distinctive content is the absolute sum of residual term in the regression above. 
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Table 2.8. Time varying impact of admission documents  
Panel A. Time varying impact of  tone of admission document on underpricing 
 
Tone  
Variable 
VC 
backed 
Log Net 
Proceeds 
AIM 
Dummy 
Internet 
Dummy 
Log Und. 
Share 
Log Firm 
Age 
Market 
Return 
Intrcpt. Year & 
Industry 
 
R-sqr 
 
Before the 2008 Crisis (N. Obs= 240) 
% Positive -0.009 
(-0.13) 
0.076 
(2.34) 
-0.007 
(-0.95) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
0.019 
(0.70) 
-0.007 
(-1.96) 
-0.002 
(-0.26) 
0.097 
(2.51) 
0.126 
(1.61) YES 0.12 
% Negative -0.068 
(-1.79) 
0.079 
(2.38) 
-0.006 
(-0.93) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
0.021 
(0.77) 
-0.007 
(-1.91) 
-0.002 
(-0.28) 
0.101 
(2.79) 
0.185 
(2.61) YES 0.13 
% Uncertain -0.085 
(-2.23) 
0.074 
(2.31) 
-0.007 
(-0.98) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
0.026 
(1.04) 
-0.007 
(-1.91) 
-0.003 
(-0.47) 
0.094 
(2.44) 
0.204 
(2.62) YES 0.14 
% Litigation -0.049 
(-2.90) 
0.070 
(2.17) 
-0.007 
(-0.94) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
0.023 
(0.87) 
-0.008 
(-2.14) 
-0.001 
(-0.17) 
0.096 
(2.47) 
0.185 
(2.87) YES 0.13 
% Weak -0.110 
(-1.89) 
0.071 
(2.21) 
-0.007 
(-1.01) 
0.003 
(0.11) 
0.032 
(1.21) 
-0.007 
(-1.87) 
-0.003 
(-0.50) 
0.092 
(2.33) 
0.176 
(2.55) YES 0.14 
% Strong -0.038 
(-0.35) 
0.076 
(2.30) 
-0.007 
(-0.87) 
0.004 
(0.13) 
0.019 
(0.71) 
-0.007 
(-2.01) 
-0.002 
(-0.36) 
0.098 
(2.58) 
0.138 
(1.71) YES 0.12 
 
After the 2008 Crisis (N. Obs= 80) 
% Positive 0.093 
(0.80) 
-0.080 
(-1.30) 
-0.023 
(-1.34) 
-0.040 
(-0.95) 
-0.060 
(-3.04) 
-0.003 
(-0.57) 
-0.008 
(-0.68) 
0.068 
(0.81) 
0.219 
(2.03) YES 0.26 
% Negative -0.013 
(-0.20) 
-0.039 
(-0.90) 
-0.023 
(-1.30) 
-0.042 
(-1.01) 
-0.061 
(-2.32) 
-0.004 
(-0.88) 
-0.008 
(-0.59) 
0.064 
(0.75) 
0.304 
(2.54) YES 0.24 
% Uncertain 0.069 
(1.34) 
-0.036 
(-1.03) 
-0.026 
(-1.56) 
-0.050 
(-1.18) 
-0.073 
(-3.44) 
-0.003 
(-0.60) 
-0.008 
(-0.60) 
0.073 
(0.94) 
0.213 
(2.12) YES 0.27 
% Litigation -0.017 
(-0.39) 
-0.035 
(-0.89) 
-0.024 
(-1.36) 
-0.040 
(-0.97) 
-0.062 
(-2.88) 
-0.004 
(-0.90) 
-0.008 
(-0.61) 
0.063 
(0.76) 
0.308 
(3.15) YES 0.26 
% Weak 0.021 
(0.31) 
-0.044 
(-1.26) 
-0.024 
(-1.36) 
-0.045 
(-1.10) 
-0.065 
(-3.20) 
-0.004 
(-0.77) 
-0.007 
(-0.54) 
0.069 
(0.83) 
0.279 
(2.54) YES 0.26 
% Strong -0.120 
(-0.97) 
-0.036 
(-1.01) 
-0.018 
(-1.13) 
-0.025 
(-0.58) 
-0.070 
(-3.22) 
-0.006 
(-1.32) 
-0.010 
(-0.83) 
0.049 
(0.60) 
0.322 
(3.15) YES 0.27 
The dependent variable is Underpricing defined as the percentage change from offer price to first day closing price. Tone variables (positive, negative, uncertain, 
litigation, weak and strong) are constructed by word lists provided by LM (2011). Pre-crisis period is from 2004 to 2007.Definitions of controls are given in 
Appendix. 
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Table 2.8 Continued 
Panel B. Time varying impact of admission document's length on underpricing 
Section Document 
Length 
VC 
backed 
Log Net 
Proceeds 
AIM  
Dummy 
Internet 
Dummy 
Log Und. 
Share 
Log Firm 
Age 
Market 
Return 
Intrcpt. Year & 
Industry 
 
R-sqr 
 
Before the 2008 Crisis(N. Obs= 240) 
All -0.088 
(-3.31) 
0.091 
(3.11) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.037 
(-1.27) 
0.017 
(0.65) 
-0.005 
(-1.29) 
-0.001 
(-0.16) 
0.105 
(2.59) 
1.065 
(3.64) YES 0.18 
RF -0.063 
(-6.39) 
0.080 
(2.73) 
0.003 
(0.56) 
-0.020 
(-0.82) 
0.026 
(1.07) 
-0.005 
(-1.45) 
-0.003 
(-0.52) 
0.106 
(2.92) 
0.614 
(6.62) YES 0.21 
 
After the 2008 Crisis (N. Obs= 80) 
All -0.057 
(-1.36) 
-0.061 
(-1.75) 
-0.013 
(-0.65) 
-0.067 
(-1.48) 
-0.037 
(-1.24) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
-0.004 
(-0.33) 
0.078 
(1.07) 
0.886 
(2.01) YES 0.30 
RF -0.03 
(-1.29) 
-0.049 
(-1.45) 
-0.013 
(-0.61) 
-0.041 
(-1.03) 
-0.033 
(-0.92) 
-0.004 
(-0.87) 
-0.006 
(-0.46) 
0.075 
(1.01) 
0.517 
(3.04) YES 0.29 
The dependent variable is Underpricing defined as the percentage change from offer price to first day closing price. Document Length is log of total number 
words in the whole document. Pre-crisis period is from 2004 to 2007. See Appendix for variable definitions of controls. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Trends in European IPO market after the Financial Crisis 
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3.1. Introduction 
 The recent crisis has had a major impact on IPO activity throughout the world, which has 
experienced a long period of stagnancy with very few new offerings and underwriters engaging 
in fierce competition to secure the few available deals. In 2011, Bloomberg reported that IPO 
fees in Europe had hit a historical record low at 1.88%, far lower than the 5.4% fees charged on 
the US IPOs21. 
 Underwriting fees represent substantial costs for a listed company. Underwriters have 
charged substantially less on European IPOs as compared to US ones, as documented by 
Abrahamson et al. (2011). Is it indeed the case that gross spreads have become even lower 
during and after the financial crisis? Gross spreads, though, are only part of the costs of going 
public. As the literature on IPOs widely documents, another substantial cost is underpricing, or 
money left “on the table”. Ritter (2012) states that a medium-sized candidate company loses, 
on average, 5% of its post-IPO market value because of underpricing. If we include gross 
spread, the total cost of an IPO, in the US, can reach 10 to 17% of post-IPO capitalization, 
indicating that the cost of going public plays a important role in a company's decision in this 
regard. He further argues that it is not clear whether and how the direct and indirect costs of 
IPO have changed over the last decade, and indeed very little research has been carried out to 
shed light on this question, particularly in Europe. This paper attempts to fill this gap by 
investigating whether and how the costs of going public in Europe, both direct (gross spreads) 
and indirect (underpricing), have changed in the wake of the recent financial turmoil. 
 Up to now very few papers have investigated European IPO markets, and usually these 
have been country-specific (mostly in the UK). To the best of our knowledge, no paper has 
looked at recent IPOs in Europe. In this paper, we construct a pan-European dataset of IPOs 
                                                 
21Bloomberg “IPO Fees in Europe Fall to Record Low as More Banks Chase Deals”, 2011-09-20 
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between 2000 and 2012 which allows us to address our research question. Our results show 
that both underpricing and underwriting fees have decreased since 2007. When comparing our 
results with those of Abrahmason et al. (2011), it clearly emerges that gross spreads in Europe 
have decreased further, whereas this is much less the case in the US. We also provide evidence 
that underwriter reputation increases the level of underpricing in the post-crisis period, 
suggesting that the certification role of investment banks has become much weaker. In addition, 
in the EU underwriters seem to be syndicating more in the recession than they did in the pre-
crisis period.  
 The paper goes onto attempt to shed light on the determinants of the decision to go public 
during the financial crisis. The question “Why do companies go public?” is in general a very 
important one, and, as Ritter and Welch (2002) argue, "there are myriad theoretical reasons for 
firms wanting to go public, but only sparse evidence due to a general lack of data on the pool 
of private firms". The lack of suitable data on private companies does indeed tend to be a major 
obstacle for the investigation of this question. A notable exception is the seminal paper by 
Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998). Using a proprietary database of public and private Italian 
companies, they empirically test alternative theories that have been proposed to explain IPO 
decisions. They show that company size and industry market-to-book ratio may explain the 
likelihood of going public, and that for a company the incentive for IPO is not primarily to 
obtain external financing, but to rebalance accounts in times of high investment or growth. The 
authors also find that IPO lowers the cost of borrowing and increases turnover in control. 
 Building on this paper, we investigate the determinants of going public during the 
financial crisis. Owing to availability of data, we restrict our focus to the UK IPO market only, 
as in the UK we are also able to gather data on private companies, which allows us to conduct a 
meaningful analysis, given that both private and public companies are subject to similar 
regulations and tax rules (Ball and Shivakumar 2005). The UK is, however, the largest 
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European IPO market, and so it is certainly pertinent to acquire a deeper insight into what has 
motivated UK companies to go public during the crisis, and whether these factors have 
changed when compared to listing decisions before 2007. We show that pre-crisis determinants 
do not have the same explanatory power since 2007, and, more generally, that the models have 
very little power to explain IPO decisions during the financial crisis. Interestingly, we find that 
market-to-book ratio has opposite coefficient estimates in the two periods. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews earlier literature on IPO 
decisions and the costs of IPO, while Section 3 is concerned with data and methodology. In 
Section 4, we provide preliminary results, along with summary statistics, and Section 5 
provides a conclusion. 
 Literature Review 
3.2.1. The Costs of IPO  
 Gross spread represents the largest part of the direct costs of an IPO. Chen and Ritter 
(2000) show that during the period between 1995 and 1998, there is a clustering of 
underwriters’ fees at exactly 7% for IPOs of a size ranging from 20 million to 80 million 
dollars. They demonstrate that 90% of medium-sized issues paid a gross spread of 7%. 
 Recently, Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) have found that this figure of 7% 
remains relevant for the US market, reaching an even bigger proportion of approximately 95% 
between 1998 and 2007. They also provide empirical evidence that European IPO fees do not 
show such a clustering, and that there is a clear wedge between gross spreads in the US and 
those in Europe, specifically showing that underwriters in Europe which also operate in the US 
tend to charge 3% less for fees. The authors test for several alternative explanations such as 
litigation risk, legal cost and retail offerings, but conclude that none of these provide clear 
evidence which explains why fees for European IPOs are cheaper. 
  
106 
 
 Corwin and Schultz (2005) show that gross spread and the number of underwriters are 
positively correlated. Similarly, using a sample of secondary equity offerings (SEO) completed 
in the US between 1995 and 2004, Huang and Zhang (2011) find that the number of 
underwriters is positively associated with gross spread. This suggests that more bookrunners 
induce more marketing efforts and hence demand more compensation. Their results show no 
sign of variation in the cost of SEOs. 
 The indirect costs of placing an IPO are mainly related to underpricing, one of the most 
puzzling issues in finance. The literature on underpricing is wide-ranging, and a number of 
theoretical arguments, accompanied by empirical evidence, have been suggested to explain first 
day return. As pointed out in the first chapter, Ljungqvist (2007) classifies theoretical 
arguments into several groups such as information asymmetry theories, agency cost arguments, 
institutional explanations and behavioral approach (see Chapter One for a detailed discussion 
of literature on underpricing). 
3.2.2. The IPO Decision 
 The literature on IPO provides several theoretical arguments, but very little empirical 
evidence to explain the motivations for going public. Our understanding of the determinants of 
IPO decisions is limited to only one empirical paper by Pagano et al. (1998) and a few survey 
articles, such as Brau and Fawcett (2006) and Graham and Harvey (2001), the latter of which is 
concerned with CEOs' financing decisions rather than with IPO motivations.  
 Ritter and Welch (2002) nicely summarize most recognized explanations, categorizing 
them into two groups: the market timing approach, and life cycle theories. We shall briefly 
touch here on the general notions underlying each class of explanation. 
 Market timing hypothesis is concerned with the relationship between market wide 
conditions and external financing decisions made by equity offerings. Early studies such as 
Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) and Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988) show that IPOs are 
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clustered in time. These papers also show that there are “hot markets” where IPO offer price 
and underpricing increase. Lucas and McDonald (1990) study a model that posits that 
information asymmetry between issuer and investor plays a role in explaining equity offerings. 
If companies know that the market undervalues the true price then they will delay equity 
offerings until a bull market allows for more favorable pricing. Consistent with this argument, 
Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm and Yu (2003) and Lowry and Schwert (2002) show that 
firms tend to time the IPO market, highlighting a substantial increase in initial IPO filings after 
high offer prices are observed. Ritter and Welch (2002) and Alti (2005) explain this pattern by 
the information spillover argument, namely that a potential issuer can assess investor demand 
by observing the price pattern of recent IPOs before deciding whether to go public. In a survey 
involving 336 chief financial officers (CFOs), Brau and Fawcett (2006) document the fact that 
their firms strategically time IPOs to exploit strong market conditions. 
 Life cycle theories rest on the notion that companies make corporate decisions based on 
the resources available, so that they can increase value over its lifetime. Such value creation by 
means of IPOs may be achieved for a variety of reasons. Some of the principal incentives for 
IPO in life cycle theories are diversification (Pagano 1993), after-market liquidity (Ellul and 
Pagano 2006), increased market monitoring (Stoughton and Zechner 1998), dispersed 
ownership (Chemmanur and Fulghieri 1999), higher likelihood of improved acquisition price 
(Zingales 1995), better reputation (Maksimovic and Pichler 2001), initiation of analyst 
coverage (Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter 2003), and innovation (Ferreira, Manso and Silva 2014). 
 
3.3. Data and Methodology 
3.3.1.  IPO Costs: Gross Spread and Underpricing 
 Our IPO sample has been retrieved from Dealogic. Dealogic is one of the key databases 
used mainly by investment banks. For the EU deals, it has a wider coverage than standard IPO 
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databases such as SDC, and moreover it provides key pricing details as well as gross spreads of 
deals that are not easily available. The sample is composed of IPOs that took place between 
2000 and 2012, inclusive. To be consistent with the standard exclusions done by many IPO 
studies, we have eliminated financial firms, closed-end funds, and real estate and property 
firms, as well as companies that are cross-listed. 
 To examine the impact of the recent financial crisis on the costs and determinants of 
IPOs, we divide our sample period into two regimes: the pre-crisis period, and the period of the 
crisis itself. We take the crisis period to be the time between 2008 and 2012, but our results 
remain qualitatively similar if we set the beginning of crisis as August 2007. In order to allow 
reasonable comparison of pre-crisis and crisis periods, we require each country in the sample to 
have at least five IPOs in both regimes. The data on price range and gross spread of 
underwriters in the US, on the other hand, is retrieved from the SDC database. 
 We investigate the determinants of underpricing by employing standard OLS regressions, 
where we take the following control variables into account: 
Und. share: Underwriter market share calculated as the percentage of proceeds underwritten by 
each underwriter to the total amount underwritten by all underwriters in a given year. 
Fixed-Priced: Dummy variable equal to one if the IPO mechanism is based on fixed pricing. 
Log Proceeds: The natural logarithm of IPO proceeds. 
Market Ret: Mean 30 day FTSE return before the issue date. 
Internet: Dummy variable equal to one if the company is internet stock, zero otherwise. 
VC: Dummy variable equal to one if the company is backed by venture capital funding. 
Main market: Dummy variable equal to one if the IPO is listed in the main market of the 
corresponding country. 
3.3.2.  Determinants of IPO Decision 
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 We obtain financial balance sheet data on public and private UK companies from the 
Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database compiled by Bureau Van Dijk. FAME 
provides comprehensive financial information for 2.8 million active firms, 1.8 million of which 
are provided in detailed format and the rest in summary format. In addition, the database covers 
about four million inactive firms, almost one million of which are in detailed format. FAME 
collects data from records such as annual reports, documents of incorporation, liquidator’s 
accounts and articles filed at Companies House in the UK and the Companies Registration 
Office in Ireland. It also provides information about the ownership history of non-quoted 
companies, along with global and domestic ultimate ownership. When a firm is acquired, or 
switches from one type of ownership (public) to another (private), the database reports the date 
the company changed its name. 
 A number of checks are performed to filter and clean FAME data from outliers and data 
entry errors. First, we leave out those companies that show a change of over 30% in total assets 
from the prior fiscal year: through this, most divestments, mergers and acquisitions are 
controlled for, since such corporate events are likely to sharply alter the book value of total 
assets. Secondly, we compare financial statements for the same company provided by 
Computat Global tape, and finally all variables are winsorised at 1%. 
 Dealogic observations are then matched with FAME, based on the international securities 
identification number (ISIN), and for mismatched IPOs we perform merging based on 
company names. All of these steps leave us with a sample of a total of 455 IPOs, of which 367 
IPOs are from the pre-crisis period (2003-2007) and the remaining 87 are completed during the 
crisis (2008-2012). Our sample of private firms for the same period is made up of 4,588 UK 
companies. 
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 One of our main objectives is to test the varying determinants of IPO decisions over time. 
In order to achieve this, we follow Pagano et al. (1998), starting with the following Probit 
model: 
Pr(IPOi,t=1) = α + β1 ROAi,t-1 + β2 CASHi,t-1 + β3 SIZEi,t-1 + β4 CAPEXi,t-1 + β5 GROWTHi,t-1 
   
+ β6 LEVERAGEi,t-1 + β7 MTBi,t + β8 RATEi,t-1 +  YEAR 
 
 The dependent variable IPO takes value 1 if the sample firm goes public in a given year, 
and 0 if the firm remains private. Return on assets (ROA) stands for profitability measure and 
is calculated as the ratio of EBITDA to total assets in the fiscal year before the given year t. 
CASH is the lagged total cash amount scaled by total assets. SIZE is measured by the log of 
sales at year t-1, while CAPEX is capital expenditure to total assets. GROWTH stands for the 
percentage change in sales from the prior year t-1. LEVERAGE is defined as long-term debt to 
total assets, and MTB the market-to-book ratio of listed companies in UK at year t-1. To 
incorporate the impact of borrowing constraints on IPO decisions, we have included the annual 
Euro LIBOR interest rate, RATE, from the European Central Bank. 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1.  Summary Statistics 
 In Table 3.1, we document IPO distribution over country and two time horizons. Our 
sample covers 2,864 IPOs completed between 2000 and 2012 in 13 European countries. The 
UK has the greatest number of issues, with 976 IPOs making up almost 35% of the whole 
sample. Offerings from France, Germany and Italy add up to 574, one fifth of the total. It is 
clear that the number of IPOs see a significant drop, falling from 2007 before the crisis to 857 
during the crisis period. Another notable difference is in the market segment in which private 
companies intended to float. During the recent recession, firms in Belgium, France, Norway, 
Poland, Spain, Sweden and the UK tend to go to public in lower-equity market segments rather 
than through the main exchange of the country. 
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 Panel B in Table 3.1 reports changes in determinant of IPOs by time and pricing 
mechanism. For fixed-priced IPOs, mean underpricing decreased by 1% during the crisis 
period, though the difference between the two time horizons is not significant. Fixed-priced 
IPOs are charged 0.46 % more during the recent financial recession, suggesting that going 
public via fixed pricing becomes more expensive. Both proceeds and listings on the main 
exchange show a significant drop during the crisis period. 
 On the other hand, IPO costs, underpricing and gross spread do not increase during the 
recent crisis. On average, underpricing declines by 13% in the EU since 2007. This difference 
is significant, at 1%. Similarly, mean gross spread falls from 3.69% to 3.02%. As with fixed-
priced issues, open-priced IPOs received less VC funding during the crisis period, while 
listings on the main exchange increased by 6%. Unlike fixed-priced IPOs, there is no 
significant difference between proceeds in each of the two time horizons. In short, the 
summary statistics in Panel B indicate that companies that go public via fixed-pricing tend to 
be small, and have received lower proceeds and incurred greater costs during the unfavorable 
market conditions since 2007. 
3.4.2.  Underwriter Rankings and Fees in Europe 
 Underwriter rankings in the EU during our sample period 2000-2012 are provided in 
Table 3.2. For each year, underwriters are ranked based on their market share, which is 
calculated as the percentage of IPO proceeds underwritten by each underwriter as part of the 
total amount underwritten by all underwriters in a given year. For syndicated deals, we do not 
take average proceeds, but assume that each syndicate member has underwritten the issue 
independently. Then, in each row, the top ten bookrunners' shares are reported, from the highest 
to the lowest. Panel A shows the abbreviated names of underwriters. We find that nine new 
underwriters (namely Millennium Investment Banking, Caixa, Banco Espirito Santo, Lazard-
Natixis, Mediobanca, BBVA, PKO BP, Bankia and Bradesco BBI) enter the top ten during the 
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crisis period, and argue that these new arrivals might result from lower demand for reputable 
underwriters and increased underwriter competition after 2007. 
 In Panel B in Table 3.2, we report the dynamics of underwriter market shares for the top 
ten bookrunners during the sample period. For each year, the percentage underwriter share is 
provided. For example, UBS's market share in 2000 is 7%, and it varies from 2% to 9% 
between 2000 and 2012. The last row shows the total market share of the top ten underwriters, 
which is on average over 50%, with total market share reaching a peak of 74% in 2011. 
 The top ten underwriters in the EU are conglomerate investment banks which operate 
globally in most countries around the world. The EU underwriter market shares and fees are 
compared in Table 3.3 with those in the US market. The figures show first that eight of the top 
ten underwriters in both the EU and US are the same investment banks: Morgan Stanley, 
Goldman Sachs, Bank of America- Merrill Lynch, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, JPMorgan, 
UBS Bank and Citi Group. Secondly, the top ten investment banks in the EU hold, on average, 
58% of all underwriting business, whereas those in the US cover 91% of the whole IPO 
market. This shows that the IPO market in the EU is fragmented compared to the US. Thirdly, 
consistent with Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011), there is a clear wedge between the 
mean fees charged by top underwriters in the EU and US.  
 Our next step is to look at the change in market share and fees of the top investments 
banks that operate in the EU and US. The results are shown in Panels B and C of  3.3. The 
volume of proceeds underwritten shows a remarkable drop for all investment banks after 2008. 
Although Morgan Stanley underwrites 100 billion Euros before the crisis, its market volume 
then shrinks to 26 billion between 2008 and 2012. However, the total market share of all top 
ten underwriters does not decline, but increase by almost 7% during the crisis period. In 
contrast to volume in the EU market, the volume of IPO proceeds of some underwriters in the 
US actually increased after 2007. For example, JPMorgan underwrites 22 billion dollars more 
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during the crisis period than in the pre-crisis era. Another difference between the EU and US is 
the change in total shares. In contrast to the total market share in the EU, the total market share 
of the top ten investment banks in the US remains closer across the two time periods: in both 
periods, those ten bookrunners underwrite more than 90% of all IPOs. 
 Panels B and C in Table 3.3 show that underwriters tend to demand lower fees during the 
crisis period. The difference is more obvious for the EU than for the US. In Panel D, 
differences in means for the same underwriters that do business in both continents are 
examined. In the EU, differences in gross spread are positive and significant for all eight 
investment banks. Goldman Sachs charges on average 1% less during the crisis period, and the 
difference is significant at 1% level. JPMorgan reduces mean fees from 2.96% to 2.52% after 
2007. In the US, however, we do not find the same pattern. Firstly, fees do not drop 
significantly, with the largest difference being 0.29% which is statistically significant. 
Secondly, only four out of eight underwriters seem to reduce their fees significantly. New 
entries to the underwriting business and a preference for domestic underwriters may play some 
role in explaining the reduced fees in the EU. 
3.4.3.  Price Range 
 Unlike US IPOs, IPOs in most EU countries tend to be priced within the price range 
indicated in the prospectus because of different practices in setting the price range and pricing 
regulations (Jenkinson, Morrison, Wilhelm (2006)). In the US, regulations prohibit companies 
from providing any information to investors before the initial prospectus is filed. In Europe, 
exchange of information begins at an earlier stage than in the US: analysts' reports, for 
example, are made available to investors before the announcement of the intention to float. 
Although there are less regulatory restrictions on firm-investor interaction in the early part of 
the IPO process, the EU rules impose greater constraint on price range. In the case of the UK, 
the offer is withdrawn if the final offer price is outside the initial price range: legal sanctions 
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thus deter underwriters from setting a price outside the range. We look at the differences in 
price range set by the same underwriters that manage IPOs in both the EU and US. Table 3.4 
shows that in the EU the four of eight underwriters tended to widen price range during the 
crisis period, though differences are not significant. In contrast, the same underwriters' price 
ranges shrink after 2007 in the US. The difference is significant, though, for only three 
investment banks. 
 The frequency distribution of price range is provided in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2. To 
enable feasible comparison between the two markets, the price range of all EU offers is 
converted to US dollars. Figure 1.1 demonstrates that in the EU the price range set by the same 
US underwriters does not cluster, and the pre-crisis pattern does not seem to change during the 
crisis period after 2007. For the US markets, clustering at two dollars persists in both sample 
periods, as indicated in Figure 1.2. In summary, Table 3.4, taken in conjunction with Figure 1, 
suggests that, unlike the change in gross spread, underwriters' pricing practice in the pre-crisis 
period and during the crisis is similar in both the US and the EU. 
3.4.4.  Changes in Underwriter Syndicate Structure 
 IPO deals are usually managed by a syndicate of underwriters rather than by a single 
investment bank, and therefore the fee analysis above remains incomplete unless the dynamics 
of underwriter syndicates are incorporated. Corwin and Schultz (2005) state that syndicate 
members may compete against each other to maintain client relations with the issuing firm for 
future equity offerings. 
 We argue that competition among underwriters and demand for underwriter services can 
to some extent explain the drop in gross spread. European equity markets are not as liquid in 
terms of IPO volume as those in the US, where there is a high demand for underwriters. 
Moreover, the syndicate structure of underwriters in the US can restrict entry into the IPO 
market, leading to clustering in fees. Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2010) show that strong 
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networking among VC syndicates also give rise to such barriers to entry. As more players join 
the IPO market or tend to syndicate, then, fees are expected to decline. Our findings as reported 
in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 support this view. 
 Figure 2 demonstrates the change in syndicate structure from 2000 to 2012. The dark-
colored bars represent the sample of the mean number of underwriters within syndicates, where 
minimum proceeds are 5 million Euros. It may be noted that average syndicate size grows 
significantly during the recession period following 2007. Syndicate size in 2009, 2010, 2011 
and 2012 are all greater than mean size values before 2008. The light-colored bars represent the 
sample where the proceeds are greater than 10 million Euros. The figure is similar to the one in 
the dark color, suggesting that underwriters tended to syndicate more in the crisis period. The 
untabulated results show that the differences in mean syndicate size throughout is significant, 
at 1% level. This provides another layer of evidence on why fees in the EU have declined since 
2007.  
3.4.5. Relationship between Underwriter Reputation and Underpricing 
 Empirical findings about the relationship between underwriter reputation and 
underpricing are mixed. On the one hand, small, risky firms can hire reputable underwriters to 
reduce information asymmetry and hence experience less underpricing. In line with this 
argument, earlier studies such as Titman and Trueman (1986), Carter and Manaster (1990) and 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) find a negative relationship between underwriter rank and 
underpricing. On the other hand, reputable underwriters can strategically increase underpricing 
through discretionary allocation of discounted shares to maintain client relations with investors 
for the purpose of future deals. Consistent with this, Loughran and Ritter (2004) find that 
prestigious underwriters are associated with more underpricing. 
 We retest the relationship between underwriter prestige and underpricing in the context of 
the recent financial recession, when top underwriters suffer from reputation spillover, and by 
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doing so we also study changes in the determinants of underpricing. The OLS results are 
shown in Table 5. The first column reports coefficient estimates for the pre-crisis sub-sample. 
Underwriter reputation, proxied by the percentage market share of the underwriter, is positively 
linked to underpricing, with an estimate of 0.917 significant at a level of 1%. As regards the 
crisis sub-sample, the magnitude of the estimate of underwriter share is still positive, but more 
than tripled. IPOs with prestigious underwriters are therefore underpriced more during the 
crisis period than before the crisis. 
 For other determinants of underpricing, we find that the effect of Log Proceeds remains 
almost the same. Coefficient estimates on this variable barely change across the time horizons, 
and the significance level did not change at all. Market return, though, is able to predict 
underpricing for the pre-crisis era only, becoming insignificant during the crisis. Another 
difference is in Internet estimates. Internet stocks experience more underpricing during the 
crisis period, though the effect is not significant before 2008. The coefficient estimate on Main 
Market dummy flips sign in the crisis stage. Sub-sample analysis shows that the explanatory 
power of the models does not differ across the two time horizons, with R-squares dropping by 
1% in the latter sample. 
 In the last column in Table 5, we run a full sample analysis with interaction terms in 
order to test whether differences in estimates are significant. The interaction term between 
crisis and underwriter share is significant at a level of 10%, implying that investment bank 
reputation leads to greater underpricing in the unfavourable market conditions after 2007. This 
finding is consistent with the view that it is likely that increased competition and reduced 
demand for underwriters in the recession boost incentives for more discretionary allocation of 
shares, leading to more underpricing. 
3.4.6. Determinants of IPO Decisions 
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 The prior section shows that IPO costs in terms of fees and first-day initial return 
decreased during the recent recession after 2007. This section examines the varying 
determinants of IPO decisions over time. To be able to study the determinants of decisions to 
go public, we limit our sample to the UK, where there is publicly available data for private 
companies. As Ritter and Welch (2002) argue, when it comes to testing incentives for IPO 
decisions, lack of available data for private companies makes research design difficult. 
 Table 6 presents summary statistics for public and private UK companies during the 
periods 2003-2007 and 2008-2012. In Panel A, it is shown that the mean return on assets 
(ROA) of private companies is greater than that of public firms before 2008. IPO companies 
are likely to hold more cash and to have more capital expenditure than private ones, though 
capital structure does not seem to vary across the two groups. One key difference, however, is 
to be seen in sales growth, with public companies enjoying more growth before the crisis 
period. For IPO firms, the market-to-book ratio of listed companies within the same industry is 
greater than that of private companies. 
 Panel B explores the summary statistics in the recession period. Public UK companies 
have less ROA but more cash and sales growth than private companies do in the crisis period. 
We find that most of the differences in variables between the two samples are qualitatively 
similar to the pre-crisis figures, with the exception of market-to-book ratio. In the recent 
recession period, market-to-book ratio for IPO firms is smaller than the ratio for private 
companies, which potentially implies that companies with high growth opportunities prefer to 
remain private during the credit crunch period. Finally, we note that both types of companies 
increase their cash holdings between the pre-crisis era and the crisis era, and that long-term 
debt also increases for both groups in the latter period. 
 Table 7 shows the results of Probit analysis run on two sub-periods along with the whole 
period. In the first column, it is shown that cash, capital expenditure and sales growth are 
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positively associated with the decision to go public. All of these three variables are significant, 
at a level of 1%. Consistent with Pagano et al. (1998), we find that the likelihood of going 
public increases with log sales, proxy for firm size, and industry market-to-book ratio. In the 
second column, we document the fact that five out of seven significant pre-crisis determinants 
remain qualitatively the same during the crisis period. 
 There are three notable differences between the first and second columns. Firstly, short-
term interest rates become insignificant during the second time period, and secondly and more 
importantly, market-to-book ratio flips sign. More specifically, high market-to-book ratio 
increases the likelihood of IPO before 2008, supporting market timing hypothesis by Barker 
and Wurgler (2002). This finding is qualitatively the same as the empirical evidence provided 
by Pagano et al. (1998). Consistent with these results, a recent study by Gao, Ritter, and Zhu 
(2013) reports that the quarterly number of IPOs increases along with the market-to-book ratio 
of small firms in the previous quarter. During the crisis period, we find that the probability of 
an IPO decreases with an increase in industry specific market-to-book ratio. Lastly, a notable 
difference is about the predictive power of the same model in the two different time regimes. 
The Pseudo R-square decreased from 30% in the pre-crisis period to 5% during the recession 
period. 
 In order to compare coefficient estimates over the two time periods, Probit regressions 
are run for the full sample between 2003 and 2012, with interaction terms. The results are 
shown in the last column. Interaction terms with return on assets and company size remain 
significant in the full sample analysis, and the coefficient estimate on the interaction between 
crisis and market-to-book ratio negative is significant, at a level of 1%.  
 Conclusion   
 This study contributes to IPO literature by investigating the varying determinants and 
costs of IPOs completed in Europe between 2000 and 2012. IPO activity in the EU is examined 
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for two time horizons: the pre-crisis regime (between 2000 and 2007), and the crisis itself 
(from 2008 to 2012). 
 As regards IPO costs, we focus on direct costs, underwriting fees, and the indirect cost of 
going public, underpricing. We find that IPOs completed in Europe during the crisis period after 
2007 enjoy relatively lower underwriting fees and first-day underpricing then those of the pre-
crisis regime. In particular, mean underpricing declines by 13% for book-built EU IPOs during 
the recession period, and the difference for gross spread was 0.67%. 
 We further investigated fee dynamics by looking at the market share of the top ten 
underwriters in both the EU and US. Although prestigious underwriters continue to hold more 
than 50%t of all underwriting business in Europe for both time horizons, there have been new 
entries in the top ten list after 2007, which suggests that reduced fees in the recession period 
were either the result of competition between local and global underwriters or of reduced 
demand for services provided by underwriters. We also find that all top eight investment banks 
which operate in both the EU and the US reduce fees significantly in the EU, while in the US 
fee reduction is not so obvious. 
 Using a pool of public and private UK firms, we investigate whether pre-crisis 
determinants are still valid for explaining IPO decisions after 2007, and find that the typical 
factors proposed by earlier literature have little explanatory power as regards explaining IPO 
activity in the recent recession. We document that industry market-to-book ratio of listed 
companies is negatively associated with IPO decisions during the crisis period. These findings 
extend the results of Pagano et al. (1998), the single empirical about the determinants of IPO 
decisions. 
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Table 3.1. IPO frequency and summary statistics 
Panel A. IPO Distribution by Country and Crisis Period 
 
 Before the Crisis During the Crisis 
 Num. 
IPOs 
Fixed 
Priced 
Main 
Market 
Gross 
Spread 
Underp. VC 
Backed 
Num. 
IPOs 
Fixed 
Priced 
Main 
Market 
Gross 
Spread 
Underp. VC 
Backed 
Belgium 37 0.41 0.70 2.84 0.12 0.08 11 0.64 0.45 2.05 0.03 0.18 
Denmark 24 0.46 1.00 4.16 0.19 0.08 5 0.00 1.00 2.75 0.06 0.20 
France 191 0.06 0.28 3.08 0.11 0.10 91 0.49 0.38 3.29 0.04 0.11 
Germany 264 0.08 0.52 4.14 0.27 0.11 53 0.28 0.00 3.67 0.03 0.02 
Greece 98 0.29 0.95 3.83 0.43 0.00 7 0.86 1.00 3.00 0.24 0.00 
Italy 119 0.02 0.39 3.58 0.09 0.06 26 0.31 0.81 3.83 0.11 0.08 
Norway 71 0.35 0.99 3.81 0.04 0.18 28 0.32 0.93 2.05 -0.01 0.04 
Poland 129 0.08 0.99 3.20 0.22 0.07 401 0.73 0.26 2.06 0.31 0.04 
Romania 6 0.83 0.00 . 0.46 0.00 6 0.67 0.00 . -0.05 0.00 
Spain 6 0.00 1.00 3.14 0.15 0.33 20 0.45 0.20 2.47 0.06 0.00 
Sweden 50 0.36 1.00 3.63 0.07 0.16 17 0.35 0.82 3.50 -0.02 0.18 
Switzerland 36 0.08 0.44 4.47 0.19 0.33 8 0.13 0.63 3.80 0.07 0.25 
UK 976 0.85 0.15 3.85 0.19 0.08 184 0.84 0.12 4.15 0.09 0.02 
This table reports summary statistics of key variables for 2864 European IPOs completed during 2000-2012. We require sample 
countries to have at least five offerings in both time periods. We drop the IPOs that belong to industries: Finance, Insurance, Real 
Estate and Closed End Funds. Fixed Priced is equal to one if the IPO mechanism is based on fixed pricing. Main market takes 
value one if the IPO is listed in the main market of the corresponding country. Gross Spread is the underwriter fee as percentage 
of the proceeds. Underpricing, Underp., is the percentage change from offer price to first day closing price. If the firm has VC 
financing then, VC Backed takes value one, zero otherwise.  
 
Panel B. Differences in Means across the Two Time Periods by Pricing Mechanism  
Fixed-Priced IPOs Open-Priced IPOs 
Variable 
Pre 
Crisis 
During 
Crisis 
Diff. in 
Means 
Pre 
Crisis 
During 
Crisis 
Diff. in 
Means 
Underpricing 0.18 (0.11) 
0.17 
(0.07)   0.01 
0.17 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.01) 0.13*** 
Gross Spread 3.89 (4.00) 
4.35 
(4.75)  -0.46*** 
3.69 
(3.50) 
3.02 
(3.00) 0.67*** 
VC Backed 0.05 (0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00)   0.01* 
0.13 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 0.06*** 
Main Market 0.18 (0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00)   0.09*** 
0.61 
(1.00) 
0.67 
(1.00) -0.06** 
Internet 0.12 (0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00)   0.03 
0.15 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 0.11*** 
Proceeds 24.91 (8.37) 
9.44 
(1.04)  15.47*** 
157.85 
(36.08) 
133.85 
(14.64)  22.00 
Price range 0.10 (0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00)   0.09*** 
3.13 
(1.84) 
2.57 
(1.48) 0.56** 
Numb. of 
IPOs 985 557 
 
1022 300 
 
This panel reports the differences in means across two time periods for two different 
subsamples. Open-priced IPOs are companies that are priced via bookbuilding. Otherwise, 
the sample firm classified as fixed-priced. Underp., is first day underpricing defined as the 
percentage change from offer price to first day closing price. Gross Spread is the 
underwriter fee as percentage of the proceeds. If the sample firm is from Internet industry 
then Internet takes one, zero otherwise.  
  
121 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Table 3.2. Underwriter rankings in Europe 
           Panel A. Rankings by shares (as percentage) over the sample period 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2000 DB GS MS Carne. UBS SEB CS BNP Sant. CG 
2001 CIB MS Intesa ABN GS BAML CG SG BNP UBS 
2002 Citi CIB HSBC Sant. GS DB UBS MS CS SEB 
2003 BAML GS JP UniCr. CGC CS HSBC Intesa ABN UBS 
2004 GS MS Nomura Citi UBS CIB CS BAML Dexia KBC 
2005 CIB BNP BAML CS SG MS ABN Nomura DB JP 
2006 ABN MS JP UBS BAML GS CS CG Citi DB 
2007 DB MS GS Citi JP CS BAML UBS Sant. RC 
2008 Citi JP MIB Caixa MS DB BAML GS BES UBS 
2009 GS MS BAML UniCr. JP ABN BNP CIB Lazard SG 
2010 GS JP MS CS BAML DB Medio BBVA UBS PKO 
2011 CS Citi BAML BNP MS JP Bankia DB Barc. UBS 
2012 JP Citi UBS MS HSBC GS CS BAML BBI DB 
Panel A reports rankings of underwriter for each year from 2000 to 2012. We calculate the underwriter share as the 
percent of proceeds underwritten by each underwriter to the total amount underwritten by all underwriters in a given 
year. The abbreviations are as follows. MS= Morgan Stanley, GS=Goldman Sachs, DB=Deutsche Bank, CS=Credit 
Suisse, Sant.=Santander, CG=Commerzbank Group, CIB= Credit Agricole CIB, SG= SG Corporate & Investment 
Banking, CGC= Canaccord Genuity Corp, RC= Renaissance Capital, MIB= Millennium Investment Banking, BES= 
Banco Espirito Santo, Medio= Mediobanca, PKO= PKO BP, BAML=Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 
JP=JPMorgan, BNP= BNP Paribas, ABN= ABN AMRO Bank, and Barc.=Barclays. 
 
 
    Panel B. Rankings of top ten underwriters' shares (as percentage)  
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
MS 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.07 
GS 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.20 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.21 0.11 0.02 0.07 
BAML 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.21 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.14 0.05 
DB 0.10 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.05 
CS 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.15 0.05 
JP 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.11 
Citi 0.02 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.10 
UBS 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.09 
BNP 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.03 
ABN 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.02 
Total 0.54 0.50 0.46 0.70 0.52 0.53 0.63 0.63 0.53 0.67 0.53 0.74 0.64 
Panel B presents rankings of top underwriters for each year from 2000 to 2012. We calculate the underwriter share as the 
percent of proceeds underwritten by each underwriter to the total amount underwritten by all underwriters in a given year. The 
abbreviations are as follows. MS= Morgan Stanley, GS=Goldman Sachs, BAML=Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 
DB=Deutsche Bank, CS=Credit Suisse, JP=JPMorgan, BNP= BNP Paribas, and ABN= ABN AMRO Bank. 
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Table 3.3. Underwriter rankings across the EU and the US 
Panel A. Top ten underwriters' total amounts across the EU and the US during (2000-2012) 
 
Europe United States 
Rank Name Total Amount 
Und. 
Share(%) 
Gross 
Spread  Name 
Total 
Amount 
Und. 
Share(%) 
Gross 
Spread 
1 MORGAN-STANLEY 126535.5 8.48 3.18 BOA-MERRILL 249256.1 15.58 5.82 
2 GS 112802.1 7.56 2.98 CITI 233613.2 14.61 5.57 
3 BOA-MERRILL 92780.8 6.22 2.65 MORGAN-STANLEY 182710.7 11.42 6.05 
4 DEUTSCHE-BANK 89846.4 6.02 3.27 GS 169937.4 10.62 6.25 
5 CREDIT-SUISSE 89749.2 6.02 3.33 CREDIT-SUISSE 142068.5 8.88 6.36 
6 JPM 84356.5 5.66 2.85 JPM 129437.8 8.09 6.40 
7 CITI 78383.7 5.26 2.94 BARCLAYS-CAP 113220.8 7.08 6.31 
8 UBS-BANK 77616.4 5.20 3.00 UBS-BANK 95137.3 5.95 5.80 
9 BNP Paribas 62363.2 4.18 2.51 DEUTSCHE-BANK 77233.1 4.83 6.35 
10 ABN AMRO Bank 56080.2 3.76 2.95 WF 68733.7 4.30 5.51 
Total 58.36  91.36  
This panel presents top ten underwriters' market share in the US and the EU. Total Amount, in millions € for the EU sample and $ for 
the US sample, is the sum of all proceeds underwritten by a the given underwriter during 2000-2012. Underwriter share, Und. share, 
is the percent of proceeds underwritten by each underwriter to the total amount underwritten by all underwriters. Gross Spread is the 
underwriter fee as percentage of the proceeds. 
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Table 3.3 Continued 
Panel B. Top ten underwriters' total amounts across the EU and US for pre-crisis period during (2000-2007) 
 
Europe United States 
Rank Name Total Amount 
Total 
Amount(%) 
Gross 
Spread  Name 
Total 
Amount 
Total 
Amount(%) 
Gross 
Spread 
1 MORGAN-STANLEY 100386.0 8.80 3.32 BOA-MERRILL 144040.3 17.74 5.87 
2 GS 88390.5 7.74 3.20 CITI 136358.0 16.79 5.52 
3 DEUTSCHE-BANK 73694.1 6.46 3.35 GS 89731.7 11.05 6.31 
4 UBS-BANK 63897.7 5.60 3.13 MORGAN-STANLEY 80560.1 9.92 6.18 
5 BOA-MERRILL 63109.5 5.53 2.78 CREDIT-SUISSE 70201.6 8.64 6.46 
6 CREDIT-SUISSE 59193.7 5.19 3.52 UBS-BANK 61588.4 7.58 5.83 
7 JPM 54179.3 4.75 2.96 JPM 53620.0 6.60 6.52 
8 ABN AMRO Bank 53849.6 4.72 2.96 BARCLAYS-CAP 46595.2 5.74 6.48 
9 Credit Agricole CIB 47994.5 4.21 2.52 WF 36021.1 4.44 5.63 
10 CITI 47982.9 4.20 3.12 DEUTSCHE-BANK 27952.9 3.44 6.50 
Total 57.20  91.94  
This panel presents top ten underwriters' market share and fees in the US and EU for pre-crisis period (2000-2007). Total Amount, in 
millions € for the EU sample and $ for the US sample, is the sum of all proceeds underwritten by a the given underwriter during 2000-
2012. Underwriter share, Und. share, is the percent of proceeds underwritten by each underwriter to the total amount underwritten by 
all underwriters. Gross Spread is the underwriter fee as percentage of the proceeds. 
 
Panel C. Top ten underwriters' total amounts across the EU and US for crisis period during (2008-2012) 
 
Europe  United States 
Rank Name Total Amount 
Total 
Amount(%) 
Gross 
Spread 
 Name Total Amount 
Total 
Amount(%) 
Gross 
Spread 
1 CREDIT-SUISSE 30555.5 8.72 2.38  BOA-MERRILL 105215.8 13.36 5.71 
2 CITI 30400.8 8.68 2.30  MORGAN-STANLEY 102150.6 12.97 5.91 
3 JPM 30177.2 8.61 2.52  CITI 97255.2 12.35 5.65 
4 BOA-MERRILL 29671.3 8.47 2.04  GS 80205.7 10.19 6.16 
5 MORGAN-STANLEY 26149.5 7.46 2.62  JPM 75817.8 9.63 6.23 
6 GS 24411.4 6.97 2.17  CREDIT-SUISSE 71866.9 9.13 6.15 
7 DEUTSCHE-BANK 16152.3 4.61 2.80  BARCLAYS-CAP 66625.6 8.46 6.02 
8 BNP Paribas 14938.1 4.26 2.01  DEUTSCHE-BANK 49280.2 6.26 6.21 
9 UBS-BANK 13718.6 3.92 2.50  UBS-BANK 33548.9 4.26 5.73 
10 BARCLAYS-CAP 8677.4 2.48 2.81  WF 32712.6 4.15 5.40 
Total 64.18   90.76  
This panel presents top ten underwriters' market share and fees in the US and EU for pre-crisis period (2008-2012). Total Amount, in 
millions € for the EU sample and $ for the US sample, is the sum of all proceeds underwritten by a the given underwriter during 2000-
2012. Underwriter share, Und. share, is the percent of proceeds underwritten by each underwriter to the total amount underwritten by 
all underwriters. Gross Spread is the underwriter fee as percentage of the proceeds.            
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Table 3.3 Continued 
Panel D. Differences in fees charged by top eight underwriters that operate both in the EU and US 
 
Europe  United States 
Rank Name Pre- Crisis 
During 
 Crisis Difference 
 Name Pre- Crisis 
During 
 Crisis Difference 
1 MORGAN-STANLEY 3.32 2.62  0.70***  MORGAN-STANLEY 6.18 5.91 0.27** 
2 GS 3.20 2.17  1.03***  GS 6.31 6.16 0.15** 
3 BOA-MERRILL 2.78 2.04 0.74**  BOA-MERRILL 5.87 5.71    0.16 
4 DEUTSCHE-BANK 3.35 2.80    0.55*  DEUTSCHE-BANK 6.50 6.21    0.29* 
5 CREDIT-SUISSE 3.52 2.38    1.14*  CREDIT-SUISSE 6.46 6.15 0.31** 
6 JPM 2.96 2.52 0.44**  JPM 6.52 6.23    0.29 
7 CITI 3.12 2.30   0.82***  CITI 5.52 5.65   -0.13 
8 UBS-BANK 3.13 2.50 0.63**  UBS-BANK 5.83 5.73    0.10 
This panel presents average fees charged by top eight underwriters that operate in both the EU and US for two time horizons: pre-
crisis (2000-2007) and during-crisis (2008-2012). Gross Spread is the underwriter fee as percentage of the proceeds.  
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Table 3.4. Differences in price range set by top eight underwriters that operate both in the EU and US  
 
Europe  United States 
Rank Name 
Pre- 
Crisis 
During 
 Crisis 
Difference 
 
Name 
Pre- 
Crisis 
During 
 Crisis 
Difference 
1 MORGAN-STANLEY 3.76 3.92 -0.16  MORGAN-STANLEY 1.95 1.43  0.52*** 
2 GS 4.14 4.50 -0.36  GS 2.12 1.96  0.16** 
3 BOA-MERRILL 3.65 1.91  1.74  BOA-MERRILL 1.33 1.37 -0.04 
4 DEUTSCHE-BANK 5.23 5.37 -0.14  DEUTSCHE-BANK 1.76 1.57  0.19* 
5 CREDIT-SUISSE 4.81 3.12  1.69  CREDIT-SUISSE 1.99 1.96  0.03 
6 JPM 2.65 3.01 -0.36  JPM 1.87 1.85  0.02 
7 CITI 3.37 3.65 -0.28  CITI 1.09 1.07  0.02 
8 UBS-BANK 3.96 1.93  2.03  UBS-BANK 1.25 1.15  0.10 
This panel presents average price range set by top eight underwriters that operate in both the EU and US for two time horizons: pre-
crisis (2000-2007) and during-crisis (2008-2012). Price range is the dollar difference between high and low values of filed offer price. 
For the EU offers, all issues in different currencies are converted to US Dollars. 
  
Figure 3.1. Frequency distributions of price range set by top eight underwriters that operate both in the 
EU and US  
Figure 3.1.1. Price range in the EU 
 
Figure 3.1.2. Price range in the US 
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Figure 3.2. Underwriter syndicate structure in EU 
 
This figure shows the variation in the average number underwriters in syndicates from 2000 to 2012. The 
dark colors represent the sample where minimum amount of proceeds is 5 million Euros. The light bars are 
for the sample where the proceeds are greater than 10 million Euros.   
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Table 3.5. Underwriter ranking and IPO underpricing 
 
 
Before 
Crisis 
During  
Crisis 
Full 
Sample 
Intercept 0.958*** 
(0.13) 
1.123*** 
(0.28) 
0.970*** 
(0.12) 
Und. Share 0.917** 
(0.41) 
2.957** 
(1.06) 
0.889** 
(0.40) 
Fixed-Priced 0.053* 
(0.03) 
-0.012 
(0.02) 
0.048 
(0.03) 
Log Proceeds -0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.057*** 
(0.02) 
-0.050*** 
(0.01) 
Market Ret. 0.196** 
(0.07) 
0.146 
(0.13) 
0.196** 
(0.07) 
Internet -0.001 
(0.03) 
-0.052** 
(0.02) 
-0.004 
(0.03) 
VC -0.018 
(0.02) 
-0.003 
(0.03) 
-0.012 
(0.02) 
Main Market 0.063*** 
(0.02) 
-0.105*** 
(0.03) 
0.053** 
(0.02) 
UK -0.039 
(0.03) 
-0.093** 
(0.04) 
-0.032 
(0.02) 
Germany -0.039 
(0.02) 
-0.145*** 
(0.04) 
-0.041 
(0.03) 
France -0.039** 
(0.02) 
-0.209** 
(0.08) 
-0.040** 
(0.02) 
Italy 0.958** 
(0.13) 
-0.030 
(0.03) 
-0.045** 
(0.02) 
Crisis 
 
0.153 
(0.31) 
Crisis* Und. Share 
  
1.972* 
(1.01) 
Crisis* Fixed-Priced 
  
-0.063 
(0.04) 
Crisis* Log Proceeds 
  
-0.007 
(0.02) 
Crisis* Market Ret. 
  
-0.042 
(0.13) 
Crisis* Internet 
  
-0.033 
(0.04) 
Crisis* VC 
  
-0.015 
(0.04) 
Crisis* Main Market 
  
-0.152*** 
(0.04) 
Country Interactions 
Industry Dum. YES YES YES 
N.Obs 
R-Sqr 
1247 
0.12 
689 
0.11 
1936 
0.10 
This table reports OLS regressions results for the link between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing 
across two time horizons: pre-crisis (2000-2007) and during-crisis (2008-2012).Dependent variable is 
Underpricing defined as the percentage change from offer price to first day closing price. Underwriter 
share, Und. share, is the percent of proceeds underwritten by each underwriter to the total amount 
underwritten by all underwriters in a given year. Fixed-Priced is equal to one if the IPO mechanism is 
based on fixed pricing. Log Proceeds is the natural logarithm of IPO proceeds. Market Ret. is the mean 30 
day FTSE return before the issue date. If the company is internet stock then Internet takes value one, zero 
otherwise. VC is a dummy variable equal to one if the company is backed by venture capital funding. Main 
market takes value one if the IPO is listed in the main market of the corresponding country.   
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Table 3.6. Summary statistics of public and private UK firms 
Panel B. Before the crisis 
 
IPO Firms Private Firms 
Variable Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max 
ROA 0.05 0.11 -0.35 0.66 0.09 0.08 -0.35 0.66 
CASH 0.17 0.09 0.00 0.68 0.09 0.08 -0.23 0.68 
DEBT 0.18 0.06 0.00 1.11 0.18 0.10 0.00 1.11 
CAPEX 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.21 -0.05 -0.02 -0.73 0.21 
GROWTH 0.53 0.29 -0.58 2.50 0.09 0.05 -0.58 2.50 
LOG SALES 9.70 9.67 5.91 13.49 9.54 9.47 5.91 13.49 
RATE 3.36 3.43 2.33 4.45 3.36 3.43 2.33 4.45 
MTB 1.75 1.85 1.34 1.89 1.51 1.55 0.68 1.89 
This panel presents summary statistics of 1824 private firms and 229 firms that went to public during 2003-
2007. ROA is return on total assets. CASH is net cash holdings from operating activities. DEBT is defined as the 
ratio of long term debt to total assets. CAPEX is capital expenditures scaled by total assets. GROWTH is 
percentage change between sales between two consecutive calendar years. RATE is annual Euro LIBOR interest 
rate provided by European Central Bank. MTB is average market to book value of all public companies in the 
same two-digit industry in a given year.  
 
 
Panel B. During the crisis 
 
IPO Firms Private Firms 
Variable Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max 
ROA 0.03 0.08 -0.35 0.63 0.11 0.08 -0.35 0.66 
CASH 0.18 0.09 0.00 0.68 0.11 0.08 -0.23 0.68 
DEBT 0.24 0.08 0.00 1.11 0.19 0.11 0.00 1.11 
CAPEX 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.21 -0.04 -0.02 -0.73 0.21 
GROWTH 0.57 0.28 -0.58 2.50 0.06 0.03 -0.58 2.50 
LOG SALES 10.07 10.15 5.91 13.49 9.54 9.41 5.91 13.49 
RATE 2.03 1.60 0.45 4.82 2.03 1.60 0.45 4.82 
MTB 0.98 0.95 0.68 1.19 1.11 1.11 0.68 1.69 
This panel presents summary statistics of 3485 private firms and 87 firms that went to public during 2008-2012. 
ROA is return on total assets. CASH is net cash holdings from operating activities. DEBT is defined as the ratio 
of long term debt to total assets. CAPEX is capital expenditures scaled by total assets. GROWTH is percentage 
change between sales between two consecutive calendar years. RATE is annual Euro LIBOR interest rate 
provided by European Central Bank. MTB is average market to book value of all public companies in the same 
two-digit industry in a given year.  
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Table 3.7. Determinants of IPO decision for pre-crisis and during crisis periods. 
Before Crisis During Crisis Difference 
Intercept -6.567*** 
(1.37) 
-6.591*** 
(1.52) 
-6.441*** 
(0.74) 
ROA -2.182*** 
(0.61) 
-5.208*** 
(1.02) 
-2.287*** 
(0.54) 
CASH 7.223*** 
(0.62) 
7.332*** 
(0.87) 
6.917*** 
(0.57) 
DEBT -0.306 
(0.38) 
0.259 
(0.47) 
-0.068 
(0.33) 
CAPEX 19.127*** 
(1.11) 
23.222*** 
(1.67) 
20.21*** 
(1.06) 
GROWTH 1.970*** 
(0.17) 
1.588*** 
(0.18) 
1.869*** 
(0.16) 
LOG SALES 0.367*** 
(0.06) 
0.517*** 
(0.09) 
0.356*** 
(0.05) 
RATE -0.573** 
(0.26) 
0.084 
(0.62) 
-0.806*** 
(0.10) 
MTB  0.657** 
(0.30) 
-4.605*** 
(0.83) 
1.231*** 
(0.23) 
Crisis 
 
0.170 
(1.40) 
Crisis*ROA -3.557*** 
(1.14) 
Crisis*CASH 0.576 
(1.03) 
Crisis*DEBT 0.268 
(0.57) 
Crisis*CAPEX 2.628 
(1.95) 
Crisis*GROWTH -0.329 
(0.24) 
Crisis*LOG SALES 0.193* 
(0.10) 
Crisis*RATE 0.517*** 
(0.15) 
Crisis*MTB -5.156*** 
(0.79) 
YEAR YES YES YES 
N. Obs 4123 8774 12897 
Psedeo R-sqr 0.30 0.05 0.15 
This panel presents Probit results for the decision to go public for both public and private UK firms during 
2003-2012. The dependent variable is equal to one if the sample firm floats in a given year, zero otherwise. ROA 
is return on total assets. CASH is net cash holdings from operating activities. DEBT is defined as the ratio of 
long term debt to total assets. CAPEX is capital expenditures scaled by total assets. GROWTH is percentage 
change between sales between two consecutive calendar years. RATE is the annual Euro LIBOR interest rate 
provided by European Central Bank. MTB is average market to book value of all public companies in the same 
two-digit industry in a given year.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 This dissertation consists of three essays on initial public offering (IPO), with a focus 
on the costs of IPOs in terms of gross spread and underpricing.  
 In the first chapter, we investigate the impact of internal agency conflicts within 
venture capital syndicates on the IPO performance of portfolio companies. Our conjecture is 
that large and heterogeneous VC syndicates do tend to suffer from conflict of interests and 
coordination problems which undermine their ability to monitor effectively their investee 
companies and are, thus, likely to jeopardize their ability to create value. As a consequence, 
this might lead to poorer IPO performances.  
 We explore the effect of size and diversity of VC syndicates on short and long run IPO 
performances and examine whether the existence of alternative governance mechanisms such 
as bank loans might attenuate the impact of agency conflicts on the performances of the 
investee companies around the IPO date. 
 Our findings provide convincing evidence that VC syndicate size has a very strong 
negative effect on IPO underpricing and long term operating performances. This result is 
robust to many different specifications of our model and to controlling for the endogeneity of 
our variable of interest. Results appear to be stronger for our two VC diversity proxies which 
support our interpretation of the results centered on the conflict of interest and coordination 
problems within large and heterogeneous VC syndicates. This is further confirmed by the fact 
that, given the size of the VC syndicate, a greater concentration of the funding in the hands of 
few VCs does benefit IPO performances, because it implies fewer controlling VCs who have 
stronger incentives to monitor the venture.  
We do also provide some evidence that, by representing an alternative monitoring 
mechanism, the existence of bank lending is able to moderate the distortions created by large 
VC syndicate and therefore reduce their negative impact on IPO underpricing.  
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In the second chapter, we perform textual analysis on the admission documents of UK 
IPOs and examine the pricing effects of tone, length and information content of prospectuses. 
Unlike recent findings for book-built US IPOs, we find that high level of uncertain tone and 
less distinctive content decrease underpricing for fixed-priced UK IPOs. More importantly, 
document length explains a significant fraction of variation in first day underpricing, 
suggesting that length variable can be used as another information uncertainty proxy along 
with firm age and firm size.  
 We further show offer price is positively associated with uncertain tone implied by 
more negative, weak and uncertain words. However, post-IPO return volatility cannot be 
explained by uncertain language of admission documents. Thus, our results based on 
document tone are hard to be explained by information uncertainty arguments. On the other 
hand, document length is negatively correlated with underpricing but positively correlated 
with offer price for a sample of fixed-priced UK IPOs. This indicate length of document seem 
to matter more than document tone or content of document. 
 Admission documents have more negative and uncertain tone during the crisis period 
than they do in pre-crisis period. In addition, we show that prospectuses use less strong 
language in the recent crisis. Our results stand still for the period before the recent crisis but 
not during the recent financial recession triggered in late 2007.  
 We report that length of whole admission document or risk factors, log of total words 
in the related section, is a powerful factor in explaining underpricing, offer price and post-
IPO return volatility for fixed-priced UK IPOs. Thus, we suggest that future empirical 
research on IPOs can incorporate this variable into research design.  
 My last essay contributes to the IPO literature by investigating the time varying 
determinants and costs of IPO completed in Europe during 2000-2012. We examine the EU 
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IPO activity for two time horizons: pre crisis regime, between 2000 and 2007, and during 
recession regime, from 2008 to 2012.  
 For the costs of IPOs, we focus on the direct cost, underwriting fee, and the indirect 
cost of going public, underpricing. We find that IPOs completed during the crisis period after 
2007 in Europe enjoy relatively less underwriting fees and first day underpricing then those 
do in pre-crisis regime. In particular, we document mean underpricing declines by 13 per cent 
for book-built EU IPOs in the recession period. For the gross spread, the difference is 0.67 
per cent.  
 We further investigate the fee dynamics by looking at top ten underwriters' market 
share in both the EU and US. Although prestigious underwriters continue to hold more than 
50 per cent of all underwriting business in Europe for both time horizons, there are new 
entries to the top ten list after 2007. This suggests that reduced fees in the recession period is 
either a result of competition among local and global underwriters or less demand for service 
provided by underwriters. We further find that all top eight investment banks that operate 
both in the EU and US reduces fees in the EU significantly. For the US, however, the fee 
reduction is not that obvious.  
 Using a pool of public and private UK firms, we investigate whether pre-crisis 
determinants are still able to explain IPO decision after 2007. We find that typical factors 
proposed by existing literature have poor explanatory power to explain IPO activity in the 
recent recession triggered by 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, we document industry market-
to-book ratio of listed companies is negatively associated with IPO decision in crisis period. 
These findings extend the results by Pagano et al. (1998), one of the rare studies about the 
determinants of IPO decision. 
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